Ocean freight is cyclical. Rates swing, and every carrier sells a similar slot. The cure is to bundle the factory gate, the train, the customs desk and the warehouse. Then switching costs the customer real money. That is the commercial logic behind the COSCO supply chain strategy.
The numbers back it up. Supply chain revenue “other than shipping fee,” the report’s own term, reached RMB 24.09 billion in the first half, up 11.61%, while total container revenue grew only 2.38%, according to the interim report. By our calculation, the service equalled about 22% of container revenue in the first half.
Yang Chen, managing director of Xinde Marine News, describes the build-out: joint ventures with local port groups, stakes in logistics firms, and trucking and rail systems covering 56 and 26 countries. However, these are company claims. We found no independent check.
Resilience is a product, and rivals sell it too
Amid disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, COSCO developed alternative Gulf cargo routes using ports outside the strait and inland transport connections. That landbridge carried over 30,000 TEU by 17 May. According to Yang Chen’s account, the volume had exceeded 50,000 TEU by 15 September. Meanwhile MSC, Maersk and CMA CGM sell overland alternatives of their own. So the COSCO supply chain product has no monopoly on resilience.
The landbridge offers an alternative, but its contribution should not be confused with the throughput lost at individual terminals. CSP Abu Dhabi Terminal handled 442,977 TEU in the first half, down 44.3% from 795,758. At the same time, operators are investing in additional capacity outside the Strait of Hormuz. DP World has agreed in principle to build a new container terminal at Fujairah designed for up to 2.5 million TEU a year, while Gulftainer is pursuing a major expansion at Khor Fakkan.
When ocean freight takes back the spotlight
Then freight rates took over. Third-quarter revenue rose 29.39% to RMB 75.69 billion, while attributable net profit climbed 80.73% to RMB 17.23 billion. The container shipping business generated RMB 73.295 billion in third-quarter revenue, up 30.35% year on year. Over nine months, supply chain revenue reached RMB 37.15 billion, up 12.92%.
Subtracting the first-half figures, GeoTrends calculates third-quarter supply chain revenue at roughly RMB 13.1 billion, up about 15% year on year. Its share of container shipping revenue was approximately 18%, compared with 22% in the first half. Supply chain revenue is included in container shipping revenue, not added to it. Over nine months, supply chain revenue grew 12.92%, against 12.15% for container shipping revenue overall. The first-half growth gap had largely closed.
The first-half growth gap reflected a sluggish half for ocean revenue, not a law of nature. When freight rates rebound, ocean shipping can quickly reclaim the spotlight. The commercial promise of the COSCO supply chain business is insurance-like: more options for moving cargo when established routes are disrupted. Whether that translates into more resilient earnings remains harder to establish. Revenue share is not margin, and the available figures do not isolate supply chain profitability.
Different routes to the same logistics prize
European rivals write cheques for whole businesses. APM Terminals bought the Panama Canal Railway, a 76 km line with USD 77 million of 2024 revenue. MSC’s Africa Global Logistics launched in 2023 with 22 port and rail concessions. MSC’s 2022 purchase of its predecessor, Bolloré Africa Logistics, carried a €5.7 billion enterprise value. CMA CGM paid €4.85 billion for Bolloré Logistics, then closed on Freightliner on 29 January 2026, adding ten terminals.
COSCO, by Yang Chen’s account, leans more on partnerships and stakes. It holds 51% of a Ningbo supply chain venture with Ningbo Zhoushan Port and 60% of a Guangxi venture with Beibu Gulf Port Group. It also lifted its stake in COSCO SHIPPING Logistics & Supply Chain from 7% to 19%, he writes. The transactions’ financial terms are not specified in Chen’s account, limiting direct comparisons with the European acquisitions. These ventures operate within China’s jurisdiction. Abroad, a similar approach may face a different regulatory environment, including investment screening.
Piraeus rebounds, but what does it measure?
COSCO runs Piers II and III through Piraeus Container Terminal (PCT) under a 35-year concession that began on 1 October 2009. In the first half, Piraeus handled 1,995,150 TEU, down 2.9%, while COSCO’s overseas terminals grew 18.0%. COSCO blamed softer Mediterranean demand and bad weather. Then the third quarter reversed the slide: Piraeus handled 1,090,284 TEU, up 11.4%, which CSP credits to growing Mediterranean demand. By our calculation, that lifts nine-month volume by about 1.7%. Mediterranean demand was central to COSCO’s explanation of both movements, although adverse weather also contributed to the first-half decline.
The profit line tells a different story. In 2025, PCT’s turnover rose 12.5% to €317.9 million, and net profit reached €36.1 million, even as throughput fell 5.95%. Revenue rose while volume fell. That may reflect changes in pricing, service mix or other revenue sources, but the public numbers do not say which.
The rail performance still needs measuring
In China, the COSCO supply chain model comes with route-level data. COSCO reports 11,914 TEU on its Huizhou–Yantian rail service and nearly ten departures a week. At Piraeus, PCT says its rail ramp handles up to ten trains a day. Yet GeoTrends found no public indicator of rail’s share of container traffic. A missing metric is not missing traffic. It means outsiders cannot judge performance.
Han Chao, chairman of Piraeus Port Authority (PPA), said in December 2025 that the authority is examining interventions to strengthen the rail link. The statement included neither a measurable target nor a timetable.
Meanwhile, Thriasio II, a planned rail freight and logistics hub west of Athens, has been awarded to a consortium of Hellenic Train and DAMCO. The ministry confirmed the 30-year concession award, valued at more than €561 million excluding VAT, clearing the way for contract signing. COSCO is not the awardee. The commercial relationship between the port and the inland hub could become an important test of logistics integration, regardless of who controls the infrastructure.
Brussels changes the bargaining terms
A near-unanimous shareholder vote on 27 August expanded the Piraeus Port Authority’s corporate powers. Approved with 99.94% of votes, the charter amendment gives PPA greater scope to manage ports beyond Piraeus, acquire stakes in other companies and establish subsidiaries. Chairman Han Chao linked the subsidiary provision to logistics development.
The change is already taking shape. On 19 October, PPA announced plans to establish Piraeus Gate Supply Chain, a wholly owned subsidiary intended to develop logistics, transport and infrastructure services. Its planned activities include warehousing, distribution, partnerships and investments in Greece and abroad.
Meanwhile, Regulation (EU) 2026/1386 introduces a stronger framework for screening foreign investments, with its main provisions applying from 17 January 2028. Every member state must establish a screening mechanism. Investments in transport infrastructure assessed as critical will fall within the common minimum scope, including qualifying investments made through EU-based subsidiaries controlled by non-EU investors.
The implication for COSCO is conditional, not automatic. A future investment in a European port or rail asset could face additional scrutiny, depending on the transaction, ownership structure and national assessment of the infrastructure. The charter amendment came just over 16 months before the new framework’s main provisions take effect.
COSCO reports selected route-level logistics figures in China. At Piraeus, comparable public indicators of inland connectivity remain difficult to find. The real question is whether Piraeus can become a measurable logistics gateway, not just a busy terminal. Three tests will tell.
First, will PCT or PPA disclose rail’s share of container traffic? Second, what investments or partnerships will follow PPA’s new subsidiary? Third, will any hinterland link, at Thriasio II or elsewhere, report volumes tied to Piraeus?
Until then, Piraeus can claim resilience, but outsiders cannot measure it.