Skip to content

The Chancay Megaport promises a global trade advantage for Peru but has sparked social and environmental tensions, with community concerns challenging its ambitious expansion under COSCO’s investment

Port2Port | by
Jasson Agustín Fernández Díaz
Jasson Agustín Fernández Díaz
GeoTrends_View of the Chancay megaport construction site in Peru with surrounding residential area, highlighting proximity of construction to local homes amidst growing concerns and local protests
OjoPúblico / Omar Lucas
The Chancay Megaport Project in Peru, a strategic venture aimed at enhancing trade, has spurred significant controversy
Home » Chancay Megaport: A strategic gateway and a source of tension in Peru’s coastal development

Chancay Megaport: A strategic gateway and a source of tension in Peru’s coastal development

The Chancay Megaport, initially conceived in the late 1990s, has evolved from a local port vision into a pivotal project for global trade, now backed by China’s COSCO Shipping. However, the port’s development has been marked by controversies over land acquisitions, regulatory flexibility, and environmental and community impacts. Local communities express concerns about air quality, wetlands preservation, and limited public consultation. This mix of economic promise and social discord underscores the complex impact of Chancay’s transformation, positioned to rival Peru’s largest ports while facing ongoing local opposition.

Tensions surrounding the approval and construction of the Chancay Port Terminal Project

Environmental tensions: Since 2013, a group of local fishermen has protested the construction of the Port of Chancay, led by Terminales Portuarios Chancay S.A. (TPCH). The Virgin de la Covadonga Fishermen’s Association claimed that the Environmental Impact Study (EIA) process was incomplete, putting two significant elements at risk: The Santa Rosa wetlands and the remains of the Chilean warship, Virgen de la Covadonga, sunk during the Pacific War.

The Santa Rosa wetlands, situated just 180 meters from the project, are shielded by El Cascajo hill. Every month, a group of residents gathers to clean the wetland and remove water lettuce that covers its surface, making them its de facto guardians. The consortium proposed reducing the height of El Cascajo from 80 meters to 4 meters, effectively erasing it. Although consortium reports indicated plans to monitor potential impacts on the wetland, the residents of Chancay remained skeptical.

“We’ve identified a high diversity of species in the wetland, including plants found nowhere else in Lima. What’s happening with the megaport is concerning,” commented Héctor Aponte, a doctor of biological sciences who continues to study the Santa Rosa wetland. According to his research, these coastal ecosystems are interconnected and vital for conserving migratory bird routes.

On March 3, 2013, the District Defense and Development Front of Chancay organized a blockade of the Panamericana Norte highway. However, Terminales Portuarios had already achieved its objectives by persuading certain local leaders of artisanal fishermen to sign an acceptance agreement in exchange for a financial compensation of $3,200 each. This agreement facilitated the approval of environmental impact studies and led to the sale of Chancay’s beaches and sea.

In April 2013, residents of Los Álamos and Peralvillo mobilized against the megaproject’s construction, following a public consultation that reportedly did not reflect the actual sentiment of affected residents.

“We aren’t against investment, but we want it to be executed elsewhere, away from the population. For instance, it could be in Río Seco,” stated Zenón Gallegos, President of the Chancay Port Defense Front. Similarly, former Provincial Mayor of Huaral, Víctor Bazán Rodríguez, along with some council members, expressed concern over the project’s location:

“We must respect the people’s decision; building a mineral port in Chancay is not advisable. It should be done elsewhere.”

Between 2014 and 2015, complaints were filed in the courts of Callao and Chancay over alleged irregularities in the authorization and approval processes by the state and Chancay’s local authorities. The committee continued to organize activities while the project moved forward, with Terminales Portuarios Chancay purchasing the Cerro la Trinidad subterranean pass from National Assets in 2015 for 487,143.71 soles for an area of 24,417.89 m².

In 2016, as former President Ollanta Humala inaugurated the project by laying the cornerstone, residents organized a protest nearby. They held banners reading, “Yes to life. No to pollution,” and “Volcan means minerals. Don’t deceive us,” hoping Humala would listen. However, he left by helicopter before the event concluded, leaving no opportunity for engagement. Despite the cornerstone ceremony, protesters reaffirmed their commitment to fighting against the construction of the contentious port.

In August 2020, following a virtual public hearing on the Modification of the Detailed Environmental Impact Study (MEIA) for the Chancay Multipurpose Port project, social organizations from the district of Chancay (Huaral) submitted a report to SENACE containing 50 technical observations prepared by biologist Stefan Jorg Austermühle, Executive Director of the NGO Mundo Azul.

Austermühle’s report highlighted several effects that the consortium had not included in its initial study, such as coastal erosion caused by large-scale land movements and the impact on marine wildlife due to the heavy traffic of large vessels anticipated at the port. He told BBC Mundo that “the study presented by the company used inappropriate methodologies to conceal and downplay the impacts, taking advantage of the Peruvian authorities’ lack of expertise.”

For the Association for the Defense of Housing and the Environment of the Port of Chancay, the Environmental Monitoring Committee of the Santa Rosa Wetland, the District Defense Front of Chancay, and other organizations, the project poses “severe negative environmental impacts that will harm our natural resources, environment, and population as a whole.”

After receiving Austermühle’s report, SENACE requested that the consortium modify its Environmental Impact Study, resulting in changes to some aspects of the project. Among these adjustments, large tubes were installed that now span Chancay Beach from end to end. Austermühle explained that “these are geotubes, used to contain rising waters,” but cautioned that “this technology has already failed in many other places and does not resolve the coastal erosion issue.” This poses an additional problem for an area that was affected on January 15, 2022, by an oil spill at a refinery operated by the Spanish company Repsol.

William Jurado, a native of Chancay, points to the fishing boats anchored off the beach. “We used to live peacefully with fishing and tourism, but all that is over now,” he says. His main concern is that the port will continue to expand and ultimately consume the wetland he enjoys walking through, where he watches seagulls, swallows, sandpipers, gallinules, and ducks flutter about. “I feel a deep sense of indignation,” Jurado expresses. The residents have also voiced their concerns about the potential destruction of marine wildlife. “The birds of the Santa Rosa Wetland would permanently leave due to the loud noises from construction and port operations.”

Just meters away from the Chancay Port Terminal construction site lies the Santa Rosa wetland

For this reason, the Chancay District Defense Front, the District Interests Coordinator of Chancay, the Association for the Defense of Housing and Environment of Chancay Port, the Environmental Monitoring Committee of the Santa Rosa Wetland-Chancay, the National Human Rights Coordinator, and CooperAcción have demanded that SENACE reject the EIA for the “Expansion of the Operational Port Area-Phase 1 of the Multipurpose Chancay Port Terminal” project, prepared by the ECSA consultancy firm.

Miriam Arce, President of the Association for the Defense of Housing and Environment of Chancay Port, states, “The EIA presented by ECSA attempts to hide the danger of collapsing Chancay’s cliffs, the loss of tourist beaches, and, on top of that, they promise solutions they will not fulfill. President Vizcarra, do not approve this EIA; enough with the abuse.” William Jurado, General Coordinator of the Environmental Monitoring Committee for the Santa Rosa Wetland-Chancay, denounces that ECSA “chose a construction alternative that only prioritizes lowering project costs. Therefore, we request that it not be approved because it endangers the Santa Rosa Wetland’s natural ecosystem, a habitat vital for conserving our biodiversity.”

Not everyone here seems to share the same sorrow. Recently, new residents have arrived in Chancay, drawn by the expectations of growth and opportunity around the port. “Some people have already started occupying wetland land, thinking they’ll be able to sell it in the future,” says Davila. At the edge of the small town, a sign points to the shifting times: “I buy land near the megaport.”

One achievement of the citizen protests regarding the EIA in December 2020 was the inclusion of the wetland within the project’s direct area of influence, due to social pressure and similar objections from SENACE. “The EIA does not address pollution from smaller particles or impacts on wetland birds. The company offered different versions to secure approval,” says Williams Jurado, Coordinator of the Santa Rosa Wetland Environmental Monitoring Committee.

In 2023, the Peruvian Society for Environmental Law (SPDA) issued a report summarizing the key controversial issues in their assessment of potential environmental and social impacts, listing important points to consider:

•        The ITS as an exceptional tool for environmental modification and/or improvement.

•        Compatibility of the project with the Santa Rosa Wetland.

•        Gaps in the citizen participation mechanisms used.

•        Environmental compensation in transport and communications investment projects.

•        Air pollution from blasting and noise pollution.

•        Coastal erosion and receding seawater, which impact the ecosystem and marine life.

•        Impacts on artisanal fishing and tourism.

Urban tensions: In March 2017, a group of residents reported to local media that a series of explosions and excavations, conducted as part of the Environmental Impact Study, had caused cracks in their homes. SENACE was aware of this, and various reports, accessed by “Ojo Público” (2024) through a transparency request, confirm that the entity had documented “dissatisfaction with the project due to property damage” since March 2019.

The consortium acknowledged in documents linked to the EIA modification that the effects of vibrations from their work ranged from “always noticeable” to “strongly noticeable” to people nearby, supporting what residents reported. Following complaints, the consortium covered minor repairs, such as fixing cracked windows, as confirmed by Diálogo Chino after visiting over a dozen homes in areas where the Mamani family and others live. However, according to the owners, these damages persist, and there is still no resolution for the more severe impacts.

By 2021, more testimonies emerged, reporting that for the past five years, work on what is set to become the most important port on the continent has been damaging homes, and no one is listening to residents’ complaints. The white paint covering the walls of the Mamani Flores family home has deteriorated. Mold and cracks spread across the cement that holds up this Chancay house, located on Peru’s coast, 80 kilometers north of Lima. “We didn’t build a house for it to collapse overnight. We built it for our children, but now it’s uninhabitable,” says Oscar Mamani, as worn down as his walls.

The Mamanis live nearly 100 meters from the wall separating them from the land occupied by Cosco Shipping Ports Chancay Peru. Miriam Arce, president of the Association for the Defense of Housing and the Environment in Chancay, reports that “many neighbors have seen cracks appear in their homes, and entire neighborhoods have to be evacuated daily due to the blasts.”

In addition to the cracks, residents state they’ve had to endure daily noise and explosions from the construction of the Multipurpose Port for the past year. “The noise, the ear-piercing sounds, the constant sonic pollution. I’m asking for this to stop; they shouldn’t treat us this way. I’m fed up, I can’t take it anymore. I’m exhausted; I’m going to report the company,” said one neighbor.

The issue now is that the construction is taking place near populated areas like the January 21st Human Settlement and Santa Rosa, which are both being affected. In communication with LAMULA (2017), community leader Miriam Arce stated that “32 explosions have been carried out so far.” “90% of the homes near the port are affected.” She added, “Noise pollution from heavy machinery drilling into the hill next to the homes is unbearable and harmful to human health.”

She also calls on local authorities and the Ombudsman’s Office to address the situation, as their right to live in a healthy and safe environment is being compromised.

The construction of the Chancay Megaport has affected the homes of some local residents

In response to the 2020 MEIA, biologist Austermühle’s report highlighted health risks, and during a press conference, representatives of Chancay’s social organizations stated they face a risk of lung cancer due to exposure to toxic emissions. They also warned of the risk of property collapse, including homes, businesses, industries, agricultural areas, and the coastal roads on the Chancay cliff edge, due to beach erosion (up to 190 meters).

“We are suffering psychological damage. No one knows what it’s like to live all day on edge due to the explosions,” says Arce, who raised the issue directly with President Castillo in Yauyos at one of the cabinet meetings he often holds in rural areas away from Lima. Although Pedro Castillo initially listened and advised her to contact the Minister of Transportation and Communications, Arce claims all her attempts have been in vain.

In May 2023, the issue of land subsidence resurfaced in the city, and megaport construction was halted due to ground sinking. On the morning of May 17, authorities announced the suspension to allow investigations into the cause of the phenomenon, which has destroyed several houses and affected dozens of homes in the Peralvillo area. A section of land 10 meters wide and 16 meters long collapsed, destroying an elderly couple’s home. In October 2022, there was also subsidence on a road near a school at the opposite end of the 2023 collapse site.

Rómulo Zarauz, head of Social Responsibility at COSCO, points out that the subsidence is due to an abrupt change in the soil, which consists of sand and debris from fill, particularly affecting informal constructions. Five years ago, construction began on an underground tunnel for the port of Chancay as part of an investment by the Chinese company COSCO Shipping. By that time, 350 meters of the tunnel, designed to traverse the Trinidad hill, had been completed. The tunnel is located 16 meters deep, and the subsidence has reached 3 meters.

As a result of this subsidence, several homes have developed cracks, and affected residents have requested compensation for building new houses. However, residents prefer to have their homes rebuilt on the same site rather than being relocated, as proposed by the consortium, which intends to move them to other apartments. These houses were constructed just five years ago.

Additionally, regarding the explosions, it was emphasized that the work was carried out using blasts, which occurred between 1 PM and 3 PM. Each explosion intensified in 2022, leading to the first cracks in the homes. According to the consortium, 440 houses would be affected, with 120 receiving compensation. The company offers a monthly payment ranging from $240 to $400 (900 to 1,500 soles), depending on the proximity of the houses; those closest receive $400 (1,500 soles). However, residents do not want the noise or the explosions.

Rómulo Zarauz, Social Responsibility Manager at COSCO Shipping, the company responsible for the construction, reported that the exact causes of the subsidence are being investigated and that construction would be temporarily halted until answers are obtained. Preliminary findings suggest that the disaster may have been caused by changes in soil type along the tunnel construction area. “The problem is that the variability of the soil along the tunnel is very high. When you add to this that people build in unsuitable areas, the level of risk increases considerably. However, until now, we hadn’t encountered significant problems,” the spokesperson explained to Canal N.

Institutional tensions: In early 2021, while public attention was focused on the pandemic, one of the most controversial events surrounding the project occurred: on February 10, less than two months after receiving the request from COSCO Shipping Ports Chancay Peru, the APN granted the company port authorization for the New Stage 1 of the “Chancay Multipurpose Port Terminal” project. The resolution of Board Agreement No. 0008-2021-APN-DIR established, among other points, that the Chancay terminal was a private initiative for public use, exclusively providing essential services within the port infrastructure. This port authorization generated debate in March 2024 when the case became public through two complaints.

First, the APN acknowledged in a statement that it lacked the authority to grant exclusivity of services to the terminal and classified its action as “an error in an administrative act.” Therefore, it requested the annulment of Article 2 of the aforementioned board agreement. “There is no legal framework that empowers me to grant exclusivity,” said Milagros Miguel, head of the legal advisory unit at the APN, during a session of the Special Chancay Project Commission of the Peruvian Congress held on April 1, which included representatives from the Port Authority, the company, and sector authorities. “If we start with a violation of our regulations, what legal security and what message are we sending to other investors? A country that does not comply with its own laws, what kind of country is that?” Miguel stated. In a similar vein, the Ministry of Transportation’s Legal Office filed an administrative lawsuit against the Chinese company to annul the agreement. However, in June, the MTC withdrew the lawsuit.

Second, on February 14, 2024, four departments of the Public Transport Infrastructure Investment Supervisory Authority (Ositran) sent a report to Verónica Zambrano, president of Ositran, requesting that an informative complaint be filed with Indecopi. The complaint refers to an alleged bureaucratic barrier imposed by the National Port Authority (APN), which would have favored the Chinese-Peruvian consortium responsible for the port terminal, according to Latina Noticias. Ositran, in its role of regulating economic activity related to public port infrastructure, whether publicly or privately owned, identified these irregularities.

Verónica Zambrano explained that in Peru, there are two types of port management: by concession contract and by port authorization. The Ports Law of Peru (Law 27943) allows for exclusivity of services only through concession, not through port authorization. She also clarified that the goal of promoting port investments is for large private investments to recover their capital through service exclusivity, even though the law does not contemplate this possibility for port authorizations. Therefore, she believes the solution lies in reviewing and adjusting Law 27943 to adapt regulatory forms to the new scenario of large private investments.

Considering this situation, the executive branch, through the ministries, expressed its intention to resolve these controversies by amending the National Port System Law. This solution could materialize soon if Congress approves the APN’s proposed amendment to the Ports Law, which would empower this entity to grant exclusivity in services to private companies, as occurred three years ago with Cosco Shipping Chancay Peru. Finally, on June 7, 2024, Law No. 32048 was enacted, amending Law 27943 to allow “port authorizations” to be granted to private holders, enabling them to provide port services exclusively. This amendment aims to promote port development in the country.

The Chancay Port is going to transform the region, reshaping its economy, landscape, and community dynamics

History of the enabling of the port to COSCO Shipping Ports Chancay Peru

2007: Origin of Chancay Port S.A.: The story begins in the late 1990s when CEPRI PESCA PERÚ established several subsidiaries to privatize its movable and immovable assets. Among these, PESCA PERÚ CHANCAY S.A. was founded, which was awarded in the second auction of 1996 to Pesquera Némesis S.A. for a bid of $1,520,962.15 (5,751,333.00 soles). In 2004, through an administrative restructuring, Pesquera Ribaudo S.A., owned by former Admiral Juan Ribaudo De La Torre, took over the administrative control of Pesquera Némesis S.A.

In 2007, Juan Ribaudo founded Empresas Chancay Port S.A., utilizing resources from Pesquera Ribaudo S.A. Despite sanctions imposed by INDECOPI, he acquired land adjacent to Pesquera Némesis S.A., which was subsequently transferred to this new company.

According to research by Ojo Público (2024), records from the National Superintendency of State Assets (SBN) indicate that one of the first signs of its expansion dates back to April 17, 2009, when Chancay Port S.A. purchased a public plot of land measuring 115,876 m². In a resolution from the SBN regarding the public auction, it was reported that on the same day, Chancay Port became the owner of the land. The auction’s starting price was $98,088.57 (approximately $0.85 USD per m²), and the final payment was $98,088.67—just 10 cents above the base price for the entire lot.

The SBN records also show three additional purchases—made through public auction—by Chancay Port. The first was a plot of 32,340 m², acquired in June 2009 for $35,197 (less than $1.09 USD per m²); the second, a land area of 39,454 m², purchased for $48,000 (less than $1.22 USD per m²); and the third, an area of 2,256 m², bought for $11,000 (about $4.88 USD per m²). The last two acquisitions occurred in January 2010.

Originally focused on providing shipping and vessel services, the company received an injection of $13,000 (50,000 soles) and changed its name to Chancay Port S.A. On the same day, they also updated the company’s objective to include activities related to port operations and dock management. In this context, Juan Ribaudo De La Torre’s vision was to create a mega port in Chancay, competitive with the Port of Callao, taking advantage of its deep draft that would allow for the arrival of vessels with substantial cargo volumes and the transportation of containerized grains and minerals. Ribaudo projected that the construction would take about 20 years, divided into six phases.

2008: Application for permits to build the port: For Chancay Port S.A. to develop port infrastructure, it first required a temporary authorization to conduct studies for future construction. This permission is granted by the National Port Authority (APN), a specialized technical body that promotes the development of ports in the Republic of Peru. The APN grants this permission for a maximum period of two years, which can be renewed for an additional year.

At that time, one of the controversial events surrounding the project occurred: the declassification of an “intangible” coastal zone. On January 30, 2008, Ribaudo de la Torre, as the General Manager of Chancay Port, sent a letter to the Peruvian Navy requesting the transfer of a maritime area reserved for national defense. The reason was the construction of a multipurpose port terminal in the bay of the district.

To facilitate this, he requested a modification of Supreme Resolution 0694-2005-DE/MGP, which outlines the coordinates of coastal areas designated exclusively for the Navy’s use in national defense. According to sector regulations, properties reserved for armed forces for security and national defense purposes are intangible, inalienable, and imprescriptible due to their strategic nature. Two months later, the then-commander general of the Navy, Carlos Gamarra García, sent a project to the Ministry of Defense (Mindef) to modify the aforementioned resolution. Initially, the ministry observed the project for “technical-legal omissions,” but the matter did not end there.

On May 8, 2008, the secretary to the Navy commander addressed the observations, stating that the maritime area requested by Chancay Port S.A., measuring “approximately 0.170 km² (a triangle of 600 x 550 meters), represents only 0.002% of the total area designated for national defense purposes.” For this reason, he indicated, it “does not strategically affect the operational activities of the Naval Forces.” Thus, in November of that year, Mindef ratified Supreme Resolution 539-2008-DE/MGP—signed by then-Minister Ántero Flores Aráoz and Alan García, as President of the Republic. This regulation modified RS 694-2005 DE/MGP and formalized the transfer of the maritime area to Chancay Port.

Jorge Manchego Rendon explained to Ojo Público (2024) that this should not have occurred. “They shouldn’t [have ceded that maritime area],” he said. Former Defense Minister Mariano González Fernández has a somewhat different opinion. While he does not see it as an irregularity, he considers this measure unusual. “It’s something sui generis due to [what it means for] the investment in a new port of this nature. It’s not something that happens every day, but it has followed the legal process,” he stated when consulted on the matter.

In December 2008, Chancay Port began the necessary procedures with the APN, which made several observations regarding its master plan. The company addressed the concerns, and the APN sent the file to the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC). Interest was high, prompting them to request a regional interest declaration from the regional government to carry out the projects. However, the technical team of the Regional Government of Lima detected, among the main concerns for the project, the lack of a detailed study and a report on sediments based on tides and topography. This latter study is crucial for planning the stability of the works and the dimensions and location of the breakwaters.

2009: The first permits for Chancay Ports: On May 20, 2009, the company was granted the first temporary authorization for the use of a water area and the coastal strip, covering an area of 623,243 m² (0.62 km²). This authorization lasted one year, as requested by Chancay Port. Upon expiration, the company could request a renewal for an additional year, which it did on April 20, 2010.

In 2010, they applied for an extension of the permit, which was granted. Temporary authorizations typically last for one or two years, with an additional one-year extension. In 2008, they were granted a one-year permit, and in 2010, they were approved for a retroactive extension covering the period from 2009 to 2010. At the beginning of 2011, they again requested temporary authorization, but Article 30 of the National Port System Law Regulations states that such authorizations are exclusive in nature, thus prohibiting the granting of consecutive authorizations (DM2011-07-13).

Τhe project has also to community tensions, with environmental concerns and impacts on local homes

2011: Creation of Terminales Portuarios Chancay S.A. to request a new permit: In parallel to this denial, a new company emerged that sought a temporary authorization from scratch for the project: Terminales Portuarios Chancay S.A. This company was established on April 5 of that same year, with shareholders including Chancay Port S.A.—the company to which the MTC had denied the renewal of the permit (with the same legal address, the same manager, and a social capital of 30,000 soles)—and Empresa Administradora de Puertos S.A., a subsidiary of the mining company Volcán, created months earlier.

In this context, just two weeks after the denial to Chancay Port, the MTC granted Terminales Portuarios Chancay S.A. the temporary authorization for the use of a water area and the coastal strip, this time covering more than 1.4 million m² (1.4 km²), almost double the initial size.

Moreover, Ojo Público (2024) indicates that eight months later, Terminales Portuarios Chancay S.A. increased its social capital from $7,963 (30,000 soles) to approximately $2.2 million (8.2 million soles), representing an increase of over 27,000%, as reported to the National Superintendency of Public Registries.

2013: Approval of the Environmental Impact Study (EIA) for the Terminales Portuarios Chancay Project: On December 13, 2013, the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC) approved the Environmental Impact Study (EIS) for the “Project for Bulk, Liquid, and Rolling Cargo Terminal” of Chancay Port Terminals. A year earlier, on October 2, 2012, the Chancay District Municipality had already approved the terms and conditions for a road improvement project submitted by Chancay Port Terminals. This project included the construction of a 2.3-kilometer underground viaduct that would traverse the port’s access roads and the neighborhoods of Santa Rosa, Peralvillo, and Los Álamos, intended exclusively for vehicular traffic related to terminal operations.

In light of this situation, citizens from the affected areas submitted a document to the Chancay District Municipality requesting explanations and the legal, social, and economic justification for the construction of the viaduct. On January 14, 2014, the municipal manager, Carlos Sánchez, responded that Chancay Port Terminals had not submitted any technical or administrative files to request authorization, but had only made a project presentation. “Officially, the route of this viaduct is unknown,” he stated to Ojo Público (2024).

In March of the same year, the Urban Development Management of the Provincial Municipality of Huaral issued a technical report concluding that the construction of the viaduct would cause severe damage to homes and generate significant noise pollution for residents in the nearby areas. Furthermore, the report warned that the Chancay District Municipality had approved the project without conducting an adequate analysis.

Seven months later, the National Port Authority (APN) granted Chancay Port Terminals S.A. the first authorization for the project “Bulk, Liquid, and Rolling Cargo Terminal at Chancay Port.” This document authorized the commencement of port construction for a period of 27 months. Two months later, on December 19, 2014, the Chancay District Municipality granted the building permit for the terminal.

The approval of the Technical Sustaining Report (TSR) for the construction of the tunnel-viaduct by the MTC came only on July 10, 2015, nearly six months later. Three months afterward, the company obtained the building permit from the Chancay District Municipality for this component of the project. Regarding the Environmental Impact Study (EIS) for this project, community leader Miriam Arce pointed out to LAMULA (2017) that the public hearing in 2013 was conducted “abusive and arbitrarily.” She also noted that “citizens and representatives from the project’s impact area were not allowed entry.”

2016: Volcán Compañía Minera–The new owner of Chancay Port Terminals: Following the death of Juan Ribaudo, the subsequent two years were marked by the absorption of his partners by Chancay Port Terminals. In April 2016, the company absorbed Chancay Port, which had increased its capital to over $4.3 million (S/16.5 million). The following year, it was the turn of the Port Management Company, whose capital had also grown to nearly $39 million (S/145.5 million). Thus, Volcán Compañía Minera S.A.A., through Empresa Administradora de Puertos S.A.C., acquired 100% of the shares of Chancay Port Terminals S.A. During this period, Volcán sought strategic partners and investors interested in continuing the construction phases of the port infrastructure. It was estimated that the multipurpose port in Chancay would require an investment of $1.6 billion and include the construction of ten equipped docks. Simultaneously, the Logistics Activity Zone in Chancay would be developed, with an estimated investment of approximately $1.2 billion. Notably, in May 2016, former President Ollanta Humala laid the first stone, officially inaugurating the megaport project in Chancay.

2019: Creation of COSCO Shipping Ports Chancay Perú: The turning point occurred in May 2019 when the Chinese company COSCO Shipping Ports Limited acquired 60% of Chancay Port Terminals for $225 million during the first half of the year, sharing ownership with the Peruvian miner Volcan, which retained the remaining 40%. The project was renamed COSCO Shipping Ports Chancay Perú. This is the first port that the large state-owned Chinese shipping company will fully control in the Western Hemisphere, as its presence in the Port of Seattle, USA, is limited to operating a terminal. COSCO operates 34 terminals worldwide, 11 of which are outside of China, including those in Valencia and Bilbao.

Recently, on August 24, 2023, at a General Shareholders’ Meeting of Volcan, the separation of an asset block corresponding to 40% of the shares of COSCO Shipping Ports Chancay Perú S.A. was approved. Additionally, the creation of Inversiones Portuarias Chancay S.A.A. was authorized, which will receive the resulting asset block from the spin-off. The procedures for its registration and listing on the stock exchange are underway, and on September 15, 2023, the constitution of Inversiones Portuarias Chancay S.A.A. came into effect.

This is the boundary between the megaport’s land and the local community. People are beginning to feel cornered

2020: Approval of the Modification of the Environmental Impact Study (MEIA): On December 22, the Directoral Resolution 00158-2020-SENACE-PE/DEIN was published regarding the project “Expansion of the Port Operational Zone – Stage 1 of the Multipurpose Port Terminal of Chancay.” The request for the evaluation of the MEIA-d was submitted by Cosco Shipping Ports Chancay Perú S.A. to the Environmental Assessment Directorate for Infrastructure Projects of the National Service of Environmental Certification for Sustainable Investments (SENACE), which ultimately approved the request. The approval of the MEIA-d is part of the “IntegrAmbiente” process, a public sector effort to integrate up to 14 environmental permits into the evaluation of a detailed Environmental Impact Study (EIS-d).

“Obtaining this approval through the Global Environmental Certification modality allows for the issuance of all necessary permits within the certification itself, which would otherwise need to be requested from other entities linked to the project, in addition to establishing limited deadlines for evaluation,” stated Percy Grandez, lawyer for the Marine Governance Program of the Peruvian Society for Environment (SPDA), in Dialogo Chino (2021). Grandez added, “One of the purposes of this framework was to have short timelines, making it a modality aimed at attracting investments.”

The approval of the MEIA-d occurred amid controversies. According to various social and environmental organizations, a series of concerns raised by authorities, such as potential impacts on air quality and the Chancay wetland, were not addressed. In March 2021, SENACE rejected the appeal submitted by citizens. The reason: the arguments presented did not challenge the resolution itself, but rather the observations that civil society believed the company had failed to respond to. According to SENACE, this was insufficient to annul the approval.

Miriam Arce, spokesperson for the Association in Defense of the Housing of Chancay Port, asserted that the project never had community approval. “They held a virtual hearing that was a fraud; we objected to that because they did not use any virtual platform, only a cable television channel. And during the in-person participatory workshops before the quarantine, they did not allow the community in, and when we tried to speak, infiltrators would make noise,” Miriam told Wayka (2020).


The second part of Jasson Agustín Fernández Díaz’s article is also published on geo-trends.eu. The full research on the Chancay Megaport is available in Spanish on the website www.contestedports.com.

References 

Chavez, R.; Alarcón, L.; Huamán, G. (2024). Megapuerto de Chancay: la historia detrás de la expansión del hub comercial en Perú. Ojo Público. https://ojo-publico.com/5297/la-historia-detras-la-expansion-del-megapuerto-chancay 

Chavez, R.; Alarcón, L.; Ziegler, G. (2024). El controvertido camino para la exclusividad de Cosco Shipping en el megapuerto de Chancay. Ojo Público. https://ojo-publico.com/5323/el-controvertido-camino-para-la-exclusividad-el-puerto-chancay 

Equipo Editorial (2020). Terminal portuario Chancay podría afectar la salud de la población. CooperAcción Informa. https://cooperaccion.org.pe/terminal-portuario-chancay-podria-afectar-la-salud-de-la-poblacion/ 

Meneses, A. (2020). Megapuerto de Chancay: Senace aprueba proyecto pese a riesgos ambientales. Wayka. https://wayka.pe/megapuerto-de-chancay-senace-aprueba-proyecto-pese-a-riesgos-ambientales/ 

Moreno, L. (2021). Chancay: El megapuerto peruano que sacude a un pueblo. Dialogue Earth. https://dialogue.earth/es/sin-categorizar/43228-chancay-el-megapuerto-peruano-que-hace-temblar-a-un-pueblo/ 

Paucar, J. (2017). Chancay: vecinos denuncian daños en sus viviendas por construcción de megapuerto. LAMULA. https://redaccion.lamula.pe/2017/03/27/chancay-viviendas-se-caen-a-pedazos-por-explosiones-en-construccion-de-megapuerto-videos/jorgepaucar/