The recent NATO summit in The Hague has produced what diplomatic circles euphemistically term “robust discussions” about defence spending targets. In plainer English, several European governments have discovered that promising to spend five percent of GDP on military hardware involves rather more than symbolic gestures and stirring rhetoric about collective security.
Spain has emerged as the unlikely protagonist of this transatlantic drama, with Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez delivering what amounts to a masterclass in diplomatic defiance. His characterisation of the five percent target as “unreasonable and counterproductive” has sent ripples through alliance corridors, where such candour typically receives the same reception as a vegetarian option at a Texas barbecue.
The arithmetic behind Europe’s newfound reluctance proves illuminating. According to French analytical publication Le Grand Continent, European NATO members would require an additional €510 billion annually to meet the defence spending obligations. Germany alone faces a €125 billion increase, while France confronts an €86 billion burden. These figures represent more than statistical abstractions; they constitute genuine fiscal earthquakes for governments already wrestling with post-pandemic debt levels and increasingly restive electorates.
The economics of military enthusiasm
British think tank New Economics Foundation has provided perhaps the most sobering analysis of the defence spending implications. Their research indicates that NATO’s European Union members would need €613 billion annually to reach the five percent target—a sum considerably exceeding the €375-526 billion shortfall for meeting the bloc’s environmental and social objectives.
This comparison illuminates the opportunity costs that European media outlets have seized upon with considerable relish. The Guardian’s coverage emphasises how Britain’s additional £32 billion annual military expenditure could alternatively fund enough onshore wind farms to generate 620 terawatt-hours of electricity, equivalent to 88 percent of the country’s projected 2050 energy consumption.
Such calculations have prompted uncomfortable questions about priorities that extend far beyond traditional defence policy debates. Sebastian Mang from the New Economics Foundation observes that Europe’s public finance discussions have never concerned affordability, but rather governmental choices about priorities. His assessment that extraordinary military mobilisation exposes the “double standard applied to investment in climate, housing and care” resonates across European capitals where austerity measures remain fresh memories.
Political resistance across the continent
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) has produced what amounts to a manifesto of dissent, with prominent figures including former parliamentary leader Rolf Mützenich and foreign policy specialist Ralf Stegner characterising the defence spending targets as “irrational.” Their document argues that military alarm rhetoric and massive armament programmes create instability rather than security, while calling for gradual détente with Russia.
This internal German opposition reflects broader European scepticism about Washington’s strategic assumptions. Spanish government sources have noted with characteristic directness that they represent “the only ones saying out loud that the emperor has no clothes,” despite many others sharing similar reservations privately.
Belgium and Slovakia have provided explicit support for Spain’s position, though their backing remains cautious. Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever acknowledged that while his country might attempt to meet capability targets with less than 3.5 percent of GDP, “NATO is not foolish” about the realistic costs involved.
The Trump factor and transatlantic tensions
Donald Trump’s reaction to Spanish resistance has provided considerable entertainment for European observers. His characterisation of Spain as “a problem” and threats to make the country “pay twice as much in other ways” exemplify the diplomatic subtlety that has become synonymous with American foreign policy discourse.
The irony has not escaped European commentators that Trump demands five percent defence spending from allies while the United States itself would struggle to maintain such levels sustainably. Spanish officials have noted this contradiction with evident satisfaction, pointing out that France and Germany support increased military expenditure primarily to boost their domestic defence industries rather than address genuine Russian threats.
Media perspectives and national interests
European media coverage reveals fascinating variations in national perspectives on defence spending obligations. German publication Der Spiegel has focused extensively on what it terms “accounting tricks” that allies employ to approach spending targets, while highlighting internal political opposition within the SPD.
Italian media outlets have remained notably subdued despite their country’s commitment to the five percent target, perhaps reflecting awareness that Italy’s debt levels make such expenditure particularly challenging. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has emphasised that targets “should be binding for all 32 alliance members,” though this position conveniently ignores the differential economic impacts across member states.
The reality behind unity rhetoric
Euronews analysis has proven particularly astute in identifying the gaps between official declarations and practical implementation. Their observation that “not all is as it seems” despite statements about alliance unity captures the essential tension between diplomatic necessity and domestic political reality.
The summit’s final declaration deliberately obscures these contradictions through carefully crafted language about “flexibility” and future reviews. Spain and Slovakia maintain they can achieve capability targets while spending less than mandated percentages, while NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte expresses polite scepticism about such mathematical optimism.
Environmental and social implications
The environmental consequences of massive defence spending increases have received particular attention from progressive European media outlets. The Guardian reports that NATO’s military buildup could increase greenhouse gas emissions by nearly 200 million tonnes annually, directly contradicting European climate commitments.
This environmental dimension adds another layer to the defence spending debate, particularly for governments that have staked considerable political capital on green transition policies. The contradiction between military expansion and climate objectives creates uncomfortable choices that extend well beyond traditional security considerations.
The 2029 review
NATO allies have agreed to review progress on defence spending trajectories in 2029, potentially setting new capability targets depending on geopolitical developments. This timeline conveniently extends beyond Trump’s current presidential term, assuming constitutional limitations remain operative.
The review mechanism provides European governments with breathing space to develop more sustainable approaches to defence spending while maintaining alliance solidarity. However, it also ensures that these debates will continue to simmer throughout the remainder of the decade.
European resistance to NATO’s defence spending targets reflects deeper questions about the alliance’s strategic direction and the distribution of security burdens. While official rhetoric emphasises unity and shared commitment, the reality involves complex negotiations between competing national interests, fiscal constraints, and domestic political pressures.
The Spanish-led opposition to five percent defence spending targets represents more than accounting disputes; it embodies fundamental disagreements about European security priorities in an era of multiple challenges. Whether this resistance evolves into sustained policy alternatives or gradually succumbs to American pressure remains the defining question for European defence policy in the coming years.
References
- Gayle, D. (2025, June 24). Europe’s pledge to spend more on military will hurt climate and social programmes. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/24/europes-pledge-to-spend-more-on-military-will-hurt-climate-and-social-programmes
- SPD: Prominente Mitglieder stellen sich gegen Außenpolitik der Bundesregierung. (2025, June 11). Der Spiegel. Retrieved from https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/spd-prominente-genossen-stellen-sich-gegen-aussenpolitik-der-bundesregierung-a-d8584f78-39ac-4fa2-9a02-879829152e3b
- 5% du PIB des Européens représente 500 milliards d’euros en plus. (2025, June 24). Le Grand Continent. Retrieved from https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2025/06/24/des-depenses-de-defense-a-5-du-pib-representeraient-510-milliards-deuros-en-plus-par-an-pour-les-europeens/
- Ayuso, S., Vidal Liy, M., Pérez, C., & González, M. (2025, June 25). “Spain is a problem”: Trump lashes out over NATO contributions. El País. Retrieved from https://english.elpais.com/international/2025-06-25/spain-is-a-problem-trump-lashes-out-over-nato-contributions.html
- Tidey, A., & Murray, S. (2025, June 25). Defence spend to 5% of GDP, Ukraine, Russia: The key takeaways from the NATO summit. Euronews. Retrieved from https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/06/25/defence-spend-to-5-of-gdp-ukraine-russia-the-key-takeaways-from-the-nato-summit