The U.S. air strikes in Venezuela and the removal of Nicolás Maduro caused strong concern in Beijing, which in recent years had developed into one of the country’s main economic and energy partners. Despite tough statements of condemnation, the Chinese side appears cautious and is avoiding moves that could lead to a direct confrontation with the United States.
China has invested heavily in Venezuela, mainly in the oil sector but also in critical infrastructure. However, the real exposure of Chinese interests, while real, is not considered decisive for the country’s overall energy security.
Venezuelan oil and the limits of dependence
Over the past two years, Chinese imports of crude oil from Venezuela averaged slightly above 300,000 barrels per day. This volume represents a small share of China’s total imports, which exceed 11 million barrels per day. In certain periods, mainly during the summer, flows increased noticeably, without changing the overall picture.
Cheap, heavily discounted Venezuelan crude was mainly directed to independent refineries in eastern China, which operate with lower margins and greater flexibility. For these refineries, the loss of such cargoes creates cost pressure but not a dead end, as alternative supplies from Russia and Iran remain available.
Chinese loans and the “legacy” of the past
A critical aspect of China’s presence in Venezuela concerns the loans granted since 2007, mainly in exchange for future oil deliveries. The total value of this financing is estimated at 50–60 billion dollars, although it is believed that most of it has already been repaid.
According to assessments, a limited balance remains, which Chinese state banks can manage through restructurings or new agreements, as they have done in the past. The issue is not considered an immediate threat to China’s financial system.
The greatest exposure is found in the production sector. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has operated in Venezuela for decades, mainly through joint ventures with the state-owned company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). The most important of these produces around 110,000 barrels per day, a volume that has value but is not critical for the Chinese group.
Any changes to the ownership or legal status of the joint ventures would create delays and losses but not a strategic blow. CNPC has a broad portfolio of activities in other regions of the world.
More exposed are small, private Chinese companies that entered the Venezuelan production sector in recent years, with limited investments and low returns. For them, an unstable political environment or a renegotiation of contracts could mean a full withdrawal.
However, their overall economic footprint is small and does not affect the general picture of China–Venezuela relations.
What Beijing is waiting for
The key question for China concerns the form of the regime that will emerge after Maduro and its stance toward existing foreign investments. Equally important is the role of PDVSA and whether there will be an attempt to redefine agreements concluded in previous years.
At the same time, Beijing has invested in sectors beyond energy, such as electricity and telecommunications. A broad removal of Chinese companies could cause serious operational problems for the country, which acts as a deterrent against extreme choices.
In the near term, China’s strategy can be summed up in one word: wait. In the short term, there may be losses in cargoes and investments. In the long term, however, Beijing believes it will have room to return, provided the political landscape stabilizes.
Venezuela remains for China a difficult but not irreplaceable partner. Developments are causing turbulence, but not a strategic earthquake—at least for now.