China doesn’t need troops to dominate—its influence is already in place. This striking warning from Vasilis Petropoulos captures the core insights of the new report China in the Security Conundrum of Europe’s Southeastern Periphery, co‑authored with Plamen Tonchev. Published by the Institute of International Economic Relations (IIER/IDOS), the study exposes how Beijing is quietly transforming the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean into a strategic chessboard, leveraging infrastructure, technology, and political influence to advance its reach without firing a single shot.
GeoTrends spoke with Petropoulos, Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and Associate Research Fellow at IIER, to explore what this means for Greece, NATO, and the EU—and why today’s subtle Chinese maneuvers could decisively reshape the balance of power on Europe’s southeastern flank tomorrow.
– In your report, you argue that China is shifting from a purely economic presence to a more hybrid role in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. What is the limit of this penetration? Do you believe that China is working toward establishing a permanent military presence on European soil?
China is indeed transitioning from a purely economic presence in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean to a more “hybrid” model, tapping into its tech exports and its political instruments of influence. It seeks to consolidate its strategic presence through investments in infrastructure, ports, and energy, as well as through cultural and diplomatic engagement, and by developing bilateral military ties such as joint exercises, high-level meetings, and naval visits.
However, China does not appear to be working toward a permanent military presence on European soil—something that would, in any case, be unrealistic given the inevitable backlash such a strategic move would trigger in the U.S. camp. Despite their economic dependencies on China, no Balkan country is willing to host a permanent Chinese military presence that would bring it into direct confrontation with the West, which remains the primary guarantor of security in the region.
Moreover, Beijing’s careful foreign policy, based on the principle of “peaceful rise,” would not allow such a risky move that could engender a major crisis, forcing Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean countries to choose between China and the West. Such a dilemma would not benefit China, as it is hard to imagine any European country turning its back on the U.S. and, secondarily, the EU, at least in the near future, and it would contradict China’s long-standing narrative of not forcing partners to take sides. This narrative, after all, is used to undermine the more assertive foreign policy pursued by the U.S. in Southeast Asia.
A more realistic scenario for Beijing would be a presence without a permanent military base—that is, a scaling-up of occasional missions, joint exercises, or participation in UN peacekeeping operations.
– How do you assess the risks posed by Chinese investments in critical infrastructure to the security of NATO and EU member states? Are there differing views among European countries?
Chinese investments in critical infrastructure—such as ports, energy networks, telecommunications, and logistics—pose multidimensional risks to the security of NATO and EU member states. Beyond economic dependency, they create possibilities for political pressure and strategic vulnerability, especially when investments involve sectors that can affect defense readiness or the flow of trade and data.
The participation of Chinese companies in 5G networks and telecommunications or surveillance systems in countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, as well as Huawei’s involvement in upgrading the internal telecommunications systems of the port of Piraeus in Greece, raises concerns about potential data leakage or exploitation. There is also the risk that Chinese investments could be used as leverage for political influence.
However, the perception of these risks is not uniform across Europe. Northern and Western European countries view such investments with increasing concern and support stricter EU investment-screening mechanisms. Eastern and Southern countries, especially those in dire need of financing, tend to be more positive, regarding China as an alternative source of capital. Meanwhile, countries such as Hungary, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are politically more aligned with Beijing.
Overall, the risk posed by Chinese investments is not merely technical or economic but strategic: it concerns the control of critical infrastructure, the leakage of data, and the undermining of European cohesion. Addressing it requires a common European policy, stronger investment screening, and transparency in dealing with Beijing in order to safeguard Europe’s strategic autonomy and security.
– How can the EU reconcile its strategic autonomy objectives with its close coordination with NATO and the U.S. regarding China?
There is indeed a prima facie contradiction between the EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and its close dependence on NATO and the U.S. On the one hand, the EU aspires to act as an autonomous geopolitical actor capable of charting its own course with respect to Beijing, balancing competition, cooperation, and systemic rivalry. On the other hand, the United States pushes for a tougher stance toward China, viewing it primarily as a strategic competitor and a threat to Western security.
In this context, Washington encourages the EU to adopt a more active role in the Indo-Pacific, supporting U.S. efforts to contain China’s power in the region, particularly regarding Taiwan’s security.
Nevertheless, the EU can balance these two poles by pursuing:
a) Strategic resilience—investing in its own infrastructure, technologies, and supply chains to reduce dependence on both China and the U.S.;
b) A common EU strategy toward China—to avoid fragmented national approaches that undermine European cohesion;
c) Sectoral diversification—maintaining close military cooperation with NATO and the U.S. while pursuing a more independent economic and technological policy toward China.
Overall, the EU should aim for a complementary, not dependent, relationship with NATO—remaining within the Western security framework while retaining its capacity for independent judgment and action toward China, which represents both a challenge (economic dependence, unfair trade practices, support for Russian aggression) and a potential source of investment opportunities.
– COSCO controls much of the port of Piraeus, which effectively serves as a key Belt and Road hub in Europe. Do you believe Piraeus has become a strategic lever of pressure for Beijing toward Brussels? Is Piraeus ultimately Europe’s weak spot vis-à-vis China?
Through Piraeus, Beijing has secured a stable access point to the heart of the European market, connected directly by rail to the Balkans and Central Europe. Thus, Piraeus functions both as an entry port for goods and as a symbol of Europe’s dependence on Chinese supply chains.
Beyond its economic dimension, Piraeus has also gained political weight. For Beijing, it serves as a tool of soft pressure toward Brussels—a demonstration that China holds a “stake” within the European ecosystem. This investment provides Beijing with a lever of influence, as it creates economic interdependencies that make it difficult for the EU to fully align with U.S. calls for decoupling from China.
It is no coincidence that, in key EU votes and deliberations, certain Southern and Eastern European countries, including Greece, have at times adopted more moderate positions toward Beijing precisely because of these economic ties.
In practice, therefore, Piraeus functions as a strategic lever of pressure—not through military power but through economic influence and the political cost of disengagement. China does not need to actively use the port for this purpose. The mere existence of the investment grants it a passive form of influence within Europe’s decision-making architecture.
From the European standpoint, Piraeus can indeed be seen as an Achilles’ heel, as it exposes the lack of a unified European strategy toward Chinese investments. While the port has undoubtedly contributed to Greece’s economic growth and its transformation into a logistics hub, it has simultaneously ceded strategic control to a non-European actor. This means that, in times of geopolitical tension or crisis, the EU does not have full operational or political sovereignty over one of its most important entry gates.
– Based on your analysis, does the EU have a coherent strategy to limit Chinese influence in its periphery, or does Brussels still operate in a fragmented, ad hoc manner?
So far, the EU lacks a coherent and unified strategy to curb Chinese influence in Europe’s periphery. Its actions remain largely fragmented and spasmodic. Although steps have been taken toward a more cohesive approach—such as the adoption of the term “systemic rival” (2019), the EU’s investment-screening mechanism, and the Global Gateway initiative as a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—the political priorities of member states regarding China still differ significantly.
This divergence prevents the establishment of consistent frameworks and coordinated behavior at the European level. Differing commercial interests and varying levels of economic vulnerability vis-à-vis China have led to a fragmented stance.
The vote of October 4, 2024, concerning the imposition of tariffs of up to 45% on Chinese electric vehicles exported to the EU, is a telling example of this plurality of positions when it comes to Beijing. Countries such as Italy and France led the push for the measure, while others—notably Germany, whose economy is more tightly linked to China—favored a more moderate stance, either due to incentives offered by Beijing (e.g., loans, trade privileges) or out of fear of retaliation against their companies operating in China or against their exports.
Overall, the EU currently stands between intention and implementation. It recognizes the need to limit Chinese presence, but it lacks the unified political will and operational coherence that would turn this intent into an effective long-term strategy.
– How does the United States view China’s presence in Greece? Is Washington encouraging Athens to place limits on COSCO’s activities or to reassess its relationship with the Chinese conglomerate?
The United States views China’s presence in Greece—and especially COSCO’s control of the port of Piraeus—with growing caution, considering it part of China’s broader strategy to penetrate Europe’s periphery. From Washington’s perspective, Piraeus is not merely a commercial port but a node of geo-economic and geostrategic importance, given its proximity to key sea lanes and NATO bases in the Eastern Mediterranean. The U.S. believes that the Chinese presence there poses potential security risks due to the strategic nature of the investment.
Moreover, COSCO is a state-controlled entity which, in Washington’s view, could, under certain conditions, serve Beijing’s broader political and strategic goals. Although there is no indication of militarization at Piraeus, the U.S. fears that Chinese influence could be used as a tool of political leverage or intelligence-gathering during a crisis.
Since 2019, the U.S. has quietly intensified its pressure on Athens, urging closer scrutiny of Chinese investments—not only in Piraeus but also in sectors such as energy and telecommunications. These pressures are not necessarily expressed publicly but rather through diplomatic channels and defense dialogues, in which the U.S. emphasizes the need for “resilience” against state-backed investors associated with rival regimes.
At the same time, Washington is working to strengthen its own footprint in Greece through defense cooperation (Souda, Alexandroupolis, Larissa) and by promoting alternative economic partnerships to reduce China’s relative weight.
For its part, Greece is trying to maintain a delicate balance. It understands the importance of Chinese investments for its national economy (especially in the shipping and port sectors) but also knows that its strategic security relies on the U.S. and NATO. Thus, Athens adopts what could be called a policy of silent adjustment: it does not openly challenge the COSCO deal but has, in recent years, slowed its further expansion and become more cautious toward new Chinese proposals.
Overall, the U.S. views Piraeus as a symbol of Chinese influence on NATO’s southern flank and seeks to prevent it from becoming a springboard for Beijing’s economic or political leverage in the region. The pressures on Athens are real but discreet, aiming at a gradual realignment of Greece within the framework of Western strategic cohesion rather than an abrupt break with China.
“The strategic challenge for Athens is to remain a reliable Western partner without becoming trapped along emerging fault lines between East and West”
– How do you assess the emphatic statements made by the U.S. Ambassador to Athens, Kimberly Guilfoyle, regarding COSCO—specifically her remark that it is possible to “bypass” the fact that the Chinese company controls Greece’s largest port? What do you believe the Ambassador means by the term “bypass”?
Washington still deplores the acquisition of the majority stake of the Piraeus port by COSCO, as it considers this move to be at variance with vital American interests in the region. Despite the lingering discomfort this deal has brought to the U.S. foreign-policy establishment, the Americans have started to think of it as a fait accompli, at least under the current circumstances.
Not having the means—or even the political bandwidth—to reverse the deal and sideline COSCO in Piraeus, the U.S. has to stomach the Chinese presence in the Mediterranean. However, instead of castigating Greece for ceding this strategic asset to a rival, Washington seems ready to find ways to work around this inconvenience.
In her remarks, Ambassador Guilfoyle echoed this sentiment. While admitting that COSCO’s presence is “unfortunate,” she attributed the Greek government’s decision to sell Piraeus to China to Greece’s pressing financial needs amid the severe recession the country was experiencing in the mid-2010s, essentially justifying Greece’s choice. Going a step further, the Ambassador expressed the U.S.’s willingness to “circumvent” the Chinese control of Piraeus, reaffirming Washington’s commitment to the country’s strategic infrastructure.
“Circumventing” does not necessarily mean ignoring COSCO’s rights or attempting to place the port for sale anew, as this would be extremely challenging for Greece—both legally and financially—since the first step would be a complete national takeover or re-nationalization of Piraeus. Greece could try divesting or restructuring Piraeus, exercising pressure through diplomatic channels and economic levers, buying back shares, or renegotiating the concession agreement—all of which would carry financial and reputational risks, sending a problematic message to other foreign investors wishing to do business in Greece.
A more realistic pathway—one that Ambassador Guilfoyle likely hinted at when using the term “circumvent”—is the diversification of Greece’s national infrastructure. By encouraging American private companies to invest in other Greek ports with strategic potential, e.g., Elefsina, Washington can help Greece reduce its dependency on the Chinese-controlled Piraeus port. This scheme reflects a long-term strategy with the U.S. marshalling its resources to counter Beijing’s influence in Greece through a realistic and smart policy centered on infrastructure diversification rather than a headstrong and uncertain policy of squabbling over Piraeus.
– Your report mentions that Chinese companies are expanding into energy, telecommunications, and smart-city projects. How deep has this penetration gone in Greece? Is there real oversight over the data and networks involving Chinese technology?
China’s penetration of Greece in the fields of energy, telecommunications, and “smart cities” is indeed advancing cautiously but steadily—and often under the radar.
In the energy sector, Chinese companies such as State Grid have acquired strategic stakes (notably 24% of Independent Power Transmission Operator [ADMIE/IPTO], the Greek electricity transmission operator), granting them access to key infrastructure for electricity transmission. At the same time, through partnerships in renewable energy and photovoltaics, China has strengthened its presence in a sector directly linked to Greece’s energy security and green transition—both top strategic priorities for the current government.
In telecommunications, companies such as Huawei play a central role in supplying 4G and 5G network equipment. Although Greece, following EU recommendations, has imposed restrictions on Chinese suppliers’ participation in the core of its networks, Chinese technology remains widely used in peripheral systems and infrastructure. Similarly, in smart-city projects (such as pilot programs for smart lighting, traffic management, and security), Chinese firms have collaborated with Greek municipalities and institutions, providing sensor, camera, and data-analytics technologies.
The crucial question is whether genuine oversight can exist over data and networks involving Chinese technology. In practice, oversight is partial. Greece applies EU cybersecurity frameworks and is subject to European supervisory mechanisms, yet its technological dependence on Chinese equipment limits transparency and full access to source code and operating protocols. This means that, although the infrastructure is formally under Greek control, technical “windows” and vulnerabilities may remain.
In summary, China’s presence in Greece is not dominant but qualitatively significant, having penetrated critical nodes of the country’s digital and energy infrastructure, creating dependencies that are difficult to reverse. Effectively managing this reality requires constant EU oversight, technological diversification, and investment in domestic and European solutions so that data security does not depend on third-party providers—particularly those controlled by a state with strategic ambitions at odds with the West.
– If China were politically or economically compelled to reduce its presence in Piraeus, who do you think would claim succession? Would you expect a European or an American consortium to take control of the largest port in the Eastern Mediterranean?
If China were forced to scale down its presence in Piraeus, the port would become the subject of intense geo-economic competition, as it combines commercial, energy, and strategic importance for the entire Eastern Mediterranean. In that case, it is highly likely that joint European and American initiatives would emerge to prevent another non-Western actor from stepping in and to ensure that the port’s control passes to a consortium aligned with NATO and the EU.
The United States would be immediately interested—not so much for commercial profit as for strategic security reasons. Washington views Piraeus as a vital link in NATO’s southeastern flank and would seek the involvement of American logistics, shipping, or port-management companies, probably in partnership with European partners. It would not be surprising if companies with U.S. expertise and Western financing assumed a role, possibly within a joint venture ensuring the port’s compatibility with NATO security standards.
On the European side, port operators such as DP World (through its European subsidiaries) or the Dutch APM Terminals (a Maersk subsidiary) would be natural contenders, given their experience and political sympathies in Brussels. Especially Maersk—or firms with French participation such as CMA CGM—could appear as a “European solution” capable of maintaining the port’s commercial vitality without provoking political friction.
However, any change to Piraeus’s ownership structure would be politically and legally complex, requiring renegotiation of international contracts and compensation to COSCO. Therefore, a more realistic scenario would be a gradual transfer of control through mixed-ownership schemes—with COSCO retaining a minority share while the majority stake passes to a European or American consortium, possibly with some Greek-state participation for political balance.
In short, if China were to withdraw, it is almost certain that efforts would be made to “re-Westernize” Piraeus, placing it under a Euro-Atlantic operator to ensure that the most important maritime hub of the Eastern Mediterranean remains firmly within the Western security framework and influence.
– China uses countries such as Serbia as testing grounds for new technologies, security systems, and infrastructure projects. Could this dynamic have indirect implications for stability in Greece or in Southeastern Europe more broadly?
Through major investments in infrastructure, telecommunications, and energy projects—as well as cooperation in policing, surveillance systems, and military equipment—China is using Serbia as a testing ground for how it can establish political and technological influence within the European continent without directly confronting the EU or NATO. This strategy has indirect consequences for the stability of Southeastern Europe, and therefore for Greece as well.
First, deep Sino-Serbian cooperation creates a parallel axis of influence operating outside the European framework of rules and oversight. Serbia, with its strong ties to Russia and openness toward China, could evolve into a geopolitical conduit through which Chinese technology, capital, or political influence enters the region, indirectly affecting neighboring states.
Second, China is testing in Serbia “smart surveillance” and digital-policing technologies, such as Huawei’s Safe City system, which integrates cameras, facial recognition, and data analytics. Though presented as public-safety tools, in practice they can serve as instruments of population control and data collection while expanding Chinese technological influence over regional networks. Should such systems spread to other Balkan countries, they could create bastions of technological dependence adjacent to EU—and Greek—borders.
Third, China’s growing presence in the Balkans carries political implications, encouraging non-EU countries to negotiate more assertively with Brussels, knowing they have alternative partners. This multi-dependency fosters centrifugal tendencies in the region and may undermine European political cohesion—something that directly affects Greece as an EU and NATO member.
China’s presence in Serbia is therefore not merely a local phenomenon but a strategic experiment in how Beijing can entrench spheres of influence within Europe without military involvement. If this model expands, it could alter the balance of power in the Balkans, directly influencing the security, stability, and geopolitical role of Greece in the wider region.
– In your view, is there a risk that China, Russia, and Türkiye could coalesce into a parallel axis of influence along NATO’s southeastern flank? What position would Greece occupy within such a geopolitical configuration?
A China–Russia–Türkiye alignment on NATO’s southeastern flank would indeed represent one of the most complex challenges for European and Greek security, even though there is currently little indication that such an axis will become institutionalized in the near future. While the three countries have distinct interests, they converge strategically in pursuing a more multipolar world—one in which Western, and especially American, influence is diminished.
Russia acts as the hard geopolitical pole, projecting military power and weaponizing energy dependence. China contributes through economic and technological penetration, offering capital, investment, and infrastructure to countries that feel neglected by the West—often employing commercial practices that can themselves be politicized, such as the export of rare-earth minerals. Türkiye, though a NATO member, aspires to act as a regional power-broker, exploiting its flexibility to reap benefits from both sides. This ambiguous stance has repeatedly brought Ankara into tension with the U.S., while political circles in Washington increasingly question Türkiye’s reliability within the Western camp.
This triangular relationship is not a formal alliance but rather a system of situational cooperation, grounded in shared notions of sovereignty and anti-Western balancing.
Within this environment, Greece stands on the front line—geographically, politically, and institutionally. As a member of both the EU and NATO, it serves as an advanced outpost of the Western security system in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Yet its proximity to Türkiye and to the southeastern flank—where Russian and Chinese influence is growing through investments and energy flows—makes it vulnerable to indirect pressures and regional instability.
The strategic challenge for Athens is to remain a reliable Western partner without becoming trapped along emerging fault lines between East and West. This requires reinforcing defense cooperation with the U.S. and the EU, while practicing smart diplomacy toward the Balkans and the Middle East—acting as a bridge of stability rather than a frontline of confrontation.
Should the China–Russia–Türkiye alignment acquire a more structured form—a quite distant scenario given China’s preference for discreet and non-confrontational foreign policy—Greece would emerge as a key counterweight within NATO and the EU. However, this would also bring increased responsibilities and pressures, as Athens would need to safeguard its national interests without undermining the cohesion of the Western alliance.
In other words, Greece’s position within this triangle would be pivotal but fragile.