KEY TAKEAWAYS
- Europe’s strategic anxieties are less about Russia directly invading Western Europe and more about how a Russian victory in Ukraine could reshape Europe’s balance of power.
- Historically, “the West” has depended on keeping the U.S. engaged, Germany restrained, and Russia excluded, as NATO’s first Secretary General had eloquently put it. A reversal of this formula could end NATO as we know it.
- A U.S. withdrawal from Europe, combined with a stronger German role and a Russian resurgence, risks transforming NATO from American-led to German-centric: i.e., a European continent with the U.S. disengaged, Germany unleashed, and Russia potentially included.
- Britain and France fear not Russia itself, but the possibility of Germany re-emerging as Europe’s dominant power if the U.S. disengages and Russia strikes a deal with Berlin.
- Smaller Central European states (Hungary, Slovakia) already hint at shifts that could foreshadow a larger German realignment.
- The true existential threat to Western Europe lies in the potential decline of “the West” as a transatlantic entity, not in Russian tanks crossing borders.
- Politically, it is easier to present Russia as an imminent menace than to admit fears of U.S. disengagement, German resurgence, or NATO irrelevance.
The current geopolitical imbroglio in Europe is premised on understanding reality via ideology and narrative. In the present contribution, we counter-propose history and geography as explanatory “keys.” A preliminary clarification: besides the European Union as a specific union of 27 member states, “Europe” is an actual continent in geography. It exists in physical reality. “The West” is a concept, primarily alluding to a Euro-Atlantic strategic entity, a bloc, a military alliance (NATO), and a security architecture.
If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an institutionalised and binding way to keep “the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out,” according to Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, who served as NATO’s first Secretary General from 1952 to 1957, then a gradual withdrawal or potential departure of the U.S. from Europe—combined with a return of Germany to a central position in European defence and security, and a looming Russian victory in Eastern Europe in the war in Ukraine, i.e., a situation that would lead to “the Americans out, the Germans up, and the Russians in”—would mark either the end of NATO, as its raison d’être would be nullified, or, at the very least, the transformation of NATO from an American-centric to a German-centric power structure.
Furthermore, it would mark the end of “the West” as a transatlantic Euro-American strategic entity and the commencement of its confinement to the European continent (this is perfectly consistent with a state of affairs resembling a pre-American European period of the West, such as that of the Crimean War, hence the return of Türkiye), that could result in the decline of the European West and the return of Europe, initially through Russia (as is already the case) and, potentially, subsequently through Germany—which is what truly inspires fear.
From the Crimean War to the Atlantic Order
- The combination of Russia’s withdrawal from World War I and the entry of the U.S. into it (1917–1918) formed the geopolitical foundation for the construction of the West as a strategic entity on a transatlantic Euro-American scale. A few decades earlier, the European-Mediterranean-Black Sea foundation for this had been laid with the Crimean War (1853–1856).
- As long as Russia was within the system, there was a “Europe” independent of North America. From World War I onwards, especially from the moment the U.S. entered the European security architecture, Atlantic Europe gradually became dependent on North America due to the inability to balance, first, Central Europe and Imperial Germany in the World Wars and, secondly, Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia during the Cold War.
During World War I and World War II (1914–1945), we witnessed Europe’s first subjugation by “the West,” while at the end of the Cold War (1947–1991), we saw “the West’s” definitive victory over Europe and the overshadowing thereof. In the first case, we had the defeat of Central Europe and in the second, the defeat of Eastern Europe. From a German-centric perspective, the end of Europe came in 1945; from a Russian-centric perspective, in 1991.
“The West,” in order to be hegemonic in the European continent, requires the controlled predictability of Germany and the expulsion of Russia (be it the Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, or today’s Russian Federation) from the system.
NATO and EU expansion: The institutional westward conversion of Europe
The expansion or enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union is the institutional mechanism for the conversion and transformation of the whole of Europe into “the West,” and historically presupposes the defeat of Imperial Germany in Central Europe, initially, and the defeat of Soviet Russia in Eastern Europe, subsequently.
This transformation of Central and Eastern Europe into “the West,” through their integration into “Euro-Atlantic Western institutions” (1990, 1999, and 2004 in NATO; 2004 and 2007 in the EU), stopped at the Dnieper (Ukraine) and the Caucasus (Georgia).
Among Europeans, the “Western”-oriented—i.e., Atlanticist—ones seem to fear that the United States’ stance, combined with a looming Russian victory in Ukraine, could lead to a reversal of this present state of affairs. Moreover, since Russia has not succeeded in becoming “Western,” the object of this fear is that if the U.S. comes to an understanding with the Russian Federation, such a development could reinforce the tendencies of the Federal Republic of Germany to assume a role that would be markedly different from its post-1945 one.
Furthermore, the U.S. is showing signs of moving in a post-liberal and post-Western direction, and without Russia as an enemy and existential threat, there is no “West” as a strategic entity. Finally, an agreement between the Americans, Germans, and Russians poses an actual existential threat to the British and French, due to the sheer logic of history, geography, and realist International Relations 101.
The war in Ukraine and the shifting European power balance
It is indeed true that the war taking place in Eastern Europe does not directly threaten Western Europe, but it can certainly affect Western Europe’s relationship with Central Europe. The British and French may be forced to have a military presence in Ukraine not only to deter Russia, but also to take preventive action against a possible future Germany.
States “think” beyond the horizon of the next electoral cycle, and the notion of statecraft consists precisely in this implicit logic.
More specifically, Russia itself indeed does not pose a direct existential threat to the United Kingdom and France. Claiming the contrary would not be a convincing argument. In fact, the opposite is true: NATO’s presence in Ukraine—whether through the direct participation of the state of Kiev or through indirect participation—is an existential issue for Moscow, which is why it decided to invade, as it has signalled since before day one of the war.
However, a Russian victory in Eastern Europe can effect a shift of balance in the relationship between Western and Central Europe, i.e., the relationship between the British and French and the Germans. Such a change is already becoming apparent in smaller Central European states such as Hungary and Slovakia. And for certain quarters in Brussels, in Paris, and in London, what is happening in Budapest and Bratislava may be a harbinger of what could potentially happen in Berlin in the future.
The true existential threat: The end of the West as a transatlantic entity
The real fear-igniting existential threat to “Europe”—that is, to peace in Western Europe—is not Russia itself, but the fact that a Russian victory in the war in Ukraine could, firstly, increase the chances of the British and French losing the Americans in the medium term, or even the Germans in the long term (already, the closer the Russians get to victory, the more the British and French are losing the Americans).
Secondly, mark either the end of NATO, its sliding into irrelevance despite its recent enlargement, or its transformation from an American-centric to a German-centric power structure; and, thirdly and finally, act as a catalyst for reversing the process of transforming Europe into “the West,” signalling the beginning of the end of “Western” hegemony in Europe—with a new, and by no means necessarily peaceful, Europe emerging.
The politics of fear: Narratives for the masses
However, mobilising European public opinion in favour of rearmament at the expense of salaries and the welfare state, on the basis of communicating the above strategic calculations or strategic impasse, would be a challenging feat.
It is easier to communicate to the masses that the Russians are at the gates of Paris, poised to invade and conquer the 19th arrondissement.
* Dimitris B. Peponis is the author of The End of the Great Deviation: From Ukraine and the Pandemic to the Shaping of the New Global Order (Topos books, in Greek).