From September to December 2025, Mali entered one of the most acute security phases in its recent history, as violence no longer manifested through isolated, spectacular attacks but through a sustained and adaptive campaign. The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims – Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, progressively deployed a hybrid warfare strategy that blurred the boundaries between insurgency and governance, combining armed operations with economic blockades, logistical disruption, and systematic pressure on civilian populations.
This multifaceted approach has not only strained the operational capacity of the Malian state but has also deepened its humanitarian crisis, exposing the limits of conventional security responses to an increasingly complex and diffuse threat.
A strategy of paralysis: JNIM’s expanding playbook
In late 2025, fuel became one of the most decisive weapons in Mali’s conflict. September marked a turning point, as JNIM launched a targeted offensive against fuel convoys in the southwest, effectively turning the Kayes–Bamako and Nioro–Kayes corridors into insecure, highly contested routes. At the same time, the group imposed a nationwide ban on fuel distribution, ordering Malian suppliers to halt deliveries until further notice.
This move mirrored earlier restrictions imposed by the authorities to limit jihadist mobility. Having observed their effectiveness, JNIM appropriated the tactic, transforming a counterinsurgency measure into a tool of strategic coercion. The result was a nationwide disruption that paralysed the country during the final months of 2025.
Fuel tankers were set ablaze, according to information corroborated by our newsroom, sending shockwaves through the country’s supply chains. Shortages quickly hit Bamako and several regional capitals, driving up prices, disrupting transport, slowing trade, and fueling social tensions. Beyond the immediate economic impact, JNIM demonstrated its capacity to target the state not only militarily, but at the heart of its economic stability.
Faced with repeated attacks, Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maïga declared during a meeting with the Malian Group of Petroleum Professionals (GMPP): “Even if we have to go and fetch our fuel on foot with spoons, we will do it,” underscoring the government’s determination to maintain supply lines.
In response, the Malian Armed Forces – Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa) launched large-scale operations on 6 September, deploying significant ground and air assets to secure fuel convoys, particularly along routes from Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. While several fighters were neutralized and logistical bases dismantled in Mopti, Nara, and Kidal, these tactical gains failed to stabilize the situation, as violence gradually spread toward the west and south.
The escalation followed earlier clashes. On 1 July, JNIM had carried out coordinated attacks in the Kayes region, notably in Nioro du Sahel and Kéniéba. After suffering losses, the group appears to have shifted toward targeted retaliation, particularly against civilians suspected of cooperating with the FAMa.
“At first, it was mostly about warnings over the wearing of the veil. But after the attack in Kayes, when they stopped buses, they were specifically looking for passengers from Kayes and Nioro,” explains ND, a bus driver (anonymous, for security reasons).
According to his account, residents accused of collaborating with the army became priority targets. Today, even veiled women are reportedly at risk.
“We’re afraid for our lives. These men are unpredictable,” he adds, highlighting the pervasive insecurity along this strategic corridor.
The blockade imposed by JNIM serves multiple strategic objectives: punishing communities perceived as hostile, undermining the state’s ability to secure critical infrastructure, and amplifying political pressure on transitional authorities. More fundamentally, it illustrates a shift toward a form of hybrid warfare in which control over resources and mobility becomes as decisive as control over territory.
When fuel runs dry: Bamako’s humanitarian breakdown
By October 2025, the fuel crisis had fully reached Bamako, turning daily life in the capital into a struggle for basic mobility. As jihadist-imposed blockades tightened and attacks along key supply routes intensified, the city began to feel the direct consequences of a war increasingly fought through logistics rather than frontline clashes.
At petrol stations, shortages quickly translated into endless queues. Motorists waited overnight — sometimes up to two or three days — for just a few liters of fuel. Prices surged dramatically: from 775 CFA francs per liter to 2,000, and in some cases as high as 5,000 CFA francs on the black market, particularly in Mopti but also in Bamako. Scarcity not only disrupted transport and trade, but also exposed how fragile the country’s supply chains had become under sustained pressure.
“We no longer know what to do, because the wholesalers who used to supply us with fuel are overwhelmed by demand. We don’t have tankers, our workers are on temporary layoff, and if this continues, we will be forced to shut down,” explains the owner of the SBM fuel station in Bamako.
As the crisis deepened, its effects extended beyond the economy into essential public services. On 27 October, the Ministry of National Education announced the temporary closure of schools until 9 November. The decision sparked mixed reactions: while some saw it as a necessary precaution, others viewed it as disproportionate, arguing that shortages were uneven across the country.
The suspension disrupted school systems nationwide. “We adapted our schedule so that the few parents who are still able to get their children to school can do so without having to make the trip twice a day,” explains a primary school head. For many, however, the measure compounded an already fragile situation. According to UNICEF, hundreds of schools had already been affected by insecurity in recent years, undermining students’ long-term educational prospects.
As pressure mounted, fears of a broader destabilization of the capital began to emerge. On 28 October 2025, amid the rapid deterioration of the security environment and growing fuel disruptions, the United States urged its citizens to leave Mali “immediately.” The announcement sent shockwaves through Bamako, fueling uncertainty and reinforcing perceptions that the crisis was no longer confined to peripheral regions, but was now threatening the stability of the capital itself.
The noose tightens around Bamako
By November, the pressure on Bamako had intensified into a systematic campaign to isolate the capital. JNIM escalated its control over key transit corridors, targeting the Dakar–Bamako and Abidjan–Bamako routes — arteries essential to Mali’s economic survival. Fuel tankers and cargo trucks were set ablaze, while drivers were abducted and used as leverage, turning logistics into a battleground.
The disruption triggered a crisis of unprecedented scale. Transport networks ground to a halt, markets closed, and humanitarian operations were severely constrained, further exposing populations already weakened by years of conflict.
“Since the beginning of the crisis, we’ve been struggling with diesel. The authorities only supply gasoline, and to get diesel, you have to wait a week and then you can only get 20 liters — that’s the government’s limit. Imagine a transporter with 20 liters: that’s barely enough for a single day of work,” says Sekouba Diarra, a taxi driver.
Beyond these main corridors, JNIM’s strategy increasingly focused on areas of high economic value. The Kayes and Sikasso regions — key hubs for artisanal gold mining — have become central to this approach. Control over these areas allows the group not only to disrupt trade flows, but also to penetrate and reshape local economies.
This shift is particularly visible in mining zones such as Kéniéba, where vehicles linked to Chinese investors have been deliberately targeted. As Chinese actors play a growing role in artisanal mining, these attacks signal an effort by JNIM to assert dominance over both local and transnational economic networks.
In parts of the Sikasso region, the group has moved beyond intermittent violence toward structured control. Testimonies from Loulouni indicate that JNIM imposes zakat on gold miners — effectively transforming it into a compulsory tax — while also regulating social practices, including banning bars.
“They came and asked if I was there. I said I wasn’t, thinking they didn’t know me. That’s when they demanded four million CFA francs, saying they would come back to collect it. They warned me that if I didn’t pay, I would face the consequences,” a local merchant in the area recounts.
This grip on artisanal gold mining — a sector vital to the local economy — feeds JNIM’s financial resources while consolidating its authority over the population, in a context of a long-term weakening of state presence.
Escalation at the gates of Bamako
By early December, the conflict had reached the immediate periphery of Bamako. Between 6 and 10 December, JNIM intensified its operations around Ouelessebougou, systematically targeting road corridors, fuel tankers, and convoys transporting essential goods. What had begun as a strategy of disruption now took the form of sustained economic warfare.
At the same time, pressure extended beyond logistics into the social sphere. Movement was increasingly restricted, and behavioral norms were enforced through coercion. In some areas, public transport operators began requiring female passengers to wear the veil, while informal seating rules segregated men and women — an indication of the group’s growing influence over everyday life.
JNIM’s attacks on other mining sites and cement factories have been on the rise. In January 2026, another strike targeted a Malian businessman’s site in the Kéniéba district, causing significant material damage.
JNIM also expanded its targeting of economic infrastructure, including mining sites and cement factories. In January 2026, a further attack on a business site in the Kéniéba district caused significant material damage, suggesting that this strategy is not episodic but part of a longer-term campaign.
These actions aim not only to disrupt, but to erode state authority by exposing its inability to secure key economic assets and protect civilian activity. In response, the authorities have adjusted the military chain of command — an implicit acknowledgment of the scale of the threat — while organizing one of the largest fuel convoys to reach Bamako in recent months, reportedly involving around 1,200 tankers.
A multi-dimensional crisis with lasting consequences
Between September and December 2025, the JNIM demonstrated a clear strategic shift, moving away from direct confrontation toward a model combining economic disruption, logistical blockades, and indirect territorial control. This gradual strategy of strangulation has deeply affected daily life, weakened economic activity, and constrained humanitarian operations.
In response, the FAMa have redeployed units across key areas and reinforced security along critical transport corridors — now central to the balance of power. The objective is clear: to prevent JNIM from transforming regional isolation into a mechanism capable of destabilizing the capital itself.
Despite these efforts, the situation remains fragile. As one local official notes: “It is no longer just about fighting armed men, but a strategy aimed at bending an entire country without conquering it.” This shift reflects a broader transformation of the conflict, which now extends beyond the battlefield into the economic system, mobility networks, and social fabric of the state.
At the height of this crisis, Bamako hosted the first edition of the International Defense and Security Expo (BAMEX 2025), held from 11 to 14 November. The event brought together international delegations, experts, and numerous Turkish companies, projecting an image of resilience, international engagement, and state continuity. Yet this display of institutional confidence stood in stark contrast to the realities unfolding across the country, where insecurity, supply disruptions, and economic pressure were steadily intensifying.
At the regional level, dynamics are also evolving. The creation of the Sahel States Alliance in December 2025 reflects an effort by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to coordinate responses, pool resources, and assert greater sovereignty in the face of a shared threat. Whether such initiatives can effectively counter a decentralized and adaptive insurgency, however, remains uncertain.
Ultimately, the crisis in Mali illustrates a profound shift in the nature of contemporary conflict. No longer confined to territorial conquest or direct confrontation, it is increasingly fought through the control of flows—of goods, people, and resources. In this context, the ability to disrupt, isolate, and coerce may prove more decisive than the ability to hold ground.
* Od.Y. covers West Africa for geo‑trends.eu, focusing on security, conflict, and regional politics.