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COSCO’s dominant presence in Piraeus underscores the growing U.S.–China competition, placing Greece at the center of a strategic struggle over port control, trade routes, and geopolitical influence in the Mediterranean

Editorial | by
George S. Skordilis
George S. Skordilis
Aerial view of the Port of Piraeus with large container ships, cranes and stacked containers along the waterfront
Piraeus stands at the fault line of global power, where trade flows meet the quiet rivalries shaping tomorrow’s Mediterranean balance
Home » Piraeus at the crossroads: U.S.–China power balance in the Mediterranean

Piraeus at the crossroads: U.S.–China power balance in the Mediterranean

The debate over China’s footprint in the Port of Piraeus has returned to the spotlight, and the timing is no coincidence. Recent remarks by U.S. Ambassador to Greece Kimberly Guilfoyle about China’s expanding role in the port set off a wave of reactions in Athens and beyond. Her description of Greece as a “key location” for U.S. strategy underscored something everyone knows but few say openly: Piraeus is no longer simply a gateway for trade. It is a geopolitical pressure point.

China’s leverage rests on solid ground. COSCO, which holds the majority stake in the Piraeus Port Authority, operates under a concession approved by the Greek Parliament and shielded by binding legal obligations. Since taking over in 2016, the Chinese operator has transformed the port’s scale and rhythm.

In 2023, Piraeus handled 5.1 million TEU, with capacity reaching 8.3 million TEU. Piers II and III alone manage around 6.2 million TEU. And the rise continues: the first four months of 2025 saw 1.33 million TEU, over 5% higher than the same period a year earlier.

Washington may want to limit China’s presence. But the structural barriers are formidable. Ownership cannot be rewritten by diplomatic pressure. Contracts cannot be undone by strategic wishful thinking. And Piraeus is already locked into Asian supply chains that rely on speed, predictability and scale.

The European Union adds another layer of constraint. Its strict screening mechanism for foreign investments in critical infrastructure leaves little room for non-EU states—even allies—to steer decisions on assets like Piraeus.

The global trade picture reinforces this reality. More than 80% of the world’s goods by volume and 70% by value move by sea. About 70% of these flows begin in Asia. The maritime system that feeds European markets is not a network that can be redrawn overnight without massive economic shock.

This is why China’s port strategy under the Belt and Road Initiative matters. Piraeus isn’t just another investment; it’s one of Beijing’s most successful European anchors. The United States, meanwhile, is expanding its presence in Greece—energy projects, transport hubs, defense infrastructure—all intended to counterbalance China’s rise in the Eastern Mediterranean. But Piraeus remains the piece of the puzzle Washington cannot shift.

The reality is clear: China’s position in Piraeus cannot be overturned dramatically—at least not with the tools currently available. The port’s deep integration into Asian trade routes, the legal protection of its concession, its strong economic performance, and Greece’s need for stable infrastructure all limit how far U.S. ambitions can realistically go.

For now, the conclusion is hard but unavoidable: the United States will have to learn to coexist with China’s entrenched position in the port. For Greece, the issue is not binary and never has been. It is about sovereignty, leverage, and strategic balance. The uproar sparked by the ambassador’s comments reveals something deeper. Greece sits at a crossroads on the modern maritime map, where ports function not just as commercial engines but as platforms of power—gateways where the ambitions of nations clash like storm-tossed waves.