Six years after the first shock of the pandemic, global shipping continues to operate in a state of permanent disruption. For those following the markets, the period when freight rates and investment decisions could be explained primarily by supply, demand and the economic cycle now feels distant. Experience over recent years shows that fundamentals remain necessary, but they are no longer sufficient.
Trade as a tool of geopolitical pressure
The year 2025 made it clear that shipping has effectively become an instrument of geopolitical pressure. Trade flows are no longer shaped solely by tariffs and countermeasures, but also by targeted interventions at the level of ports, transport corridors and access of specific fleets to critical infrastructure. The experience of the U.S.–China trade war has returned in different forms, but driven by the same logic of confrontation.
Despite a temporary de-escalation agreement between Washington and Beijing, the core restrictions on bilateral trade remain in place. Elevated tariffs on U.S. products continue to limit volumes, without triggering a broad collapse in shipping demand. In markets where alternative sources of supply exist, trade flows are simply reconfigured. The replacement of U.S. cargoes with South American or other origins does not reduce overall seaborne demand, but it does alter its geography.
Strategic chokepoints and persistent conflict
A similar picture emerges in the Middle East. Discussions about a potential return to normality in the Suez Canal resurface periodically, without materially changing the situation. The diversion via the Cape of Good Hope has been absorbed into market operations. The additional cost is not sufficient to generate strong commercial or political pressure for a return to previous routes, while owners and insurers clearly prefer the option that reduces operational risk. In geopolitical terms, control over such a critical maritime chokepoint proves easy to maintain and exceptionally difficult to reverse.
The war in Ukraine fits into the same framework of uncertainty. Even if some form of ceasefire were to emerge, the full restoration of trade relations with Russia—particularly for Europe—remains a distant prospect. Sanctions are not lifted automatically, and political appetite for a comprehensive return to pre-2022 conditions is limited. The only realistic area of convergence would be the gradual withdrawal and scrapping of vessels belonging to the so-called “shadow fleet,” delivering benefits both for safety and for market balance.
Supply pressures beneath resilient demand
Despite successive crises, demand for core commodities has proven resilient. The prospect of easing interest rates supports expectations of improved economic activity in Europe and the United States. In China, the property sector continues to weigh on growth, but its drag on the broader economy has diminished, as advanced manufacturing and exports maintain momentum.
The primary source of concern for shipping lies less on the demand side and more on supply. Fleet growth is accelerating across nearly all segments, creating pressures that cannot be absorbed indefinitely by global instability. In sectors such as chemical tankers, product tankers and LNG carriers, the imbalance between new deliveries and effective demand is increasingly becoming structural.
In recent years, shipping has benefited from a succession of extraordinary events that constrained effective capacity. The question now is not whether this situation will change, but when. Once geopolitical disruption ceases to act as a mechanism for absorbing oversupply, markets will be forced back to fundamentals.
Until then, experience suggests that market sentiment and psychology continue to outweigh dispassionate analysis. In shipping, however much conditions change, one thing remains constant: sentiment still moves ahead of the numbers.