KEY TAKEAWAYS
- With its first operational use in Ukraine’s Dnipro on November 21, “Oreshnik” is a hypersonic Russian intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) carrying a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) payload. It travels at speeds above Mach 10, making it non-interceptable with current missile defence systems.
- Its introduction disrupts the U.S.’s and, by extension, NATO’s traditional strategic calculus and escalation framework by creating a novel middle ground between conventional and nuclear responses.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin claims Western military aid to Ukraine involving strikes within pre-2014 Russian territory escalates the conflict to a global level and warns of potential strikes on NATO facilities.
- The missile’s advanced technology reflects a broader shift in warfare, with breakthroughs in hypersonic manoeuvrability and targeting.
- Prima facie, NATO military targets are now vulnerable to strategic conventional strikes in novel ways, forcing a re-evaluation of defence strategies and deployments.
- The new weapons allow Russia to project power and maintain alliances without crossing the nuclear threshold, reshaping global power dynamics.
- The next step should be diplomacy, and cannot be further escalation. The need for political leaders to understand these developments and prioritize diplomacy to prevent further conflict escalation is urgent.
Political and media fervour on the possibility of Russian nuclear escalation obscure the realities manifested on the 21st of November 2024, with the Oreshnik missile strike in Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s address. Military leaders are surely studying the implications of these developments, yet political leaders, the media, and the public at large seem not to have worked these through.
The crux of Putin’s address
First things first: as ever, it is crucial to study the Russian President’s statement following “the attacks by Western long-range weapons against [Russian] territory.” By definition, and in contrast to Reuters reports, op-eds, or expert analyses, statements by heads of state (of major nuclear powers, no less) engender developments and belong to the historical record proper. The essence of the Russian president’s address could be summed up as follows:
- Concerning strikes with American ATACMS and HIMARS, British Storm Shadow systems, and (one may add) French SCALPs deep into Russia’s pre-war territory, the Russian President emphasized “experts are well aware, and the Russian side has repeatedly highlighted it, that the use of such weapons is not possible without the direct involvement of military experts from the manufacturing nations” rather than the Ukrainian military per se—and, as such, that these strikes are to be considered strikes directly by the respective countries into the Russian Federation.
- “From that point onward, as we have repeatedly emphasised in prior communications, the regional conflict in Ukraine provoked by the West has assumed elements of a global nature.”
- In response, Russia “carried out tests of one of Russia’s latest medium-range missile systems – in this case, carrying a non-nuclear hypersonic ballistic missile that our engineers named Oreshnik. [… ] the United States made a mistake by unilaterally destroying the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019 under a far-fetched pretext”, and Russia “is developing intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in response to U.S. plans to produce and deploy intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.”
- According to the Russian President, “we consider ourselves entitled to use our weapons against military facilities of those countries that allow to use their weapons against our facilities, and in case of an escalation of aggressive actions, we will respond decisively and in mirror-like manner. I recommend that the ruling elites of the countries that are hatching plans to use their military contingents against Russia seriously consider this.”
- Putin emphasised, and fact-checking confirms, that “there are no means of countering such weapons today. Missiles attack targets at a speed of Mach 10, which is 2.5 to 3 kilometres per second. Air defence systems currently available in the world and missile defence systems being created by the Americans in Europe cannot intercept such missiles. It is impossible.” (Not even Russia has the technology to intercept such missiles.)
In essence, the Russian President emphasised that future strikes with long-range weapons against the pre-war territory of Russia will entail strikes against military facilities of the countries supplying these weapons (up until now, the U.S., the UK, and France, if SCALPs are also used) beyond Ukrainian territory. Allowing ourselves to speculate, American Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Polandcould be potential priority targets, which are all but explicitly mentioned in the draft treaty on security guarantees proposed to the U.S. by Russia on 15 December 2021 and published two days later. It is worth noting that after the Oreshnik incident and Putin’s address, ATACMS strikes inside Russia’s pre-war territory have been repeated.
What is an Oreshnik, anyway?
In a nutshell, as this will be revisited below: “Oreshnik” (“hazelnut tree”) is a new Russian intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), possibly a radical redevelopment of the RS-26 Rubezh, which was discontinued when the INF Treaty was active until 2019. It is characterized by its hypersonic speed, reportedly exceeding Mach 10 (approximately 12,300 km/h or 7,610 mph), and is equipped with multiple warheads, each containing submunitions. Ukraine’s claims “that the missile took 15 minutes to fly from the Kapustin Yar range in the Astrakhan region to the city of Dnipro, a distance of around 800 kilometres (490 miles), reaching a final speed of over Mach 11”. Notably, the warheads used in this strike were non-explosive mock-ups, serving as a mere demonstration of the missile’s capabilities without causing significant damage. The Oreshnik missile, or a future iteration thereof under a different name, is capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads, with a range of up to 5,000 kilometers (approximately 3,100 miles), enabling it to reach targets across Europe and parts of Asia—yet this is minimally relevant, since (a) a number of hypersonic missiles already used in Ukraine have the capacity to be nuclear-armed, and there are plenty of options for this nightmare scenario either way (e.g., Avangard, Zircon, Kinzhal, etc.), and (b) because the very point of Oreshnik’s unveiling was, as shall be explained below, the lack of need to go nuclear.
These missiles exit atmosphere and re-enter to reach their targets vertically with extreme kinetic force, employing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV). The reason why Western military analysts (beyond tip-of-the-iceberg journalistic reports and media fog-of-war) believe Russia’s and Putin’s claims concerning Oreshnik’s capabilities is, plainly put, because they can confirm the technical aspects of what they saw on November 21: because they saw them with their own eyes and concomitant calculations.
Technologically, and in terms of physics, such feats require solutions and advancements that were previously not on the horizon. Russian officials have, for years, cryptically alluded to “new physical properties” underpinning their advanced weapons systems. This rhetoric was dismissed by many Western analysts as propaganda or exaggeration. However, the Oreshnik and other hypersonic systems now demonstrate that these claims were not bluffs. For example, the scientific advancements enabling guided hypersonic travel in conditions of extreme plasma formation—long a challenge for weapons designers—appear to have been overcome, and this is but one of the puzzle’s pieces.
Unlike traditional ballistic missiles, these systems are not constrained by predictable trajectories, making them impossible to intercept with current missile defence technologies. The manoeuvrability and hypersonic speeds of systems like Oreshnik render even the most advanced air defence systems—like the U.S. Aegis, THAAD, or Patriot systems—effectively useless. The details of Oreshnik itself—its range, delivery system, and payload—are significant but not definitive. Russian officials have already announced that Oreshnik represents only the beginning of a broader family of weapons based on similar technological breakthroughs. Future iterations may possess different ranges, diversified delivery platforms, or alternative payload configurations. Therefore, while the specifics of Oreshnik are remarkable, it is the underlying technological revolution that demands attention. This is not merely about one missile system but a class of weapons that redefine the strategic calculus.
How does this change the Western calculus? Analysing the new realities from a strategic perspective
The advent of new Russian missile technologies, epitomized by the Oreshnik system first used operationally on 21 November 2024 in Dnipro, Ukraine, has upended longstanding assumptions about military strategy and geopolitical dynamics, although this realisation will take some time to trickle down to the public sphere. Since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war at the very least, Western powers, particularly the United States and NATO, operated under a binary assumption regarding Russian military posture: faced with existential threats or significant battlefield setbacks, Moscow would either concede strategically and diplomatically or, if left with no other options, escalate to the nuclear level—a non-viable scenario in the Western calculus, since Russia knows full well that such a historic rupture would deprive the Federation of most friends and allies among the global majority, not to mention the near certainty of U.S. nuclear retaliation and the deterrence this entails. This calculus, while morally if not existentially questionable when enforced with just too much Western self-confidence, formed the implicit foundation for NATO’s military assistance to Ukraine and broader strategic behaviour in Europe. However, the deployment of advanced hypersonic missiles like Oreshnik renders this framework obsolete. Due to the sheer kinetic energy of the submunitions, coupled with the missile’s properly hypersonic capacity (and, hence, non-interceptability), these new weapons introduce a transformative middle ground: strategic, albeit conventional, non-interceptable strikes—and the fact that Russia announced future Oreshnik deployments coming under the command of its heretofore exclusively nuclear strategic forces is anything but a symbolic gesture.
Using this conventional, i.e. non-nuclear, yet also non-interceptable weapon against a facility in Dnipro is one thing; using it against U.S. military bases abroad, aircraft carriers, naval shipyards, underground bunkers, ICBM launch sites, etc. would be quite another, without needing to resort to any iteration of the nuclear option, tactical or strategic. The implications are profound. For all intents and purposes, Russia has showcased the ability to achieve strategic objectives—crippling key targets, neutralizing military assets, and asserting dominance over contested regions—with conventional weapons that deliver effects traditionally associated with nuclear strikes. This capability is not constrained by international arms treaties, most of which have lapsed or been abandoned. The death of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 has left a regulatory vacuum that Russia now exploits.
Again, NATO’s strategy has leaned heavily on the belief that Russia’s nuclear threshold remains extraordinarily high, constrained by fears of global pariah status, loss of key alliances, and catastrophic retaliation. This assumption underpins the steady escalation of Western aid to Ukraine, including increasingly sophisticated weapon systems and strikes within Russia’s pre-2014 territory. Each escalation has been framed as a calculated gamble, assuming that while Moscow might retaliate conventionally, it would stop short of nuclear escalation, knowing the diplomatic and military consequences.
Weapons like Oreshnik, however, disrupt this calculus. Capable of delivering strategic-level effects without a nuclear payload, these systems bridge the gap between conventional and nuclear deterrence. They enable Russia to respond to provocations or perceived threats with devastating precision and lethality while remaining within the bounds of conventional warfare. The dilemma of “concede or go nuclear” no longer applies, fundamentally altering the risk assessments that have shaped Western policy.
The geopolitical and strategic impact
The unveiling of these capabilities changes the nature of warfare and geopolitical considerations in several key ways. First, the asymmetry introduced by Russia’s hypersonic arsenal places NATO and its allies in a vulnerable position. There is currently no defence against these weapons, which undermines the very foundation of collective security agreements unless the nuclear spectrum is inaugurated following hypothetical non-nuclear Russian strikes. The inability to intercept or neutralize such systems erodes deterrence and may compel NATO to reevaluate its strategic posture, particularly regarding forward deployments in Eastern Europe.
Second, these developments have not yet been fully grasped by Western political leadership. Public discourse and media framing remain focused on traditional nuclear escalation scenarios, ballistic missile capabilities, and outdated notions of deterrence. This disconnect between military experts, who are acutely aware of the implications, and political leaders, who may be slower to adapt, creates a dangerous lag in strategic decision-making, a point to which we shall return in our conclusion. As hypersonic weapons become a central feature of modern warfare, this gap in understanding could lead to miscalculation or inadequate responses during critical moments.
The broader implications of these advancements extend beyond military strategy. Russia’s ability to strike with precision and devastating power without crossing the nuclear threshold complicates NATO’s escalation ladder. It also allows Moscow to signal resolve and capability to a global audience, bolstering its alliances with nations that view Western dominance with scepticism. The psychological and geopolitical impact of these weapons cannot be overstated; they shift the narrative from one of NATO supremacy to one of vulnerability.
Moreover, these weapons provide Russia with a platform to engage in strategic deterrence while avoiding the stigma and consequences of nuclear escalation. This is particularly significant in maintaining the support of key partners such as China and India, as well as the broader Global South. The prospect of Russia achieving its strategic objectives without resorting to nuclear arms—whether in Europe, the Asia-Pacific, or elsewhere—reshapes the contours of global power.
A new era of deterrence—and, hopefully, diplomacy
The emergence and operational use of systems like Oreshnik marks a turning point in modern warfare and geopolitics. As explained, these weapons render obsolete the simplistic dichotomy of concession versus nuclear escalation regarding the Russian side, thus redefining the concept of deterrence and challenging the foundations of NATO’s collective security architecture. Yet the Russian claim that the tables have turned, and that it is now the U.S.—and, by extension, NATO—that eventually faces the concession versus nuclear escalation dilemma in “the regional conflict in Ukraine [that] has assumed elements of a global nature”. This analysis commenced with the remark that “military leaders are surely studying the implications of these developments, yet political leaders, the media, and the public at large seem not to have worked these through.” After two years replete with “We cannot let Russia win in Ukraine” and “Putin’s nuclear bluff” discourses, such a disparity of information between military and political leadership is critically pernicious in the present juncture: as political leaders grapple with these realities, the risk of miscalculation remains high. Among other things, and when the stakes are that high, diplomacy is the art of preventing war—or more war. Diplomacy is always possible. Solutions are always conceivable. Peace is always preferable. Sometimes, one may need to climb down some trees beforehand.
* Sotiris Mitralexis holds a doctorate in political science and international relations; he works at University College London as a research fellow.