KEY TAKEAWAYS
- Geopolitical battlefield: Syria served as a “contained WWIII” for more than a decade, where global and regional powers engaged in proxy warfare without escalating beyond Syria’s borders.
- Internal collapse: Assad’s fall stemmed from socio-political fissures, failure to integrate diverse groups, and economic deterioration exacerbated by U.S. sanctions and halted Iranian aid.
- External shifts: Russia withdrew support due to inefficacy of Assad’s forces, focusing instead on Ukraine, while U.S. regime change efforts supported jihadist factions like HTS.
- Israel & Türkiye dynamics: Both countries benefited from Assad’s fall but now face fluid, contested borders and potential conflicts with new Syrian powers. Discussions have already commenced concerning ominous eventualities (read this analysis on GeoTrends).
- Jihadist ascendancy: HTS and other jihadist factions dominate fragmented regions, complicating long-term stability.
- Regional destabilisation: Syria joins Iraq and Libya as collapsed states, signalling a broader erosion of the modern Arab state system.
- Strategic lessons: The fall of Syria highlights the limits of foreign intervention, with Russia and Iran facing costly entanglements.
- Uncertain future: The day after Assad’s fall remains unpredictable, with power struggles and new alliances shaping the region.
Editorial note: This forms part of a cluster of four interrelated GeoTrends analyses; this one on the fall of Syria, and one on post-Assad Turkish-Israeli tensions, by Sotiris Mitralexis; one on the recent historical background of Turkish-Israeli relations as a lens for understanding Syria, and one on the ascendancy of Saudi Arabia’s and generally the Gulf Arab States’ importance as a result of recent geopolitical developments, by Dimitris B. Peponis. Onwards to analysing the fall of Assad’s Syria:
The regime change in Syria, culminating in the departure of President Bashar al-Assad, marks a profound shift in the geopolitics of Western Asia (the “Middle East”). This analysis will not address the Israeli vector of recent developments in Syria and Türkiye’s gains, as a separate analysis is dedicated to that. While the civil war in Syria has unfolded over more than a decade, the recent collapse of the Assad regime underscores a confluence of external intervention, internal fragmentation, and strategic recalibration by regional and global powers. The elephant in the room is, of course, the day after—and its implications and potential repercussions for Syria and beyond. But how did we come to this?
Context: More than a decade of WWIII-in-a-fishbowl
Any analysis of these developments ought to start from the crucial context: for all intents and purposes, Syria has been the battlefield of a “contained WWIII,” or a WWIII-in-a-fishbowl, for more than a decade; phrasing this as a “civil war” is decisively disorienting. A dizzying number of great powers and important states would fight each other, both “by proxy” and directly, within the former territory of Syria—yet, crucially, this never extended beyond the borders of the state of Syria itself, thus avoiding its development into proper regional, peripheral, continental, or global warfare.
At some point, militias armed by the Pentagon would directly fight other militias armed by the CIA. Yet the Assad regime stood firm, with the help and guarantees of, inter alia, Russia and Iran and the constant diplomatic vicissitudes of the Astana process. In what has been known as the “Assad curse” in social media, an endless litany of (most of them retired, and some deceased such as John McCain) international political figures would declare for more than a decade that Assad must go: these include, but are not limited to, Barack Obama (Former President, United States), Hillary Clinton (Former U.S. Secretary of State), John Kerry (Former U.S. Secretary of State), Joe Biden (outgoing U.S. President), David Cameron (Former Prime Minister, UK), Theresa May (Former Prime Minister, UK), William Hague (Former Foreign Secretary, UK), Boris Johnson (Former Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, UK), François Hollande (Former President, France), Nicolas Sarkozy (Former President, France), Laurent Fabius (Former French Foreign Minister), Emmanuel Macron (President, France), Angela Merkel (Former Chancellor, Germany), Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (President, Türkiye), Ban Ki-moon (Former UN Secretary-General, United Nations), Nikki Haley (Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations).
Yet, for more than a decade, Assad politically survived all possible vicissitudes, until December 2024, marking Damascus’ swift fall within a ten-day span, the rise of rebranded Al-Qaeda jihadis to power (such as al-Jolani), a country fragmented into factions and fractions and Swiss-cheesed by four foreign military powers, two of which, Israel and Türkiye, are de facto annexing territories by military force. What could have happened?
Causes
Internally, the fall of Assad was precipitated by deep-seated socio-political and ethnic fissures. The Assad regime, an extension of familial and tribal power, failed to create a cohesive national identity. The inability to integrate Syria’s diverse tribal and sectarian groups—Alawites, Kurds, Sunnis—meant that once the regime’s central authority weakened, the state collapsed like a house of cards. This collapse was hastened by economic deterioration, exacerbated by American sanctions and Iran’s cessation of oil supplies to the regime.
The fragmentation of Syria into territories controlled by various militias—many with jihadist affiliations—underscores the complete disintegration of state authority. HTS and other factions now wield power, but their influence remains localized and fragmented, devoid of the centralizing ideology that once drove ISIS.
The regime’s collapse also reflects Russia’s recalibration of its priorities. Despite its initial commitment to propping up Assad, Russia ultimately withdrew significant support, recognizing the inefficacy of the Syrian army and the untenability of Assad’s position. The Russian military saw limited strategic value in maintaining a presence in Syria once ISIS was neutralized. This strategic pivot underscores the broader limitations of Russia’s global reach amid its preoccupation with Ukraine and Eastern Europe.
Although it is undoubtedly Türkiye that was in the driver’s seat in Syria’s regime change (and presently is the greatest beneficiary from the developments), the United States’ role in orchestrating regime change in Syria has been pivotal in the larger scheme of things, driven by strategic interests that extend beyond the immediate concerns of Syria itself (see Operation Timber Sycamore). The U.S. was deeply committed to the overthrow of Assad, even to the extent of supporting factions like HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) led by figures such as Abu Mohammad al-Julani, despite their designation as terrorist organizations. This commitment was fuelled not only by America’s own geopolitical goals but also by the influence of allies like Israel and Türkiye. Israel viewed the fall of Assad as a strategic blow to Iran, disrupting the supply lines to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Türkiye’s involvement was motivated by concerns over Kurdish autonomy and Ottoman-redux territorial ambitions.
Implications and repercussions for actors besides Israel
The collapse of the Assad regime and the rise of jihadist groups in its place pose significant challenges and opportunities for regional and global actors. The chaos in Syria offers both strategic gains and significant risks for Türkiye and Israel, which are addressed in a separate analysis. While the disruption’s of Iraninfluence is advantageous, Israel’s massive bombing of Syrian military assets reflects concerns that jihadist groups could pose a future threat. Israel must now tread carefully to avoid becoming bogged down in a new conflict with emboldened jihadist factions.
Türkiye, too, faces a complex scenario. While the fall of Assad alleviates some Kurdish concerns, the presence of jihadist groups on its southern border is a double-edged sword. Türkiye’s strategic interests in Northern Syria, driven by neo-Ottoman aspirations, may clash with the need to contain extremist elements that could destabilize its own territory. Yet the fact remains that, for all practical intents and purposes, the current configuration of power in Damascus renders it an extension of Türkiye. Discussions on a future Turkish-Syrian EEZ of dubious legality just off occupied Cyprus are telling.
For the United States, the regime change represents a Pyrrhic victory. While achieving the goal of removing Assad, the aftermath—characterized by instability, jihadist ascendancy, and humanitarian crises—offers little strategic clarity. The moral and legal ambiguities of supporting groups like HTS, despite their terrorist designation, expose the contradictions in American foreign policy. The commitment to Israel’s security continues to drive U.S. involvement, but the long-term benefits remain elusive.
The Syrian Kurds find themselves in a very dark place. While they were incentivised, primarily by Israel and the U.S., as well as armed to overthrow the Assad regime in the hopes of eventually attaining statehood, in Syria’s new situation it is Türkiye’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that predominates in calling the shots for their future, which looks increasingly bleak.
Regional destabilization and the Arab world
The regime change in Syria signifies a broader trend of state collapse in the Arab world. Syria joins Libya and Iraq as examples of artificially constructed states that have disintegrated. This erosion of the modern Arab state system, with Egypt as the last remaining pillar, points to a future where tribalism and sectarianism dominate. The implications for regional stability are profound: the collapse of central authority in one state creates a vacuum that jihadist groups, warlords, and foreign powers rush to fill.
Moreover, the Syrian case highlights the limits of external intervention. Both Russia and Iran, despite their vested interests, ultimately found Syria to be a quagmire. Now it is for the Western alliance to solve the jihadi-ridden conundrum in a country witnessing the presence of both Türkiye’s and Israel’s armies conquering territory. Iran’s strategic overreach in supporting the Shia Crescent appears to have backfired, draining resources and political capital. For Russia, the lessons of Syria may inform future engagements, favouring cost-efficient strategies over protracted entanglements.
Currently, the Russian Federation has two bases inside the country: a naval base in Tartous and the Khemimim Air Base near the port city of Latakia. Russia is reported as being in direct contact with the new powers-that-be in the former territory of Syria, hoping to maintain its military bases during the day after. Yet all this remains to be seen, as there is no scintilla of stability in the country’s emerging and emergent situation; deals and configurations crystallising today might be decisively obsolete in a few months’ time.
Summing this all up, the regime change in Syria is a microcosm of the broader geopolitical and ideological struggles shaping the 21st century. Driven by external powers, internal fragmentation, and regional rivalries, Syria’s collapse underscores the fragility of post-colonial state systems in the Middle East. The repercussions extend beyond Syria, affecting regional alliances, the balance of power, and the efficacy of foreign intervention. As the dust settles, Syria’s disintegration serves as a cautionary tale for those who seek to engineer regime change without a clear vision for what follows. Yet the complexity of the Israeli positioning in all of this demands a separate analysis.
* Sotiris Mitralexis holds a doctorate in political science and international relations; he works at University College London as a research fellow.