Observers frequently draw parallels between the current U.S.–China rivalry and the Cold War, often finding a measure of reassurance in the comparison. The Cold War, despite its ferocious competition, avoided direct superpower conflict. However, such analogies often overlook a fundamental divergence: geography. The Cold War’s epicentre was the landmass of Central Europe, where the sheer scale of potential conflict and its inevitable escalation made limited warfare a chimera. The U.S.–China dynamic, conversely, unfolds across the maritime expanse of East Asia, with the Taiwan Strait as its most volatile flashpoint. This maritime setting, paradoxically, lowers the threshold for conflict, even for the limited use of nuclear weapons.
During the Cold War, the dense urban and military concentrations of Central Europe meant that any conflict would rapidly escalate, leading to catastrophic casualties and making the distinction between tactical and strategic targets exceedingly difficult. Both Soviet and Western leaders understood that maintaining limits in such a theatre was a delusion, thus lending inherent credibility to nuclear deterrence. The Taiwan Strait, however, presents a distinctly different strategic landscape.
Taiwan’s geographic fortress
Unlike Cold War Europe, the U.S. lacks a substantial military presence on the East Asian mainland. Its key allies are separated from China by significant bodies of water. Projecting power across such distances is inherently challenging. Taiwan itself, a self-governing island, is regarded by Beijing as a renegade province destined for reunification, by force if necessary. While Beijing’s control of Taiwan would be an unwelcome development for Washington, the U.S. stakes are not existential in the same vein as the Soviet subjugation of Europe once was. This perceived lower U.S. stake, somewhat counterintuitively, increases the likelihood of conflict over Taiwan, as Chinese leaders might conclude, rightly or wrongly, that the U.S. would remain on the sidelines.
Taiwan’s geography is, in fact, its most formidable military asset, posing immense challenges to any invading force. A direct amphibious landing into Taiwan’s cities would immediately precipitate urban warfare, preventing invaders from consolidating combat power ashore. Should an invading force attempt to land outside urban centres, they would find themselves attempting to stage military equipment amidst rice paddies, offering minimal cover or concealment.
Furthermore, the Central Mountain Range dominates 60% of the island’s landmass, presenting a significant obstacle to any sustained ground campaign. The remaining 40% of the island is densely populated or cultivated, meaning invaders would face either urban environments or agricultural fields immediately beyond the beaches. Amphibious operations are notoriously complex, and Taiwan’s topography would compel the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to concentrate forces at a few vulnerable beachheads. The Taiwan Strait thus becomes a natural defensive barrier.
The nuclear calculus in a maritime theatre
Should a limited conventional conflict erupt in East Asia, the prospect of limited nuclear use is considered more plausible than it ever was in Cold War Europe. While the threshold for nuclear deployment remains high, the geographical context of the Taiwan Strait alters the calculus. East Asia features a more restricted number of high-value military targets, many not situated near population centres.
Both China and the United States possess highly accurate nuclear weapons, which could facilitate limited strikes with a material impact on the conflict while ostensibly avoiding indiscriminate damage. This grim possibility underscores the unique dangers inherent in the region’s geography.
The geopolitical currents of the Taiwan Strait
China’s assertion that Taiwan is an inalienable part of its territory, coupled with its willingness to use force, forms the bedrock of cross-strait tensions. The U.S. maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” acknowledging Beijing’s “One China” principle without explicitly endorsing its claim over Taiwan. Washington provides Taiwan with defensive weaponry under the Taiwan Relations Act, a delicate balancing act designed to deter both a Chinese invasion and a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan.
Beijing has intensified its “grey zone” tactics, employing military exercises and incursions to exert pressure on Taiwan without triggering outright conflict. These tactics, often involving dual-use and unmarked vessels, aim to erode Taiwan’s resolve. The sheer volume of maritime traffic and the deceptive practices of some vessels make distinguishing commercial activity from covert operations a considerable challenge. Taiwan, for its part, seeks to diversify its trade relationships and bolster its defence capabilities, particularly in the critical semiconductor industry, where it holds a global leadership position. The economic significance of the Taiwan Strait cannot be overstated.
Regional counterweights and future deterrence
The military balance in the Taiwan Strait has undeniably shifted in China’s favour. However, China’s maritime neighbours possess the capacity to constrain its military dominance in East Asia, thereby mitigating the necessity for an extensive U.S. military buildup in the region. These states have developed Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which can effectively deny China command of its near seas. U.S. support for these regional A2/AD capabilities, coupled with efforts to enhance crisis stability, represents a pragmatic approach to deterrence.
In essence, the geography of the Taiwan Strait is not merely a backdrop but an active determinant of strategic possibilities. It demands a nuanced approach to deterrence, one that moves beyond the Cold War playbook. The focus must be on bolstering conventional power balances and supporting regional allies, rather than relying solely on the specter of nuclear retaliation. The complexities of this maritime theatre ensure that maintaining peace will be a continuous, demanding endeavour, requiring both strategic foresight and a healthy dose of British pragmatism.