KEY TAKEAWAYS
- A snapshot of the moment: The NATO summit quandaries and the 5% GDP military spending offer only a temporary glimpse of the developing situation; a deeper examination is necessary.
- Post-Cold War power shifts: The first phase of the post-Cold War era was defined by the collapse of Russian power, German reunification, and the rise of U.S. hegemony, reshaping Europe’s power structure.
- German reunification and anti-German sentiment: The growing centrality of post-Reunification Germany in European affairs has reignited historical concerns over its dominance, influencing Brexit, shifts in Franco-German relations, and broader European tensions.
- Resurgence of Russian power: Russia’s power reassertion—whether marked by 2008, 2014, or 2022—ended the post-Cold War U.S.-centric order and initiated a new Cold War era in Europe.
- NATO expansion as a catalyst: While not the root cause, NATO’s eastward expansion accelerated tensions, particularly in Russia’s geopolitical calculations and Europe’s internal strategic debates.
- European strategic autonomy: France’s push for EU strategic autonomy reflects efforts to decouple from U.S. dependence in a post-American/post-unipolar world.
- Brexit and Trump as centrifugal forces: Both Brexit and the rise of Trump can be seen as reactions to Europe’s shift toward a German-centric power structure.
- New Cold War dynamics: In a Eurocentric context, the current era is defined by competing new Cold War visions. The divide between Biden and Trump’s foreign policy is not over the existence of a new Cold War per se but rather its character—whether transatlantic (West vs. Russia) or intra-European (Europe vs. Russia).
- Germany’s central role: Germany’s position as a cornerstone of European power dynamics has reignited fears of the “German Question,” influencing EU and NATO policies.
- US retreat and European tensions: The U.S. withdrawal from European leadership has accelerated crises, but Europe’s tensions are fundamentally rooted in its own power struggles.
- Future uncertainties: Europe faces a fundamental question about its future—whether to pursue strategic autonomy or remain tied to US leadership, as changes in the balance of power between Russia and Germany continue to shape its trajectory. The EU’s crisis is systemic, driven by historical and structural shifts, and will persist regardless of US actions, shaping the continent’s future trajectory.
Europe is at a crossroads, caught between the unravelling of the post-Cold War order and the uncertainties of a post-American/post-unipolar era. While political debates often focus on news-cycle events such as the recent NATO summit and the decision on a 5% GDP military spending aim, or the immediate influences of leaders like Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, the deeper forces shaping Europe’s strategic trajectory extend far beyond individual actors and events.
At its core, the continent’s current crisis is the product of long-term shifts in the balance of power—marked by the collapse and resurgence of Russian power, the reunification and reassertion of Germany, and the gradual retreat of U.S. hegemony. These systemic transformations have not only redrawn Europe’s geopolitical landscape but have also reignited unresolved tensions over security, sovereignty, and the future of European integration.
Understanding Europe’s present dilemmas requires looking beyond the disruptions of populist politics to the underlying structural changes that continue to reshape the continent’s strategic direction.
The return of power politics in a post-American Europe
The first phase of the post-Cold War era was defined by the gradual weakening and eventual collapse of Russian power, which led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. This shift paved the way for German reunification and, combined with the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, resulted in the restructuring of Central Europe and the breakup of Yugoslavia in Southeastern Europe—radically altering the power balance across the continent. This phase concluded with NATO’s expansion into the newly reconstituted Central Europe in 1999.
As long as this transformation eliminated the Russian threat, European developments were accompanied by a subdued but discernible undercurrent of anti-German sentiment. This shift in the power structure, at a systemic level, ultimately contributed to Brexit. In this sense, the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union can be seen as a long-term consequence of German reunification and the broader shift toward a more German-centric, continental, land-based European power structure.
However, when the Russian threat re-emerged—whether one marks the turning point in 2008, 2014 (as President Macron recently suggested), or 2022—the dynamics changed. (The repeated delays in the UK’s full political disengagement from European affairs can be understood in this context.) The end of the post-Cold War, U.S.-centric order—marked by the decline of American dominance—has been sealed by Russia’s resurgence. Moscow’s calculation that Washington will not engage in direct conflict with a nuclear-armed state in Europe has emboldened Russia’s efforts to reclaim its influence. This development not only disrupts the post-Cold War balance but also challenges the existing security framework in Europe, which has been anchored in U.S. leadership and NATO’s central role. Instead, Russia seeks to establish a new European security order based on a dual-pillar system centred around Washington and Moscow.
Meanwhile, despite its relative weakness, Paris is advocating for European strategic autonomy—a move toward reducing EU states’ dependence on the U.S.—since the end of the post-Cold War world signals the beginning of a post-American era.
Germany, Russia, and the new Cold War dilemma
The first post-Cold War period was thus shaped by three key factors: the collapse of Russian power, German reunification, and the unipolar dominance of the United States. The end of this period is marked by Russia’s resurgence, Germany’s return as the linchpin of European power, and the retreat of U.S. hegemony. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, a new Cold War began. The primary distinction between the Biden and Trump administrations is not whether this new Cold War will occur but rather its nature—whether it will be a transatlantic conflict (West vs. Russia) or an intra-European one (Europe vs. Russia).
The United States’ role in this new Cold War is less about its root causes and more about the escalation of tensions—its subjective pursuit specifically, through NATO’s expansion. The historical changes occurring in Europe are fundamentally rooted in the objective development of the gradual shifts in the European power structure. These changes are defined by the erstwhile collapse of Russian power and the reunification of Germany on one side, and by efforts to reassert Russian influence and concerns about the resurgence of a dominant, reunified Germany on the other.
In this Eurocentric context, Brexit and the rise of Trump can be seen as reactions to the evolving European power structure, which has increasingly centred around Germany. Even if one disregards these two phenomena, other key developments reflect similar tensions: the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines under Biden, Chancellor Merkel’s surveillance under President Obama, Poland’s militarization, the cautious stance of former Austro-Hungarian states and Türkiye’s unique positioning regarding Russia, England’s continued engagement in European affairs, Putin’s assertion of Russian power, Le Pen’s rise in France, and Macron’s recent push for a European nuclear deterrent, following a historic call by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Together, these events can be interpreted as medium-term responses to the re-emergence of the “German Question” in Europe—although this may seem strange at the moment because the perception of the Russian threat prevails and Germany has not yet been rearmed.
(By the latter we refer more to how other European states perceive a different Germany, rather than to the motivations of the German state itself.)
In this context, the divide between Macron’s France and Le Pen’s France lies in how each approaches the Franco-German relationship and the broader question of post-American Europe. Merz’s emphasis on France and Poland—shifting focus toward the Weimar Triangle—sets him apart from Merkel and Scholz, who prioritized the Franco-German axis and largely ignored Poland. This signals an awareness of how the “German Question” should be managed within a changing Europe. Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s approach to Ukraine and its broader disengagement from European affairs has exposed underlying tensions that were previously concealed.
Strategic choices in a fragmented Europe
In other words, the ongoing transformation within the West, Europe, and NATO is the culmination of Germany’s resurgence within the context of a post-American Europe. The central geopolitical question remains: What role will Germany and Russia play in this new order? Trump’s U.S. leans toward normalization with Moscow, potentially fostering a U.S.–Russia power-sharing arrangement, while Biden’s US envisions a bipolar standoff between the West and Russia, with Germany firmly under American influence. Regardless of which approach prevails, both scenarios accelerate Europe’s internal crises.
If this analysis holds, then the primary source of European tensions is not the subjective pursuit of the United States but rather the objective development of power dynamics between Russia and Germany within the framework of a post-American Europe. NATO’s expansion may have acted as a catalyst, pushing events toward crisis, but the underlying forces at play suggest that Europe’s internal tensions will persist—independently of the US’ position.
* Dimitris B. Peponis holds an MA in Governance and Public Policies from the University of the Peloponnese’s Department of Political Science and International Relations and is the author of “The End of the Great Deviation: From Ukraine and the Pandemic to the Shaping of the New Global Order” (Topos books, in Greek).