Based on recent research by Plamen Tonchev and Vasilis Petropoulos for the Institute of International Economic Relations, this analysis explores how China’s growing footprint in Europe’s Southeastern Periphery (ESEP) intersects with critical questions of infrastructure security. Beijing’s investments in transport, energy, and telecommunications, presented under the Belt and Road Initiative as pathways to growth, increasingly reveal their dual-use potential. Far from being merely economic ventures, these projects embed strategic leverage, exposing vulnerabilities that demand urgent attention from European and transatlantic policymakers.
Transport infrastructure: Trojan Horse or trade gateway?
China’s foray into the transport infrastructure of Europe’s southeastern periphery has been a tale of both ambition and apprehension. Early enthusiasm from countries like Romania and Bulgaria for Chinese investment in their transport and energy networks largely failed to materialise. This was often due to deficient project design or, more pertinently, security concerns, particularly regarding Black Sea ports. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has only amplified the strategic significance of ports such as Constanța, rendering any prospect of Chinese involvement a matter of heightened scrutiny for NATO and EU member states.
The underlying concern, naturally, revolves around the potential for these ostensibly civilian assets to serve military ends. They could offer avenues for surveillance, intelligence gathering, or even operational support during times of crisis. This dual-use capability is not merely a theoretical construct; it is a tangible threat that could grant China considerable strategic leverage, enabling it to exert political or economic pressure on host nations. The intersection of Chinese access with Western defence logistics, particularly in NATO or EU countries, presents a particularly acute risk.
From Tbilisi to Europe: China’s strategic corridor
Georgia, however, offers a somewhat different narrative. Its role as a crucial gateway along the Middle Corridor, a trade route connecting China to Europe that bypasses both Russia and sanctions-affected Iran, has seen a growing Chinese presence. Investments in the East–West Highway, rail modernisation, and the upgrading of Batumi and Poti ports all possess inherent dual-use potential. The acquisition of a significant stake in the Poti Free Industrial Zone by CEFC China Energy in 2017, closely linked to port operations, and the exploration of increased container traffic through Batumi by a Chinese Railway delegation in 2023, underscore China’s keen interest in enhancing its logistical footprint.
Yet, the geopolitical realities of the Black Sea, with Russia and Türkiye as influential powers, suggest that the likelihood of Georgian ports being used by the Chinese navy remains low in the short term. Any permanent Chinese naval presence would undoubtedly be met with opposition, as it would fundamentally alter the regional security balance. Thus, while infrastructure improvements are evident, their direct militarisation by China is, for the time being, constrained by the prevailing geopolitical landscape.
Montenegro’s debt diplomacy: Roads to dependence?
In the Western Balkans, Chinese investments in major infrastructure and energy projects align closely with the objectives of the Belt and Road Initiative. The Bar–Boljare Highway in Montenegro, financed predominantly by Chinese loans, has drawn considerable criticism due to the significant debt burden it has imposed on the country. This financial leverage raises concerns about Beijing’s potential political influence over Podgorica, which could, in turn, translate into strategic concessions. The port of Bar, a frequent port of call for NATO military vessels, has also attracted Chinese interest, with COSCO Shipping establishing a new service there.
A high-capacity highway linking Bar to Serbia could facilitate not only trade flows but also the rapid movement of troops or equipment inland, particularly given the growing Sino-Serbian military cooperation. Similarly, the Belgrade–Budapest railway track, heavily financed by Chinese loans, presents a similar dual-use potential, capable of facilitating the rapid transport of military personnel or equipment and increasing China’s presence in EU transportation corridors, potentially for logistical dominance or surveillance during geopolitical strain. The case of Croatia’s port of Rijeka further illustrates Western concerns, where a Chinese state-owned enterprise initially won a tender for a container terminal, only for it to be cancelled under Western pressure for strategic reasons. This highlights the sensitivity surrounding Chinese involvement in infrastructure critical to NATO operations. However, the situation at Zadar port, where a Chinese-backed firm holds a significant stake and seeks a majority, suggests that such concerns are not uniformly applied, potentially providing China with control over another strategic Adriatic location.
Egypt’s strategic waterways: Beyond commerce?
Egypt, with its pivotal Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCEZ), stands as another testament to China’s converging economic and strategic interests. The SCEZ, a joint venture between the Chinese and Egyptian governments, has attracted numerous Chinese enterprises establishing manufacturing bases. Given the Suez Canal’s indispensable role in global maritime trade and its strategic value for naval operations, this investment is profoundly significant.
COSCO Shipping Ports’ acquisition of stakes in East Port Said and Ain Sokhna Port further solidifies China’s maritime presence. Even airports, classic dual-use infrastructure, raise questions regarding data access, security protocols, and potential military use. While Chinese involvement in Tirana and Plovdiv airports ultimately did not materialise, the underlying concerns persist.
Energy infrastructure: Beijing’s power play
Chinese companies have also been active in the ESEP’s energy sector, albeit with a mixed record. Negotiations for the takeover of the Cernavodă nuclear plant in Romania and participation in a nuclear plant tender in Belene, Bulgaria, were ultimately unsuccessful. However, Chinese contractors have found more success in other ESEP countries, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the construction of the Stanari lignite plant. The involvement of Norinco International, a subsidiary of a major Chinese defence contractor, in the Senj wind farm in Croatia, underscores the inherent dual-use nature of some of these energy investments.
In Egypt, Chinese state-owned enterprises contribute significantly to the country’s energy production capacity through wind and solar projects. Discussions are also underway with Chinese companies regarding conventional and small modular nuclear reactors in Türkiye, and in Greece, the State Grid Corporation of China holds a stake in the Independent Power Transmission Operator (IPTO) and is involved in a high-voltage link to Crete. These ventures, while seemingly purely economic, contribute to China’s broader influence and potential leverage within the region’s critical energy networks.
Chinese presence near naval facilities: A clear and present danger
The proximity of Chinese-controlled commercial ports to naval bases is a particularly salient point of concern. Sea ports, by their very nature, offer a fertile ground for intelligence collection. Operators routinely gather vast amounts of proprietary information concerning vessels, their movements, cargo, and personnel. This data, readily available through normal commercial operations, holds significant value for military intelligence, especially when military vessels frequent these same commercial ports. The port of Piraeus in Greece, majority-owned by the state-owned COSCO, serves as a prime example. Its capacity to accommodate large vessels, coupled with its close proximity to a major Greek naval base, has sparked concerns about its potential dual-use capabilities.
Similarly, in Israel, Chinese firms manage the Haifa Bay port and are involved in the construction of Ashdod port. The concern in Haifa is particularly acute, given the terminal’s mere 1.8-kilometer distance from Israel’s main naval base, which is also utilised by the 6th U.S. Fleet. The political ramifications of cancelling such contracts are considerable, yet the debate persists.
Further south, the Hong Kong-based Hutchison Ports’ collaboration with the Egyptian Navy to construct and manage a new container terminal within the Abu Qir Naval Base, alongside concession agreements for two new container terminals in Ain Sokhna and El Dekheila, highlights a clear and present security threat. These ports are readily adaptable for military needs, making their dual-use nature unequivocally apparent.
While there is no conclusive evidence that Chinese investments in transport and energy infrastructure in the ESEP region are explicitly intended for dual-use military purposes, the growing concerns are entirely justified. The potential for such infrastructure to be leveraged strategically during times of crisis, particularly in the context of hybrid warfare or geopolitical tension, is undeniable. Railways, ships, ports, cranes, and containers, all integral to the physical flow of trade, also form components of an increasingly integrated logistics and digital network. Chinese companies operating these assets gain access to proprietary information about transactions and movements, thereby acquiring significant coercive power, especially over countries heavily reliant on a single source of capital or lacking diversified infrastructure partners. The weaponisation of dual-use infrastructure and technologies is a well-documented facet of Beijing’s geostrategic objectives. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has long operated under the fundamental concept of Military-Civil Fusion (MCF), a doctrine that systematically eliminates barriers between civilian research, commercial sectors, and the country’s military and defence industrial sectors. This seamless integration allows for the rapid conversion of civilian infrastructure into military assets, a capability that demands vigilant observation and strategic foresight from Western powers.
The unseen hand: Beijing’s long game
China’s strategic approach in the ESEP region, particularly concerning critical infrastructure, is a nuanced blend of economic engagement and latent security implications. The seemingly benign act of building a bridge or managing a port can, under the doctrine of Military-Civil Fusion, become a conduit for intelligence gathering or a logistical asset in a future contingency.
Policy recommendations for Western allies:
- Diversify financing sources: Provide credible alternatives to Chinese capital for infrastructure projects in the ESEP region.
- Strengthen EU investment screening: Expand mechanisms to monitor and regulate foreign investment in critical infrastructure.
- Enhance NATO–EU coordination: Ensure joint assessment of dual-use risks, particularly in transport and energy networks.
- Support local resilience: Help partner states reduce overreliance on single foreign investors through capacity building and regional cooperation.
The ongoing recalibration of influence in the ESEP region is not merely an economic phenomenon; it is a geopolitical contest where the control of vital arteries and nodes of connectivity could ultimately determine the balance of power. The subtle yet persistent expansion of China’s footprint in this critical periphery demands not just observation, but a proactive and strategic response to safeguard the collective security interests of Europe and its allies.
References:
Tonchev, P., & Petropoulos, V. (2025, August). China in the security conundrum of Europe’s Southeastern Periphery. Institute of International Economic Relations