The next serious test of Greek–Turkish relations may not begin with a warship or a fighter jet. It could emerge from an electricity cable beneath the Eastern Mediterranean — or from a decision in Athens to extend Greek territorial waters south and west of Crete.
At the same time, Greece is strengthening its military partnership with Israel, adding another layer of complexity to an already fragile regional balance. How does Ankara interpret these developments — and where might strategic rivalry turn into confrontation?
In an interview with GeoTrends, Sinan Ülgen, director of the Istanbul-based think tank EDAM and a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, offers a revealing assessment of Türkiye’s strategic calculations. He explains why the growing Greece–Israel alignment is viewed with suspicion in Ankara, identifies the risks surrounding the Greece–Cyprus electricity interconnection, and draws a crucial distinction between extending Greek territorial waters in the Aegean and doing so around Crete.
His assessment reaches beyond Greek-Turkish relations, examining the possibility of military escalation between Türkiye and Israel in Syria, the constitutional debate over President Erdoğan’s political future, and the regional opportunities created by Iran’s weakening.
— Greece is moving forward with the development of “Achilles’ Shield,” a missile defense system incorporating Israeli air defense technologies. Does Ankara view Greece’s deepening strategic partnership with Israel as a potential threat?
In Ankara, the deepening partnership between Israel, Greece and, to some extent, Cyprus is perceived as an emerging axis aimed at countering Türkiye’s regional influence.
That said, I think we need to be careful in assessing its significance. Like Greece, Türkiye is a NATO member, and its fundamental defense posture is defensive. Ankara is certainly monitoring these developments as part of the broader defense and deterrence environment in the Eastern Mediterranean.
However, at this stage, I think it would be an overstatement to suggest that Türkiye is particularly concerned about this partnership.
— The planned electricity interconnection between Greece and Cyprus is one of Athens’ key strategic projects. Could its implementation trigger a new confrontation with Türkiye over disputed maritime zones in the Eastern Mediterranean?
Potentially, yes. The issue is not so much the nature of the project itself, but the fact that it intersects with existing disputes over maritime boundaries and exclusive economic zones in the Eastern Mediterranean.
For the project to proceed, substantial undersea work will be required, including in areas where Türkiye contests the maritime claims involved. That is where the main point of contention could arise.
Ultimately, this would be another manifestation of the broader disagreement over exclusive economic zones, particularly in the eastern part of the Eastern Mediterranean.
— Athens appears to be considering extending Greece’s territorial waters to 12 nautical miles south and west of Crete, a move that could have significant implications for Greek-Turkish relations. How would Ankara respond to such a decision, and what risks could it create?
Yes, such an extension would certainly bring existing disputes back to the forefront, particularly because it would conflict with the maritime boundaries established under the Türkiye–Libya agreement, which is based on a six-nautical-mile territorial sea rather than 12 nautical miles.
The key question, therefore, is what steps the Greek government would take to enforce such an extension if it decided to proceed.
— Türkiye has maintained a casus belli against Greece since 1995 over the potential extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in the Aegean. Could that threat also apply to an extension south and west of Crete?
No, I would make an important distinction here. The casus belli applies specifically to the Aegean. Crete is a different case, with a different geographical and legal context.
The casus belli does not concern the extension of territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in general. It relates specifically to the Aegean because of its exceptionally dense configuration of islands. Extending territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in the Mediterranean is therefore not the same issue.
— Türkiye is also moving forward with legislation linked to its “Blue Homeland” doctrine, which could be adopted in the coming months. Is Ankara seeking to create faits accomplis in response to Athens’ moves in the Eastern Mediterranean?
I think there is a misunderstanding about what this legislation actually entails. Its purpose is to establish a legal framework for defining Türkiye’s exclusive economic zones. Unlike many other countries, Türkiye has so far lacked a domestic legal framework for this.
The legislation will therefore establish the relevant legal concepts without specifying the geographical boundaries of Türkiye’s exclusive economic zones. In that sense, it will not change the situation on the ground. It will simply incorporate concepts that have so far been missing from Türkiye’s domestic legislation.
Crucially, it will not establish any geographical delimitation. It is a legal instrument rather than a measure that would alter the situation in practice.
— Turning to the eastern Mediterranean, tensions between Ankara and Israel have been escalating, particularly following Israel’s strike on the Syrian military base at Abu al-Duhur in Idlib. Could these tensions lead to a direct military confrontation between Türkiye and Israel on third-country territory, particularly in Syria or Cyprus?
Cyprus is a very unlikely scenario. I do not think we will see a military confrontation there. It is somewhat more likely in Syria, although even there, a deconfliction mechanism is in place. That mechanism was not used during the latest attack on the base in Idlib.
However, I think we are currently in an extremely volatile situation, with elections approaching in Israel. After October 27, though, I expect both countries to make sure that tensions in Syria do not escalate and that the deconfliction mechanism remains in place.
There is also the U.S. factor. I think American involvement will help prevent escalation between Türkiye and Israel. That does not mean the two countries will develop convergent positions or strategies in Syria. They have fundamentally different visions for the country’s future. Nevertheless, I still consider a direct military confrontation between Türkiye and Israel in Syria a low-probability scenario.
— Speaking of elections, Türkiye’s Constitution generally limits presidents to two terms, raising questions about President Erdoğan’s eligibility to run again. One scenario being discussed is that Ankara could deliberately provoke a crisis or military escalation and invoke national security considerations to justify another presidential bid. Is there any constitutional basis for such a scenario?
That is a completely mistaken assumption, both politically and constitutionally. There is no such provision. However, there are two possible routes through which a president could seek a third term.
The first is if Parliament decides to call an early election during the president’s second term, which would allow the incumbent to stand again.
The second would involve adopting a new constitution or a constitutional amendment that could be interpreted by the Constitutional Court as allowing the president to seek another term.
There is no national security exemption that would permit a third presidential term. So the scenario you describe has no constitutional basis. The possibilities are those I have just outlined.
— Despite the Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia, neither Türkiye nor Pakistan has provided Riyadh with the military assistance reportedly envisaged under the Mecca agreement. Does this reveal a gap between regional security commitments and the willingness to act on them?
I would not describe it as a paradox, at least not yet. The Mecca agreement has not been ratified. There is a political understanding, but we have not seen the actual text. It has not been submitted to Parliament for ratification.
At this stage, therefore, there is no international obligation arising from that agreement.
— Finally, turning to Iran, President Erdoğan has adopted increasingly confrontational rhetoric towards Israel, while Türkiye has strengthened its military cooperation and arms transfers to Syria under its new government. Against this backdrop, and with Iran’s regional influence weakening, is Ankara seeking to replace Tehran as the dominant power in the region?
Not necessarily by design. But Türkiye has certainly been among the countries that have benefited from Iran’s relative weakening, particularly following the weakening of its regional proxies after October 7.
This has created more room for Türkiye to pursue a more ambitious regional role in areas where it has historically competed with Iran. That is true of Syria and Iraq, and potentially even Lebanon.
In many ways, this reflects the enduring realities of history and geography. Competition between Türkiye and Iran has long been a feature of the region, and Iran’s weakening has created new opportunities for Türkiye within that longstanding rivalry.