The European Commission presented its Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 on 15 October 2025, setting a clear deadline for military preparedness. The document states that “by 2030, Europe needs a sufficiently strong European defence posture to credibly deter its adversaries.” This public declaration creates an unusual strategic situation. Brussels essentially informed its primary adversary when it expects to be combat-ready.
Russian military analyst Igor Korotchenko responded with remarkable candour to Tass. He noted that “by 2030 the European Union intends to complete practical preparations for a possible war against Russia.” His analysis outlined Russian countermeasures, including enhanced solid-propellant missile systems and mobile ground-based platforms. The Kremlin now possesses a detailed timeline and capability breakdown, courtesy of Brussels’ commitment to transparency.
The EU Defence Readiness 2030 framework allocates €800 billion for defence spending through various mechanisms. This includes the €150 billion SAFE programme for weapons procurement. Yet the document acknowledges that current spending “remains overwhelmingly national, leading to fragmentation, cost-inflation and lack of interoperability.” The Commission targets 40% joint procurement by end-2027, up from less than 20% currently.
Budget Growth vs Strategic Gaps
| Metric | Current Status | 2027 Target | 2030 Target | Strategic Implication |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Joint Procurement | <20% | 40% | N/A | 60% remains fragmented even at target |
| EU/Ukrainian Arms Purchases | N/A | N/A | 60% | 40% still sourced externally |
| Defence Budget (EU-wide) | €218bn (2021) | N/A | €392bn (2025) | Near-doubling, but coordination lacking |
| Drone Wall Operational | 0% | 100% (end-2027) | N/A | Ambitious timeline; member states sceptical |
| Timeline to Readiness | 5 years | 2 years | 0 years | Adversary retains full preparation window |
Sources: Politico, Euractiv, L’Indépendant, The Guardian, Deutsche Welle
The table reveals the core problem with EU Defence Readiness 2030. Even when targets are met, the majority of procurement remains uncoordinated. Germany and France express concern that the Commission is “stepping on NATO’s toes.” NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte felt compelled to state “once and for all” that the EU and NATO work “hand in hand.” When such reassurances become necessary, they typically indicate underlying coordination challenges.
Moscow’s response strategy
Russian state media covered the announcement with notable interest. Izvestia reported that the plan aims to “increase Europe’s combat capability by 2030,” whilst noting Russia’s repeated concerns about NATO intensification on its western borders. The article emphasised Russia’s openness to dialogue “on an equal basis, while demanding that the West abandon the militarization of the continent.”
Korotchenko’s Tass analysis described expected European measures: mass military production across NATO and EU countries, transition from contract to conscript armies, and formation of powerful NATO strike groups. He specifically mentioned conscription already underway in Germany, likely spreading to Scandinavia. Russia now develops “flexible response options” and “advanced Russian solid-propellant missile systems” to address “current and future challenges anticipated over the next five years.”
German intelligence services warn of potential conflict by 2029—one year before the EU expects to be ready. This temporal mismatch creates strategic vulnerability.
The drone wall challenge
The European Drone Defence Initiative represents the most visible component of EU Defence Readiness 2030. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed the “drone wall” concept after NATO shot down Russian drones over Poland. The system should be “operational by the end of 2026” and “fully operational by the end of 2027.”
Several member states consider the 2027 deadline “too ambitious.” Germany and France worry about duplicating NATO efforts. Meanwhile, Russian drones continue penetrating European airspace with regularity. Estonia, Poland, and Romania report repeated incursions.
NATO is testing integrated counter-drone systems on its eastern flank. The alliance will “implement a number of additional counter drone measures” to “detect, track and neutralise aerial threats.” This runs parallel to the EU initiative. Questions remain about leadership, funding, and coordination between the two efforts.
Coordination deficit and spending reality
French media outlet L’Indépendant notes that defence budgets nearly doubled from €218 billion in 2021 to €392 billion projected for 2025. Yet spending remains “fragmented,” hindering rapid weapons modernisation. The EU Defence Readiness 2030 plan calls for specialised coalitions formed by early 2026, with programme launches by mid-2026.
These figures sound impressive until one considers the coordination deficit. Euractiv reports that the Roadmap sets “at least 40% of defence purchases as joint procurement by the end of 2027.” This means 60% remains uncoordinated, duplicative, and inefficient. Sweden’s contribution to the roadmap discussion emphasised that “indicators must be output oriented and focusing on measuring tangible results.” Stockholm wants proof of value before committing funds.
Germany pledged €10 billion for drones over coming years, according to Defence Minister Boris Pistorius. France pursues separate initiatives. Poland increases spending independently. The EU Defence Readiness 2030 framework attempts to corral these efforts into coherent strategy. The document acknowledges that “member States are and will remain sovereign for their national defence.” Sovereignty and coordination rarely coexist comfortably.
Ukraine’s immediate needs vs long-term planning
The Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 envisions Ukraine as a “steel porcupine” capable of deterring Russian aggression. Yet Ukraine requires support now, not in 2030. Kyiv faces immediate ammunition shortages, air defence gaps, and manpower constraints. Brussels offers a vision of Ukrainian defensive capability five years hence, whilst current needs go partially unmet.
Finland’s Defence Minister Antti Hakkanen warned that “Russia will continue to be a major threat to NATO after the war in Ukraine ends.” Finland shares 1,340 kilometres of border with Russia. Helsinki understands the threat intimately. Yet the EU Defence Readiness 2030 timeline suggests Brussels believes it has half a decade to prepare.
The Commission’s roadmap identifies nine capability gaps: air and missile defence, enablers, military mobility, artillery systems, AI and cyber, missile and ammunition, drones and anti-drones, ground combat, and maritime. Addressing these requires time Europe may not possess.
Strategic transparency and its costs
Military strategy typically involves deception, surprise, and information control. The EU Defence Readiness 2030 approach inverts these principles. Brussels published capability gaps, procurement targets, timeline milestones, and funding mechanisms. Russia now knows which European weaknesses to exploit and how long it has to do so.
Euronews described the situation with unintentional irony: “Europe must urgently equip itself with a strategic capacity.” The word “urgently” appears throughout EU documents. Yet the timeline extends five years. This represents either remarkable optimism about threat timelines or fundamental misunderstanding of strategic urgency.
The roadmap emphasises that “technological innovation and iteration—developed at speed and scale—will dictate strength on the battlefield.” Speed, apparently, means 2030. Scale involves getting 40% of procurement coordinated by 2027. Innovation occurs within fragmented national programmes that duplicate effort and inflate costs.
The five-year window
The fundamental challenge in EU Defence Readiness 2030 lies not in its content but its publication. Every element—from the €800 billion budget to the drone wall timeline to the 40% procurement target—now informs Russian planning. Moscow knows when Europe expects to be ready. It knows which capabilities Europe prioritises. It knows internal coordination remains problematic.
The Commission likely believed transparency would demonstrate resolve and encourage member state cooperation. Instead, it created a countdown clock visible to all parties. Russia now plans around 2030 as the inflection point. European defence industries know they have five years to scale production. Member states understand the timeline for difficult procurement decisions.
Meanwhile, Ukraine fights today’s war with insufficient resources. The Baltic states watch Russian military exercises on their borders. Poland reinforces defences whilst awaiting coordinated European support. The EU Defence Readiness 2030 framework offers them a promise: help is coming in five years.
Brussels just announced when it will be ready. Moscow heard the announcement clearly. The question is not whether Europe will be ready by 2030—but whether it can afford to wait that long.