The international system is undergoing a profound transformation. As new powers—most notably China—rise and assert themselves, the post–Cold War assumption of unchallenged U.S. global primacy is increasingly called into question. Strategic competition, economic fragmentation, and geopolitical uncertainty are reshaping the foundations of global order.
Against this backdrop, GeoTrends speaks with Plamen Tonchev, Head of the Asia Unit at the Athens-based Institute of International Economic Relations (IIER) and one of Europe’s most seasoned China watchers. A founding member of the European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC) and a member of the Hellenic Association of Chinese Studies (HACS), Tonchev offers a measured, long-term perspective on the evolution of U.S.–China relations, the contradictions of America’s current strategic posture, and the risks inherent in an emerging world without clear leadership.
– Over the past few years, U.S.–China relations have been described as increasingly adversarial and systemic in nature. If you were to sketch the big picture, where do we stand today?
I would approach the issue of U.S.–China relations in somewhat plain terms by raising a few questions that have been troubling me for some time. I hope that addressing them could help us zoom out and see the broader trajectory, rather than getting lost in the daily noise.
The first of these questions is whether China has already become a peer competitor of the United States. It is widely accepted by now that China is already a peer competitor of the United States in several critical domains, or at the very least a near-peer across the overall spectrum of factors that shape global power.
– Which indicators matter most in making that assessment?
A few economic and technological indicators are particularly telling. China’s shipbuilding capacity, for instance, is more than 230 times greater than that of the United States. The Chinese navy is already larger than the U.S. Navy in quantitative terms, even if the Americans still retain an edge in terms of quality. China is also clearly in the lead in solar energy, electric vehicles, batteries, and a range of other clean-tech areas.
When it comes to artificial intelligence, the United States appears to maintain a lead of roughly two years in cutting-edge AI chips, but China is catching up fast. And while the U.S. remains ahead in quantum computing, China has already overtaken America in quantum telecommunications. Taken together, these trends suggest that the gap between the two powers has narrowed dramatically.
– To understand these developments, how important is it to look back, say, at the post–Cold War period and the assumptions that shaped American policy towards China?
Indeed, in the midst of today’s whirlwind of events, it is always useful to take a step back and look at the big picture. And this is especially true for U.S.–China relations. Much of what we are seeing today is rooted in the optimism and certainties of the early post–Cold War era.
We all remember Francis Fukuyama’s famous thesis about “the end of history,” which we now know was misplaced. At the time, however, there was enormous enthusiasm and a strong sense of inevitability. That certainty fed directly into American hubris and a series of flawed assumptions.
One such assumption was that the United States would remain the sole superpower indefinitely and would not be held accountable for its actions. Another was the conviction—particularly during the Clinton administration—that China could be “tamed” and “domesticated” as a compliant member of a liberal, democratic global order. This thinking led to China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, a decision that many in the West now have second thoughts about.
– Were there any specific factors that accelerated China’s rise and overturned America’s “unipolar moment”?
Absolutely. The American unipolar moment was rather brief, roughly a decade in the 1990s, and it was shattered by the shock of September 11. The attacks demonstrated that the United States was not invulnerable. At the same time, the dramatic images of the collapsing Twin Towers overshadowed China’s quiet but steady rise as an economic power.
While Washington was consumed by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, China continued to grow at a rapid pace. Then came the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, which exposed deep structural weaknesses in the U.S. economy. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, China had acquired the self-confidence of a rising great power—one that believed it had the right socio-economic model and system of governance, at least from the perspective of the Chinese Communist Party leadership.
– How would you characterise the current stage of the U.S.–China economic standoff under Trump’s second term? What distinguishes this phase from earlier ones?
I would say that, apart from the geopolitical confrontation between the U.S. and China, their relations are marked by a peculiar mix of contradictions and irony, which are discernible on both sides.
It is ironic, to say the least, that China is producing vast quantities of goods that it cannot absorb domestically, which is why it is flooding global markets with its industrial output. In turn, the United States is trying to address its hollowed-out industrial base through an ambitious reshoring drive, despite serious doubts about its effectiveness.
For decades, the U.S. outsourced large parts of its manufacturing. As a result, it now produces only about 2% of the semiconductors its economy requires. The Trump 2.0 administration has announced plans to raise that share to 40% or even 50%, though whether this is realistic remains an open question. And, again, there is a striking irony in the fact that the American president speaks openly about annexing Greenland, yet the U.S. cannot produce its own icebreakers and is outsourcing this task to Finland.
– In your publications, you also point to infrastructure as an area where these contradictions are particularly visible.
That’s right. For instance, look at China, which has built thousands of miles of high-speed rail—much of it arguably unnecessary and financially wasteful. At the same time, U.S. infrastructure is increasingly worn out. Former President Biden acknowledged this reality with the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, a $1.2 trillion plan aimed at modernising American infrastructure over a decade.
Donald Trump initially sought to derail this initiative in 2021, but he is now backing it, implicitly recognising the depth of the problem. Once again, we can see contradictions and a degree of irony at play.
– How do recent diplomatic interactions between Washington and Beijing fit into the big picture of their relations?
You’re probably referring to the Trump–Xi meeting in South Korea, which focused primarily on economic issues. The United States agreed to delay for one year a ban on exporting advanced technology to Chinese companies, in exchange for increased Chinese purchases of American soybeans and renewed exports of rare earths to the U.S.
That summit highlighted the degree of interdependence between the two powers. The U.S. is highly dependent on Chinese critical materials for its high-tech sectors. China, for its part, remains dependent on advanced U.S. technologies, while it is increasingly diversifying its agricultural imports away from the United States.
At the same time, China has become a manufacturing behemoth, accounting for an ever-growing share of global industrial output—roughly 35% and counting. Yet it still depends heavily on Western markets, including the U.S., as the Global South lacks sufficient purchasing power to absorb China’s excess production.
– You have argued on other occasions that this rivalry is not only about geopolitics or geoeconomics. What do you mean by that?
I believe it would be a mistake to view the U.S.–China standoff solely through a geopolitical or geoeconomic lens. At a deeper level, this rivalry essentially reflects a clash of national self-images.
I remember writing about this during Trump’s first term—somewhat tongue-in-cheek back then—but six years later I am convinced that this psychological dimension deserves far more serious attention. Analytical tools from social and political psychology could help us better understand why U.S.–China relations are steadily deteriorating and why mutual perceptions are increasingly hostile.
– In your view, how has China responded to the upheaval of the international order under Trump 2.0?
In the early months of Trump’s second term, Beijing’s response was cautious and measured. China engaged in tit-for-tat tariffs with the United States but largely remained on the sidelines, benefiting from Washington’s alienation of its allies and withdrawal from international institutions.
That period of restraint is now over. China is increasingly on the offensive, expanding its regional and global networks, including new institutional frameworks such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS+. While Trump quarrels with partners and allies, Beijing is steadfastly strengthening its international footprint.
– Looking ahead to 2030, what shifts do you see in U.S. foreign and defence strategy?
For starters, the “hemispheric defence” concept and “Trump’s corollary” to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine are now formally enshrined in the recently published U.S. National Security Strategy. What happened in Venezuela a few days ago is a case in point, and the American president has set his sights on other parts of the Western Hemisphere as well. The Pentagon is reportedly drafting a new National Defense Strategy, which is expected to prioritise threats both at home and in the U.S. neighbourhood.
With regard to China, this strategic shift is also reflected in a softer tone towards Beijing, which is evident in Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s language during talks with Chinese counterparts and in Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s remarks about not seeking conflict with China. Although the Indo-Pacific is seen as America’s priority theatre, confrontation with China does not currently appear to top Washington’s agenda.
– And what about Taiwan—has it been downgraded as well?
Under the Biden administration, Washington’s Taiwan policy was described as “firm, but not needlessly provocative.” Under Trump 2.0, Washington appears to be rethinking its approach, moving towards a more accommodating posture—one that Beijing would not perceive as being “provocatively firm.”
While the geostrategic importance of Taiwan is duly acknowledged in the new U.S. National Security Strategy, Trump is unlikely to state that the U.S. will support Taipei in case of a flare-up, as Biden did on at least four occasions. Of course, this does not prevent the U.S. from selling arms to Taiwan, as illustrated by the $11 billion package announced last December.
– How would you summarise China’s grand strategy in response?
The contours of China’s strategy are becoming increasingly clear. Let me quote a recent RUSI analysis, which finds that Beijing’s posture rests on four interconnected pillars: playing hardball on trade and technology while avoiding direct military confrontation; weakening U.S. alliance networks by presenting itself as a champion of free trade; coordinating loosely with revisionist powers such as Russia, Iran, and North Korea; and cultivating support in the Global South by promoting an alternative international order that challenges U.S. hegemony.
– If you had to distill all this into a broader conclusion, what would it be?
I would say that China has undoubtedly caught up with the United States in many respects over the past 35 years, but that does not guarantee future dominance. Despite its spectacular achievements, China faces serious domestic challenges—an economic slowdown, a real estate bubble, weak consumption, youth unemployment, and severe demographic pressures. In addition, it is becoming trapped in an export-driven model due to unrealistic and politically motivated growth targets. As a result, the jury is still out on the question of whether China can escape the middle-income trap.
At the same time, the United States under Trump 2.0 is retrenching and turning inwards. America no longer has the economic or military capacity to lead the world single-handedly. Yet China is not ready to assume that role either. And this is the essence of the Kindleberger Trap: a world without a clear leader.
Therefore, the most likely scenario in the coming years is one of heightened uncertainty. The U.S. and China are set to be the leading powers, but without the relatively compact blocs that were formed during the Cold War. In fact, the emerging global order will be marked by the retreat of multilateralism, cynical transactionalism, fickle allegiances, and fluidity. And given the climate crisis and other global challenges, such as the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, I’m afraid that we should brace ourselves for turbulence ahead.