The week of March 22–28 was one of those rare sequences when several large, independent forces move simultaneously — and all in the same direction. Iran formalised its grip on the Strait of Hormuz by routing the trickle of remaining transits through a new channel it controls, charging up to $2 million per passage and advancing legislation to make the arrangement permanent. Ukraine, meanwhile, knocked out 40% of Russia’s western oil export capacity through a sustained drone campaign across Baltic and Black Sea infrastructure — and then disabled a shadow fleet tanker 12 nautical miles from the Bosphorus. The tanker market bifurcated sharply between Gulf rates that reflect existential risk and Atlantic rates that reflect an emerging oversupply problem. Containers rose for a fourth consecutive week. Dry bulk held above 2,000 on Capesize strength alone.
MSC confirmed it has been the money behind Sinokor’s VLCC accumulation all along. Greek owners placed orders for VLCCs at a pace not seen in years. And on the final day of the week, the Houthis launched their first missile at Israel since October 2025, formally joining the war, though stopping short of closing the Bab el-Mandeb.
The market moved. The diplomacy did not.
The Tehran toll booth
For four weeks, the Strait of Hormuz has been the world’s most expensive bottleneck. This week, Iran formalised the arrangement.
On March 22, just one vessel broadcast its AIS signal while transiting the strait. By March 24, that number had climbed to six. Against a pre-war daily average of 138 transits, the comparison is, to put it charitably, stark.
The week’s centrepiece was the “Tehran Toll Booth” — a new routing channel north of Larak Island, through Iranian territorial waters, where the IRGC checks nationality, cargo, crew, and, increasingly, the thickness of an owner’s wallet. According to Bloomberg, payments of up to $2 million per voyage are being sought, on an ad hoc basis. Lloyd’s List tracked 33 transits via Larak Island in the second half of March — and zero through the main southern channel. Two vessels, reportedly, have already paid. In Chinese yuan. The irony of the world’s most critical oil chokepoint now operating as a yuan-denominated toll road has not escaped the market’s notice.
On March 25, Iran announced that “non-hostile vessels” may transit, provided they coordinate with Iranian authorities. The Iranian parliament, meanwhile, advanced a draft bill to codify the toll system into law — reportedly targeting the first week of April for finalisation. On March 26, Israel killed Alireza Tangsiri, the IRGC Navy commander Tehran designated as the architect of the strait’s closure. And on March 27, the IRGC formally prohibited passage for any vessel linked to U.S., Israeli, or allied ports — then turned back three container ships to illustrate the point.
Diplomatically, Trump paused strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure for ten days — until April 6 — citing “productive conversations.” He also revealed that Iran had allowed ten tankers through as a gesture of goodwill, including what appeared to be Pakistani-flagged vessels. Iran responded by rejecting the U.S. 15-point ceasefire plan and submitting its own five-point counteroffer — which notably demands formal recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait. That condition is not going to fly with Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, or Washington. On Saturday March 28 — the final day of this week’s window — the Houthis entered the war. Their military spokesperson Yahya Saree confirmed the launch of a ballistic missile toward “sensitive military targets” in southern Israel, intercepted by the IDF, in explicit support of Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. The Houthis have not yet attacked commercial shipping or closed the Bab el-Mandeb — that remains, in the words of one analyst, their “nuclear option.” Australian investment bank Macquarie now puts the probability of oil hitting $200 per barrel by June at 40%.
🔭 GeoTrends outlook: Iran’s toll system is not a negotiating tactic, it is a structural claim over international waters. If the draft law passes, the Strait stops being an international corridor and becomes a managed concession. That changes the cost basis of every barrel moving from the Gulf to Asia, permanently. The ceasefire timeline is tight: April 6 is Trump’s next self-imposed deadline, Iran’s counter-terms are non-starters, and the Houthis are no longer watching from the sidelines, they fired their first missile at Israel on March 28. Whether commercial shipping in the Red Sea follows is the question the tanker market wakes up to on Monday morning.
The Atlantic retreat: too many VLCCs, too few cargoes
The tanker market’s structural response to Hormuz is now clearly visible. Unable to load in the Middle East, VLCCs are repositioning to the Atlantic basin — West Africa, Brazil, the US Gulf, Guyana — in search of alternative cargoes. The Atlantic, however, cannot absorb the volume. Shipbroker BRS put it plainly: “Soon there should be too many VLCCs chasing too few cargoes.” Shipbroker Gibson agreed: “There are simply not enough cargoes for the number of vessels that will be available.”
The divergence between Middle East and Atlantic rates tells the story plainly. The Baltic Exchange TD3C (MEG–China) index assessed at $400,928 per day in the week of March 23. West Africa–China (TD15) came in at $101,912 per day — well below MEG levels and under sustained downward pressure as repositioning tonnage floods the Atlantic.
| Route | TCE Rate ($/day) | Source | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| MEG – China (TD3C) | $400,928 | Baltic Exchange | w/e 23 Mar |
| West Africa – China (TD15) | $101,912 | Baltic Exchange | w/e 23 Mar |
| Brent Crude | ~$113–114/bbl | EIA | 27 Mar |
The real story inside the tanker market this week is Yanbu. With Hormuz effectively closed, Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea terminal has become the primary outlet for Gulf crude — and VLCC demand has surged with it. According to Vortexa data cited by Lloyd’s List, Yanbu loaded 4.1 million barrels per day of crude and condensate in the week ending March 22 — more than triple the full-year 2025 average of 1.3m bpd, and up 32% week-on-week. On Thursday March 26, ship-position data showed 33 VLCCs at berth or anchored offshore of Yanbu.
Lloyd’s List asked the Houthi Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) directly whether this booming Saudi crude trade through the Bab el-Mandeb would be allowed to continue. The answer, received Thursday morning: “There is no cause for concern in this regard, and at present there is no reason to prevent this trade from continuing.” The operative words are “at present.”
The structural exposure is not subtle. Every VLCC loading at Yanbu must transit the Bab el-Mandeb twice — in ballast inbound, laden outbound. Iran already struck Yanbu’s Samref refinery with a drone on March 19 and fired a missile at the port, which was intercepted. Less than 48 hours after the HOCC issued its reassurance, the Houthis launched a ballistic missile at Israel.
Maersk’s March 24 customer advisory described the situation as “high-risk and rapidly evolving,” warning schedule reliability would remain under pressure into Q2 and introducing a global Emergency Bunker Surcharge from March 25 — its sixteenth operational update since the crisis began. India, meanwhile, deployed five frontline warships under Operation Urja Suraksha to escort over 20 Indian-flagged vessels stranded west of Hormuz. New Delhi did not ask for anyone’s permission.
🔭 GeoTrends outlook: The tanker market now runs on three circuits, not two. The Gulf circuit pays record rates and carries existential risk. The Atlantic circuit pays declining rates and faces a growing oversupply problem. And the Yanbu circuit — the one holding global crude supply together right now — just had its security guarantor enter the war. The HOCC said “at present.” The Houthis fired a missile twelve hours later. Those 33 VLCCs anchored off Yanbu are threading a needle that got measurably narrower on March 28.
Black Sea: a second front opens
While all eyes remained on Hormuz, Ukraine opened a second energy front this week — and produced results the market has not yet fully digested.
On March 25, Reuters confirmed that at least 40% of Russia’s oil export capacity — approximately 2 million barrels per day — is currently offline, following Ukrainian drone attacks on the ports of Primorsk, Ust-Luga, and Novorossiysk, plus damage to the Druzhba oil pipeline running through Ukraine into Hungary and Slovakia. All three of Russia’s main western oil export ports have now taken direct hits in March. Reuters called it “the most severe oil supply disruption in the modern history of Russia” — and Russia is, worth noting, the world’s second-largest oil exporter. The timing, with Brent already above $113 per barrel, is not coincidental.
Then, on March 26, a Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicle struck the Altura — a Sierra Leone-flagged, Turkish-operated tanker loaded with approximately 140,000 metric tonnes of crude from Novorossiysk — just 12 nautical miles north of the Bosphorus Strait. The strike targeted the engine room, disabled the vessel, and left it drifting before Turkish rescue tugs arrived. All 27 crew members survived. The Altura was under EU, Swiss, and UK sanctions. Ukraine has not claimed responsibility. It did not need to.
The attack matters for three reasons beyond the immediate incident. First, it occurred outside Turkish territorial waters — close enough to the Bosphorus to signal that shadow fleet tankers are no longer safe in what was a transit corridor. Second, Türkiye’s Transport Minister, Abdulkadir Uraloğlu, confirmed that authorities believe the strike used an unmanned underwater vehicle — a rare method, suggesting an escalation in Ukrainian naval capability. Third, the Altura’s EU sanctions listing means any insurer, port authority, or bank touching the salvage operation faces legal exposure.
🔭 GeoTrends outlook: Ukraine has effectively established that no Russian oil export route — Black Sea, Baltic, or pipeline — is beyond reach. The 40% capacity figure is the metric that matters. Russia’s Kozmino terminal on the Pacific remains the only major western export route currently unaffected. For global oil markets already under Hormuz strain, the compounding effect of Russian supply disruption is not academic. Brent at $113 may, in retrospect, look like a rounding error.
Containers: four weeks and counting
The Drewry World Container Index (WCI) rose 5% in the week ending March 26, reaching $2,279 per 40ft container — its fourth consecutive weekly increase. The Intra-Asia Container Index (IACI) added another 5%, reaching $676 per 40ft on March 27.
| Route | Rate ($/40ft) | WoW Change |
|---|---|---|
| WCI Global Average | $2,279 | +5% |
| Shanghai–Genoa | $3,474 | +12% |
| Shanghai–Rotterdam | $2,552 | +3% |
| Shanghai–New York | $3,310 | +7% |
| Shanghai–Los Angeles | $2,591 | +4% |
| IACI (Intra-Asia) | $676 | +5% |
The move was led by the Asia–Europe lane, where a double-digit rise on Shanghai–Genoa reflects the direct cost of Hormuz avoidance and extended Cape routings. Carrier surcharge activity intensified across the week. CMA CGM’s Emergency Bunker Surcharge — already raised from $150 to $265 per TEU on March 16 — remains in force, alongside temporary EBS from MSC, OOCL, and COSCO. Maersk introduced a new global Emergency Bunker Surcharge from March 25 and a dedicated Strait of Hormuz Emergency Freight surcharge for Gulf-linked cargo. CMA CGM also announced higher FAK rates of approximately $3,500 per FEU, effective April 1.
Drewry’s Cancelled Sailings Tracker shows 38 blank sailings scheduled across weeks 14–18 (March 28–May 3) out of 706 departures. Only three blank sailings appear on Asia–Europe for the coming week, which suggests carriers do not yet see a capacity problem severe enough to blank aggressively — but are comfortable enough letting rates run.
🔭 GeoTrends outlook: Four consecutive weeks of WCI increases show the crisis is feeding directly into freight costs. The Asia–Europe double-digit move this week is the number to watch: carriers are using Middle East uncertainty to defend rate levels ahead of annual contract negotiations. If Hormuz stays effectively closed, FAK rates of $3,500+ per FEU become the new floor, not a ceiling. A reopening, when it comes, would flush surplus capacity back into the market and reverse these gains with some speed — which is why carriers are blanking selectively rather than aggressively. They want the rates. They are just not sure how long they last.
Dry bulk: Capesize holds, the rest softens
While the tanker market bifurcates between Gulf and Atlantic, the dry bulk sector tracks a quieter narrative this week. The Baltic Dry Index closed at 2,014 points on March 26 — up 13 points on the day, broadly flat across the week, and comfortably above the 2,000-point mark that has anchored the market since mid-March.
Baltic Dry Index – Weekly Monitor (16–19 Mar)
Daily Performance
| Date | BDI | Capesize ($/day) | Panamax ($/day) | Supramax ($/day) | Handysize ($/day) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mon 16 Mar | 2,038 🔺 | $23,040 | $16,528 | $16,030 | $14,186 |
| Tue 17 Mar | 2,024 🔻 | $22,691 | $16,673 | $15,878 | $13,863 |
| Wed 18 Mar | 2,064 🔺 | $23,574 | $17,016 | $15,676 | $13,668 |
| Thu 19 Mar | 2,057 🔻 | $23,389 | $17,177 | $15,540 | $13,491 |
Weekly Averages
| Segment | Avg Earnings ($/day) |
|---|---|
| Capesize | $23,174 |
| Panamax | $16,849 |
| Supramax | $15,781 |
| Handysize | $13,802 |
Week Snapshot
- BDI Trend: Sideways movement with mild volatility (~2,020–2,060 range)
- Capesize: Remains the main driver, holding above $23k/day
- Panamax: Gradual strengthening trend mid-week
- Supramax / Handysize: Soft downward drift through the week
🔭 GeoTrends outlook: BDI above 2,000 looks solid, but the architecture underneath is uneven. Capesize earns it; the rest manage it. The C3 Brazil–China run crossing $30 is a genuine signal — long-haul iron ore flows are tight enough to support rates. But the Pacific softness on C5 is a reminder that not all routes run the same dynamics. If Hormuz stays closed and bunker costs remain elevated, smaller bulkers on shorter routes face margin compression that the headline BDI figure does not fully capture.
MSC–Sinokor: the partnership surfaces
The MSC–Sinokor VLCC partnership first emerged during the week of March 20, when filings by the Hellenic and Cypriot competition authorities revealed that MSC’s Luxembourg subsidiary, SAS Lux, is acquiring a 50% stake in Sinokor Maritime.
This week brought a critical confirmation.
On March 25, Sinokor Chairman Jeong Tae-soon publicly acknowledged the deal for the first time and made clear there will be no price adjustment — despite the tanker market’s sharp rally since the agreement was signed in February. “Regardless of the Middle East situation,” he stated, “the plan proceeds as is.”
The timing is striking. The agreement predates the Hormuz crisis by several weeks, yet market conditions have since shifted dramatically. By most estimates, the valuation of Sinokor’s VLCC fleet has more than doubled. MSC, however, remains committed to the original terms.
Regulatory approvals across Greece, Korea, Cyprus, and Norway are still pending, with no decisions announced to date. MSC has not issued any public comment, consistent with its typically discreet approach.
🔭 GeoTrends outlook: The implications are significant. The deal could place between 25% and 40% of the compliant VLCC spot fleet under the influence of a single entity, at a moment when geopolitical disruption is amplifying the strategic value of scale. Approval is likely. The real question is what conditions regulators impose, and whether those conditions will carry meaningful weight once the transaction is finalized.
Greek shipping: running the gauntlet and taking hits
Dynacom (Prokopiou): three transits and counting. The Marathi, managed by Dynacom Tankers Management, arrived off the Indian port of Sikka this week after completing a third transit of the Strait of Hormuz, carrying approximately one million barrels of Saudi crude. As with its predecessors Shenlong and Smyrni, the vessel switched off its AIS transponder during the passage. Dynacom has offered no comment on any of the three voyages. It has not needed to — the AIS data speaks clearly enough. Among mainstream Western operators, Dynacom is alone in testing the route systematically. The risks are obvious. The commercial logic, at current rate levels, is equally obvious.
Maran Tankers (Angelicoussis): under fire in the Black Sea. The Maran Homer, a Greek-flagged tanker operated by Maran Tankers Management and linked to Maria Angelicoussis, took a missile hit approximately 14 nautical miles off Novorossiysk, sustaining damage on the starboard side. The 24-member crew (10 Greeks, 13 Filipinos, one Romanian) were unharmed. The incident underlines that conflict zones affecting Greek-owned shipping are not limited to the Middle East. The Black Sea trade carries its own, under-reported threat profile.
New orders: the industry bets long. Affinity Shipping confirmed this week that Greek owners account for close to half of all global newbuild contracts in 2026, a record pace. George Prokopiou leads with 12 VLCCs (~$1.4bn, Chinese yards, delivery from 2028). Evangelos Marinakis follows with 11 vessels (~$1.4bn). Anna Angelicoussis has committed to 6 VLCCs (~€800m, 2028–29), and Panos Zisimatos enters the VLCC segment with 2 vessels (~$240m).
🔭 GeoTrends outlook: The Greek newbuild wave is a straightforward bet: the tanker market stays structurally tight through 2028 as orderbooks for current-generation vessels remain thin, and owners placing orders now lock in yard slots before the next wave arrives. Whether the Hormuz crisis accelerates or complicates that thesis depends on how long the disruption lasts and how the VLCC fleet realigns post-crisis. What is certain is that Prokopiou, Marinakis, and Angelicoussis are not buying at the top of a cycle they expect to reverse quickly. And Dynacom’s willingness to run the Strait three times in three weeks, with full commercial awareness of the risk, tells you something about how Greek tanker owners price geopolitical uncertainty — differently from their European peers, and considerably more profitably so far.
The week of March 22–28, 2026 did not produce a resolution at Hormuz. It produced a toll booth, a draft bill, a dead Iranian naval commander, ten tankers as a diplomatic gesture, and a ceasefire framework Tehran formally rejected. In the Black Sea, Ukraine took 40% of Russia’s western export capacity offline and disabled a shadow fleet tanker 12 nautical miles from the Bosphorus. In the Atlantic, the tanker market is building a problem it will have to solve when the crisis ends — too much tonnage, too few cargoes, and rate pressure that Gulf premiums temporarily obscure. In boardrooms from Geneva to Seoul to Athens, the orders are being signed and the calculations made. The market does not wait for wars to end. It prices around them, through them, and occasionally — as Dynacom demonstrated three times this week — straight through the middle of them.