A new scenario about geopolitical balances in the Mediterranean is being promoted by pro-government Turkish media, with the latest example being an article by Professor Canan Tercan in Daily Sabah, titled “Redrawing the map: Türkiye–Spain power corridor can reshape Mediterranean.”
The main idea of the article is that Türkiye and Spain could form a strong “power corridor” from East to West, along with allies from North Africa and the Balkans, which could shift the balance of power in the Mediterranean and openly challenge the Greece–France–Israel axis.
According to the author, Türkiye has already built a strategic maritime and defense network through agreements with countries like Libya, Syria, the TRNC, Somalia, Qatar, Azerbaijan, and others. This network is expanding through energy connections (such as TANAP–TAP), naval infrastructure, and military cooperation. The goal is for Türkiye to become the dominant power in the Mediterranean, controlling key sea routes, energy flows, and port facilities.
The analysis presents the Eastern Mediterranean as a battleground between Türkiye and what it calls the “maximalist claims” of Greece, Cyprus, France, and Israel. The 2019 Türkiye–Libya EEZ agreement is presented as the strategic foundation of the “Blue Homeland” doctrine and as a legal tool for Turkish moves in the region. At the same time, the creation of military bases, hydrocarbon exploration, and the presence of Turkish warships are described as necessary steps to protect Türkiye’s interests.
A Mediterranean realignment or strategic fiction?
The most interesting—and most ambitious—element in the article is the idea of Spain as Türkiye’s strategic partner. According to Tercan, Spain, which has been sidelined by the West due to its stance on the Palestinian issue, could play a key role in a new Mediterranean alliance, along with Portugal and Morocco. This “Ibero-Moroccan” trio, in cooperation with Türkiye and its other strategic partners (Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Albania, Montenegro, etc.), could evolve—according to the narrative—into a regional power bloc.
Special mention is made of the ports of Tanger-Med (Morocco), Algeciras (Spain), Izmir, Mersin, and Filyos (Türkiye), which are presented as “gateways” of a supply chain from North Africa to Asia, via Türkiye and the so-called “Middle Corridor.” The idea is that this maritime route would bypass the current EU structures and offer economic and energy independence, “free from Western dominance.”
The narrative is also reinforced ideologically, with attacks against “neo-colonial practices” and proposals for an alternative geopolitical structure based on shared religious, cultural, and energy needs. There is talk of a rising “anti-hegemonic alliance” that includes—explicitly or implicitly—Türkiye, Spain, Palestine, and other Middle Eastern countries, aiming to challenge the Western bloc and, indirectly, the EU.
The analysis openly admits that this strategy is based on neutralizing the current Greece–France–Israel–Cyprus axis, which it views as a threat to regional security. Turkish moves are described as “fair” and “mutually beneficial,” in contrast to the “exclusive and imperialist” strategies of others.
Spain’s role and the limits of Ankara’s narrative
However, if we remove the Turkish lens, serious questions arise about how realistic this strategy actually is. Despite its rhetorical differences over the Palestinian issue, Spain remains an active member of the EU and NATO, with deep commitments to the Western security system. Portugal and Morocco have shown no signs of distancing themselves. Nor do Türkiye’s other proposed partners seem willing to join an anti-Western bloc—especially at a time when energy security and political stability are top global priorities.
Greece, for its part, has already built a broad and stable network of partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean, based on international law and the recognition of sovereign rights. Its participation in the 3+1 scheme (Greece–Cyprus–Israel + USA), agreements with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, defense partnerships with France, and strong ties with the EU all help secure its role as a stable actor in the region.
Türkiye’s narrative of a “new Mediterranean” may serve domestic audiences or be used to pressure potential partners, but for now, it lacks real institutional and geopolitical foundation. It’s more of a media-driven grand idea than an actionable strategic plan.
Greece, rather than reacting with panic or aggressive rhetoric, must monitor these developments calmly, with solid documentation and continuous diplomatic engagement.
The naval aspect of this geopolitical chessboard is important—but time will tell whether the Türkiye–Spain “power corridor” becomes a real shift or just another power story with no substance.