The abrupt flight of Bashar al-Assad on December 8, 2024, following the pivotal Aleppo offensive, brought an end to his 24-year rule and closed a chapter of nearly five decades of Assad family dominance in Syria. The shockwaves of this unexpected political turn are shaping the uncertain future of Syria, which is now under the rule of Ahmed al-Sharaa. While hopes for renewal are high, ambiguity prevails as al-Sharaa’s early efforts to rebuild Syria are already facing scrutiny at home.
The collapse of Assad’s regime
The outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 heavily affected the Arab world. When it reached Syria, Assad’s government attempted to suppress the nationwide protest movement, which quickly became an armed rebellion. The ensuing civil war repeatedly threatened Assad’s military government. At several points, Assad himself relied on Syrian allies Iran and Russia, while bombing opposition-controlled enclaves across Syria into compliance in order to retake most of the country.
After 2020, the war reached a stalemate. As ISIS expanded after 2015, a Kurdish-majority militia group formed under U.S. support, named the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), controlling the eastern territory of Syria. Following U.S. sanctions and Lebanon’s economic collapse, Syria’s profound economic crisis accelerated. In the meantime, Türkiye secured several opposition areas in the north while obliquely backing Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian Liberation Group, which was considered a terrorist group, in the northwestern province of Idlib. On November 27, HTS under al-Sharaa launched its critical offensive on Aleppo, pushing towards Damascus, resulting in the toppling of Assad’s regime. Assad secretly fled to Moscow on December 8 and was granted political asylum.

The rise of al-Sharaa and domestic challenges
Al-Sharaa, whose nom de guerre was Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, was one of the founding members of the al-Nusra Front, which was originally affiliated with al-Qaeda. He broke its ties with the terrorist group and transnational jihadism in 2016. Due to the international perception of HTS as a terrorist group, on January 29, the faction was dissolved, stating that it would be incorporated into state institutions. Furthermore, al-Sharaa distanced himself from other Islamist regimes and publicly stated that Syria differs from Afghanistan, presenting himself as a pragmatist who will protect women and religious minorities and will not avenge Assad’s former supporters.
However, severe violence has erupted against Alawites, especially in towns like Mukhtareyah, intensifying the sectarian divide, for which al-Sharaa pledged accountability, including from both government and opposition forces. In addition, the interim government, based on a quietist Salafi interpretation of Islam, abrogated the constitution and presented a new transitional one, consolidating executive authority in the president and eliminating the position of prime minister. By rejecting decentralization, al-Sharaa denied Kurdish aspirations for federalism or autonomy, viewing them as a threat to national unity.
International response and regional implications
The U.S. steadily supports peaceful political transitions, stability, and territorial integrity. In the case of Syria, Washington’s response was cautious and did not seek a major role in forming the new government, while providing humanitarian assistance to address immediate needs. However, sanctions remain in effect under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, extending its provisions until 2029. The U.S. has expressed its willingness to engage in diplomatic dialogues following exhortations from Europe and the UK. Its support for the SDF continues, but as the SDF is being incorporated into national institutions, the U.S. has begun reducing its military presence in Syria.
The fall of Assad had major reverberations throughout the region and internationally. Firstly, it represents the end of Iranian influence in the country. The new government has shown little interest in honoring previous agreements with Iran. Iranian diplomats and paramilitary forces withdrew hastily, and the embassy was burglarized, revealing documents of failed plans.
Russia’s position also eroded despite being a traditional Syrian ally. Al-Sharaa has no deep ties with Moscow, as he emerged from factions historically opposed to Russian and Iranian meddling. Hence, Russian companies lost access to key projects previously agreed upon under Assad. While the bases in western territories—Tartus and Hmeimim—are still controlled by Russia, they are now vulnerable and politically unwelcome, suggesting that Moscow will no longer be a decisive mediator in Syrian politics.
Turkish pressure on the Syrian battlefield was also critical to the collapse of Iranian influence there. Türkiye emerged as one of the most influential external actors in Syria, notably in the north and among Sunni factions, continuing a long history of supporting opposition forces, which now form part of the transitional political elite. Its strategic goals include expanding buffer zones in the north and pushing for a demilitarized Kurdish corridor. Additionally, Turkish companies have accelerated reconstruction and infrastructure projects in central and northern cities. Militarily, Ankara maintains a robust footprint with bases and outposts in Afrin, Jarablus, and al-Bab, and is also working on restructuring rebel militias under a Turkish-aligned command to exert its influence more subtly.
Lastly, Israel’s role remains covert but significant. Its primary aims are to prevent Iran and its proxies (notably Hezbollah) from entrenching near the Israeli–Syrian borders and to maintain security over the Golan Heights. Though there are no official relations with Damascus, diplomatic efforts behind the scenes—reportedly brokered by the UAE—focus on intelligence cooperation and counterterrorism.
Forging over thwarting
For the time being, al-Sharaa holds the upper hand in Damascus. Nonetheless, threats remain imminent, affecting various aspects of Syria’s social and political life. According to the UN, the current economic situation, while not irreversible, is unlikely to return to pre-conflict GDP levels for several decades. Ambivalence toward al-Sharaa and ongoing skepticism may impede Syria’s peaceful transition, as geopolitical pressures intensify the need for a more coherent political fabric. His success or failure will be defined by his ability to balance national unity and foreign appeasement.