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Demographic and generational shifts in the U.S. are reshaping public opinion on NATO and Israel, revealing growing divides across age, ideology, and party lines, with significant global implications

Analysis | by
Dimitris B. Peponis
Dimitris B. Peponis
Silhouettes of people standing before a large American flag, symbolizing generational shifts and evolving U.S. perspectives
Brett Sayles on Pexels
Generational change in America unfolds silently, shaping future choices and foreign policy beyond familiar alliances and traditions
Home » Towards an… anti-NATO, anti-Israel United States of America? Demographic and intergenerational shifts

Towards an… anti-NATO, anti-Israel United States of America? Demographic and intergenerational shifts


KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Shifting public opinion: American support for NATO (60–65%) and Israel is declining, particularly among younger generations, indicating a potential future reorientation of U.S. foreign policy.
  • Partisan divide: Democrats strongly favour NATO (75% positive), while Republicans are evenly split (50% positive/negative). Support for Israel is higher among Republicans (over 50%) than Democrats (40% neutral, 25% pro-Palestinian).
  • Generational polarisation: Younger Americans (under 30) lean anti-NATO and pro-Palestinian (over 30% support Palestinians vs. 15% for Israelis), contrasting with older generations’ pro-NATO and pro-Israel stances.
  • Key influencers: Liberal Democrats and White Evangelicals strongly support NATO and Israel, respectively, while MAGA Republicans and younger voters drive anti-NATO sentiment.
  • Long-term trends: Demographic shifts suggest a future U.S. less committed to NATO and Israel, driven by generational experiences (e.g., Iraq/Afghanistan wars, 2008 crisis, MAGA movement).
  • Potential rifts: Emerging anti-NATO and anti-Israel sentiments may create internal U.S. divisions, with Israel support potentially fracturing Democrats, mirroring past Republican immigration divides.
  • Global implications: Europe and Israel are unprepared for a less Europhilic, Atlanticist, and Israel-supportive U.S., necessitating strategic adjustments.

American society is undergoing a period of transformation, which is reflected in the attitude of American public opinion on two key issues: support for NATO and Israel. The changes taking place reveal sharp dividing lines between political parties, but above all between generations, signalling not only possible changes in the course of future U.S. foreign policy but also in the very nature of the United States of America in the 21st century.

In the realm of American public opinion, support for NATO remains robust, with approximately 60–65% of the populace expressing a positive view, contrasted by roughly 30% who hold a negative opinion. This support varies significantly along partisan and ideological lines. The majority of Democrats view the North Atlantic Alliance favourably, with a margin exceeding 50% (approximately 75% positive and 25% negative). Progressive Liberal Democrats are at the forefront of NATO’s advocacy. Conversely, the Republican base is markedly divided, with opinions split evenly (approximately 50% positive and 50% negative). Support for NATO within this group primarily stems from older Republicans of the Reagan era and their ideological successors, whereas younger Republicans and adherents of the MAGA movement exhibit a clear majority in their negative stance towards the Alliance. The starkest polarisation is observed between Liberal Democrats with a postgraduate education and younger Republican supporters.

Data shows that support for the war in Ukraine and opposition to Russia are predominantly driven by Democrats and older generations shaped by the Cold War.

Israel and the generational divide

Regarding attitudes towards Israel, positive sentiment remains prevalent but is waning across American society, particularly on the basis of pronounced generational divides. Older Americans tend to view Israel more favourably, while younger generations, particularly those under 30, lean towards sympathy for the Palestinians, with approximately one-third (over 30%) supporting Palestinians and about one-sixth (approximately 15%) favouring Israelis. At the partisan level, over 50% of Republicans align with Israel, whereas 40% of Democrats express neutrality, supporting both sides equally, and 25% favour the Palestinians.

However, generational differences are evident here as well: Republicans under 30 express support for Israel at a rate below 30%, compared to approximately 70% among Republicans over 65. White Evangelicals lead in their positive views of Israel and negative perceptions of Palestinians. The most extreme polarisation regarding Israel exists between White Evangelicals and young Americans aged 18–29.

According to the polls and their generational reading, support for the war in Gaza and Israeli actions in the West Bank is primarily a concern for Republicans and Cold War-era generations.

Long-term demographic trends

Taken as a whole, Liberal Democrats and White Evangelicals or Christian Zionists (who support NATO and Israel, respectively) stand in contrast to younger Americans under 30—who, needless to say, will eventually grow older and dethrone the previous generation, also at the decision-making level. Collectively, irrespective of partisan divides, the United States of the future appears to be moving towards reduced commitment to both NATO and Israel. More boldly stated, and all further factors notwithstanding, the data suggests that future generations of Americans are tending towards a more anti-NATO/anti-European and anti-Israel orientation.

These polls do not illustrate a fleeting snapshot of the moment, related to the news cycle and merely changing in accordance with tomorrow’s news cycle, but more deeply entrenched inter-generational disparities within the U.S., which are to be analysed in conjunction with wider societal shifts within American society. Taking long-term surveys into account, it is safe to assume that these disparities are not characterised by fugacity, but illustrate trends that are here to stay and be amplified by the inexorable ruthlessness of the mere passage of time, which is demography’s unstoppable driver.

Now, whether young Americans opposing NATO and those opposing Israel can coexist within the same nation in the future is a matter for a separate analysis, which would include in the equation rifts deeper still.

Implications for the future U.S.

The experiences shaping the emerging American generation, poised to lead the nation in the fullness of time, include the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 2008 economic crisis, polarisation over Israel and Palestine, the pandemic, and movements such as Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street, and MAGA, alongside both Trump administrations. The next generation of American leaders and policymakers will differ markedly from those familiar to Europeans and Israelis: less Europhilic and Atlanticist—a trend unlikely to shift through crude appeals to American paternalism and exercises in appeasing “daddy Trump”—and more polarised regarding Israel.

At the smaller and bipartisan scale, it is to be remarked that, a few years ago, immigration introduced a mighty rift within the Republican party, which resulted in its near-complete takeover by Donald Trump, transforming the party significantly. A similar rift seems to be imminent in the case of the Democrats, this time with support for Israel as the main point of contention.

Yet it is not the small scale that primarily matters. The wider picture could be summed up as follows: seen through the generational perspective, a markedly different future U.S. is emerging and taking shape, compared to the one Europeans and Israel have been accustomed to—and it is a U.S. which neither European states nor Israel seem remotely prepared to encounter.


Further reading (mind the data, not the titles)


* Dimitris B. Peponis is the author of The End of the Great Deviation: From Ukraine and the Pandemic to the Shaping of the New Global Order (Topos books, in Greek).