The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, or IMEC corridor as it has become known in shipping circles, represents one of those rare moments when grand geopolitical strategy collides with the mundane realities of container throughput and berth allocation. What emerged from the G20 summit in New Delhi as an ambitious infrastructure project has since evolved into something rather more interesting: a test case for whether economic pragmatism can survive the increasingly fractious relationship between Washington and Beijing.
Greece finds itself at the centre of this experiment, not entirely by choice. The country’s ports, particularly Piraeus, have become unwitting symbols of a broader struggle between competing visions of global trade architecture. The irony is palpable—a nation that gave the world democracy now hosts a quiet battle between authoritarian capitalism and its democratic variant, with both sides claiming to offer the better deal.
The Chinese fait accompli
COSCO’s acquisition of a controlling stake in Piraeus port in 2016 was, at the time, viewed through the relatively benign lens of privatisation and efficiency gains. The Chinese state-owned enterprise promised investment, modernisation, and increased throughput. It delivered on all three counts, transforming what had been a somewhat sleepy Mediterranean port into one of the fastest-growing container hubs in Europe.
The numbers tell their own story. Container throughput at Piraeus has more than doubled since COSCO took control, reaching 5.4 million TEU in 2023. The port now ranks among the top ten in Europe, a remarkable achievement for a facility that was struggling to maintain relevance just a decade ago. COSCO invested over €600 million in infrastructure upgrades, creating thousands of jobs and generating substantial revenue for the Greek state.
Yet this success story has acquired an uncomfortable political dimension. What Beijing initially presented as a straightforward commercial venture has since been reframed by critics as a strategic foothold in Europe’s southern flank. The IMEC corridor has only intensified these concerns, with American officials increasingly vocal about the risks of Chinese control over critical European infrastructure.
The Atlantic Council’s recent analysis captures this tension perfectly: “The final decision will depend on issues of strategic alignment, investment commitments, and geopolitical concerns, including China’s role in the Port of Piraeus.” This diplomatic language masks a rather more blunt reality—Washington wants Beijing out of Piraeus, and the IMEC corridor provides a convenient justification for that preference.
You don’t counter COSCO with press releases
India’s approach to the Greek port question, particularly in the context of the IMEC corridor, certainly reflects a level of strategic finesse. Rather than confronting China’s dominance in Piraeus head-on—where COSCO holds a commanding presence—New Delhi seems to prefer the route of circumvention, expressing interest in smaller Greek ports that could serve as alternative gateways into Europe.
The most headline-grabbing (and arguably misleading) claim on this front comes from Bharat Karnad, a prominent Indian strategic analyst. In a blog post—curiously focused on Indo-Pakistani relations—Karnad claims that “Adani has equity in three Greek ports: Kavala, Volos, and Alexandroupoli, as the trade gateway to Europe.” It’s a bold statement. It’s also, quite plainly, false.
Yes, the Adani Group has expressed interest in two Greek ports: Kavala and Volos. But as of today, that interest remains just that—interest. No acquisitions, no agreements, no stakes. And certainly no third port. Alexandroupoli doesn’t even feature in any confirmed plan involving Adani.
Which begs the obvious question: How exactly do you plan to counter China’s firm grip on Piraeus? With wishful thinking? With strategic blog posts? Let’s be clear: you don’t challenge Chinese dominance with half-baked intentions or inflated claims. You do it with bold investments, concrete partnerships, and a long-term development vision.
Until then, the scoreboard remains firmly tilted toward Beijing.
The French complication
France’s role in this emerging dynamic adds another layer of complexity to an already intricate situation. The French Terminal Link, a subsidiary of CMA CGM, has been expressing interest in expanding its presence in Thessaloniki port, though no concrete developments have materialised yet. This potential interest is particularly significant given France’s strong support for the IMEC corridor within European Union circles.
Thessaloniki’s strategic value lies not merely in its capacity but in its geographical position. The port offers direct access to the Balkans and Central Europe, potentially serving as a more politically palatable alternative to Piraeus for IMEC corridor traffic. Any future French involvement in Thessaloniki would align with broader European Union preferences for reducing dependence on Chinese-controlled infrastructure.
However, France’s ambitions extend beyond Greece. Marseille is actively positioning itself as India’s primary gateway to Europe, creating an intra-European competition that complicates the IMEC corridor’s implementation. This rivalry demonstrates that the corridor is not simply about connecting India to Europe but about redistributing economic and political influence within Europe itself.
Europe’s strategic awakening
Amid this shifting maritime map, the European Union is beginning to reevaluate its own exposure. What was once viewed as benign foreign investment is now coming under scrutiny as a potential vulnerability—particularly when it comes to Chinese involvement in critical port infrastructure. Chinese firms currently hold stakes in more than 30 terminals across the EU, including some of the bloc’s largest and most strategically located ports.
This growing unease was underscored recently by EU Transport Commissioner Apostolos Tzitzikostas, who called on European ports to “reconsider security” and examine foreign presence more carefully. Though China was not named explicitly, the subtext was clear. A draft position from the European Parliament’s Socialists and Democrats group has called for tightening the EU’s foreign investment screening regulation—again, without naming Beijing, but with eyes clearly turned toward it.
As Portuguese MEP Ana Miguel Pedro put it, “COSCO is not behaving like a typical market actor—it’s a strategic instrument of the Chinese Communist Party.” Her warning reflects a broader shift in Brussels, where policymakers now view port ownership not merely as an economic issue, but as a matter of collective European security. The case of Poland’s Gdynia terminal, partially owned by Hong Kong-based Hutchison and located next to a naval base and elite special forces facilities, has brought the risks into sharper focus. “In today’s world,” Pedro warned, “we cannot afford strategic blindness while others act with full visibility and intent.”
The economics of strategic competition
The financial dimensions of this competition reveal the true stakes involved. The IMEC corridor promises to reduce shipping time from Mumbai to Piraeus by three to six days while cutting logistics costs by 30% and transit time by 40% compared to the Suez route. These are not marginal improvements—they represent potentially transformative changes to trade patterns between Asia and Europe.
Yet these benefits come with significant caveats. The corridor’s dependence on Middle Eastern stability represents its greatest vulnerability. As Dammu Ravi, Secretary of Economic Relations at India’s Ministry of External Affairs, acknowledged, “the Middle East crisis could pose an obstacle to the IMEC corridor.” The route passes through Israel and Jordan, two countries at the centre of regional tensions that show little sign of abating.
Moreover, the technical challenges of implementing the IMEC corridor are often understated. Vice Admiral Anil Chawla notes that “the efficiency gains from IMEC are not immediately apparent,” as time savings could be offset by customs procedures and regulatory processes at transit points. The corridor requires seamless coordination between multiple countries with different regulatory frameworks and political priorities.
Greece’s delicate balance
Greece finds itself in an enviable yet precarious position. The country benefits from both Chinese investment in Piraeus and growing Indian interest in alternative ports. The challenge lies in maintaining this balance without alienating either side or appearing to favour one over the other.
The Greek government’s approach has been characteristically pragmatic. The creation of the India–Greece–Cyprus Business and Investment Council, with Eurobank playing a central role, demonstrates Athens’ commitment to developing economic ties with India. The bank will open a representative office in Mumbai and has already signed agreements to use India’s UPI payment system.
Simultaneously, Greece has been careful not to antagonise China. As The Diplomat observes, “Greece is becoming more cautious towards China amid mounting pressure from the U.S., mainly regarding the Port of Piraeus, and is limiting itself to diplomatic niceties with Beijing.” This careful balancing act reflects the reality that Greece cannot afford to lose either Chinese investment or American goodwill.
The broader maritime context
The competition over Greek ports occurs within a broader transformation of global shipping patterns. The Red Sea disruptions, sanctions on Russian energy exports, and changing trade relationships between major economies have created new opportunities and challenges for Mediterranean ports.
The IMEC corridor represents an attempt to create more resilient supply chains that are less dependent on traditional chokepoints like the Suez Canal. However, the corridor’s success depends on political stability in regions that have historically been anything but stable. The recent escalation of tensions in the Middle East has already raised questions about the corridor’s viability.
Furthermore, the corridor faces competition not only from existing routes but from other emerging alternatives. China’s Belt and Road Initiative continues to develop alternative pathways through Central Asia and Russia, while the European Union pursues its own connectivity projects with Africa and Asia.
The technology factor
One aspect of the IMEC corridor that receives insufficient attention is its potential to serve as a testing ground for new shipping technologies and logistics systems. The corridor’s emphasis on multimodal transport—combining sea, rail, and road connections—requires sophisticated coordination systems that could influence global shipping practices.
India’s digital infrastructure capabilities, particularly in payment systems and logistics tracking, could provide significant advantages in implementing the corridor. The integration of Indian digital platforms with European systems through the IMEC corridor could create new standards for international trade facilitation.
However, this technological dimension also raises questions about data sovereignty and cybersecurity. The corridor’s reliance on digital systems creates potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hostile actors. The recent focus on supply chain security in both the United States and European Union suggests that these concerns will only intensify.
Regional reactions
The IMEC corridor has generated mixed reactions from regional powers not directly involved in its implementation. Türkiye, in particular, views the corridor with suspicion, seeing it as an attempt to bypass Turkish territory and reduce Ankara’s strategic importance as a bridge between Europe and Asia.
Egypt’s response has been more nuanced. While the corridor could potentially reduce traffic through the Suez Canal, Egyptian officials recognise that it also creates opportunities for increased trade with India and the Gulf states. The key question is whether Egypt can position itself as a complementary rather than competing route.
Russia’s reaction to the IMEC corridor reflects broader tensions with the West. Moscow views the corridor as part of a broader American strategy to contain Chinese and Russian influence in global trade networks. This perception has led to increased Russian cooperation with China on alternative connectivity projects.
The investment reality
Despite the geopolitical rhetoric surrounding the IMEC corridor, the project’s success will ultimately depend on private sector investment and commercial viability. The corridor requires substantial infrastructure investments across multiple countries, and these investments must generate adequate returns to attract private capital.
The early signs are mixed. While Indian companies like Adani are in discussions for strategic investments in Greek ports, the scale of investment required for the full corridor implementation remains daunting. The project needs not only port infrastructure but also rail connections, customs facilities, and digital systems across multiple countries.
Moreover, the corridor faces the challenge of competing with established routes that benefit from economies of scale and existing infrastructure. The Suez Canal, despite its vulnerabilities, remains the most efficient route for most Asia-Europe trade. The IMEC corridor must offer compelling advantages to justify the additional complexity and cost.
The story of the IMEC corridor and Greek ports illustrates the complex interplay between economics and geopolitics in contemporary international relations. What began as a straightforward infrastructure project has evolved into a test of whether economic cooperation can survive political competition between major powers.
Greece’s experience suggests that smaller countries can benefit from great power competition if they maintain strategic flexibility and avoid exclusive alignments. However, this approach requires considerable diplomatic skill and a clear understanding of each party’s core interests and red lines.
The ultimate success of the IMEC corridor will depend not on grand geopolitical strategies but on mundane factors like customs procedures, rail schedules, and container handling efficiency. In the end, ships follow profits, not political preferences. The corridor’s fate will be determined in boardrooms and shipping offices, not in foreign ministries and think tanks.