Nearly four years after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, tensions between Moscow and the West continue to ripple well beyond the battlefield. In recent months, Russian warships and submarines have been increasingly entering British waters, stirring unease among NATO allies and European governments alike. Behind these incursions lies a calculated strategy—a form of hybrid warfare that unfolds in the maritime “grey zone,” where the boundaries between peace and conflict blur.
Analysts and security experts note that maritime assets are often used to pursue multiple objectives simultaneously—practical, political, and strategic. Hybrid activities at sea allow state and proxy actors to operate below the threshold of open conflict, in a space where distinctions between peace and war become blurred. This zone of ambiguity—the maritime “grey zone”—enables disruption, limit-testing, and posturing while maintaining plausible deniability.
To better understand the motivations and implications of these actions, GeoTrends contacted Basil Germond, professor of international security at Lancaster University. In this interview, Professor Germond explains how hybrid operations at sea are reshaping the balance of deterrence, diplomacy, and disruption in today’s geopolitics.
– Professor Germond, what is Russia’s current strategy regarding hybrid activities in the maritime “grey zone?”
Against a backdrop of heightened geopolitical, political, and diplomatic tensions between Moscow and NATO/Europe, Russia’s use of seagoing vessels—whether its so-called “shadow fleet” or its regular navy—for hybrid operations can be explained through its pursuit of several interconnected objectives, which operate across practical, political and strategic dimensions.
– How significant is the threat to undersea infrastructure, such as data cables and energy pipelines, and what practical objectives does Russia pursue at sea?
Firstly, there are practical objectives. Russian vessels can be used to map undersea infrastructure—a form of intelligence gathering that provides options for future targeting, especially in the event of open conflict. Approximately 97% of global internet traffic and communications transit through undersea cables. These systems are essential for economic activity, financial transactions, digital services, and public administration.
Attacks on undersea cables can therefore disrupt economic life, societal functioning, and national security. Sabotage against such infrastructure constitutes a form of hybrid warfare in the maritime “grey zone,” where hostile actors can deny responsibility thanks to the high degree of plausible deniability they enjoy.
– Beyond material threats, what political and strategic messages is Moscow trying to send through maritime incursions into NATO waters?
There are political objectives. Russia aims to demonstrate not only its capacity but also its political willingness to operate at the boundary between peace and war, i.e., in the maritime “grey zone.” The rationale behind hybrid warfare is to destabilise the West’s economic, political, and societal structures without triggering open conflict. Incursions by Russian vessels into NATO waters are meant to unsettle the “normal” state of affairs, generate uncertainty, spread fear, and overwhelm our ability to respond coherently to external shocks and emerging threats.
There are also strategic objectives. Sub-threshold activities at sea are designed to test the resolve and red lines of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole, as well as those of key allies—particularly those located along Russia’s borders and those most vocal in opposing Putin’s regime.
In sum, Russia’s maritime strategy involves exploiting both state-owned vessels and private or criminal assets under Moscow’s control to operate below the threshold of open conflict in order to weaken the West. This strategy does not necessarily rely on major attacks on critical maritime infrastructure—although such actions cannot be ruled out—but more often on surreptitious and deceptive activities intended to gather intelligence, project presence, and ultimately destabilise Western societies. Russia’s advantage does not lie primarily in the platforms themselves but in the environment in which they operate: the maritime “grey zone,” where plausible deniability is the norm.
– What is particular about the maritime domain?
Hybrid warfare is conducted in the so-called “grey zone,” where malign actors can deny responsibility because it is often hard to establish accountability or trace perpetrators, resulting in limited legal, political, and diplomatic liability. In some cases, the international law of the sea permits the so-called benign passage of warships through territorial waters and does not explicitly prohibit military activities in “Exclusive Economic Zones,” although in practice these “passing” ships are not restricted to purely benign activities.
For instance, in the maritime “grey zone,” Russia’s civilian “research vessels” and “shadow fleet” have the option to conduct intelligence gathering and hybrid operations, such as sabotaging undersea and offshore infrastructure, including communication cables, energy connectors, oil rigs, and wind farms.
The sea is a “grey zone” par excellence, particularly prone to hybrid warfare due to overlapping jurisdictions, the difficulty of monitoring vast expanses of water, and complex supply chains in which ships may fly the flag of one state, be owned by companies from another, and be crewed by third-party nationals. This allows malign actors to benefit from plausible deniability.
Moreover, undersea cables and pipelines are vulnerable to multiple attack vectors—from kinetic attacks to cyberattacks using crewed or uncrewed vessels—while governance is complicated by transnational ownership and ambiguous jurisdictions.
– In your view, how can these activities be effectively countered?
To better prevent malign activities in the maritime “grey zone,” we can enhance maritime surveillance, regional and global maritime domain awareness, and maintain an active presence at sea. That said, since the sea is difficult to monitor, maritime security also needs to be reactive. The faster we can intervene when something seems amiss, the more effective the response.
Quick reaction capacity is crucial for holding perpetrators accountable. Deterring malign activities below the threshold is the most effective way to prevent them in the first place. To achieve this, it is essential to remove perpetrators’ ability to deny involvement or wrongdoing by their “passing” ships, which requires collecting strong evidence. As with any crime, the most effective option is to catch perpetrators in the act—a practice known as “flagrante delicto.” This makes it easier to “name and shame” both the perpetrator and their true purpose.
Achieving this requires investment in maritime surveillance—on, above, and below the surface—and strengthening naval presence, which carries significant financial costs. Malign actors benefit from “grey zone” tactics because the cost of deterrence and defence is higher for us than the cost of sabotage or intelligence gathering for them.
Currently, NATO and individual member states are as prepared as possible to react quickly, act decisively, and prevent deniability. Not only is the level of preparedness higher, but the political willingness to proactively defend critical infrastructure has also increased. Such determination will be key to deterring Russia, which has intensified its hybrid warfare campaign to test Western resolve and challenge societal resilience.
– In one of your recent speeches at the Asia Scotland Institute, you highlighted the need for a renewed strategic vision that integrates defence and education to strengthen maritime security. What do you consider the key protocols and areas of collaboration that should be developed to make this vision a reality?
As a scholar of seapower and maritime security, my strategic vision is to bridge the gap between defence imperatives and academic inquiry by embedding maritime security within a broader, interdisciplinary educational framework. At “Security Lancaster,” we recognise that maritime security is no longer confined to traditional naval operations. It intersects with climate change, cyber threats, geopolitical instability, and the governance of global commons.
My approach integrates defence thinking with education. It aims to foster a new generation of scholars and practitioners equipped to navigate this complexity. This means combining theoretical rigour with applied insight, drawing from international relations, law, linguistics, and marine sciences to understand human and strategic interactions at, from, and with the sea.
Through collaborative research with external stakeholders, including initiatives such as the “Unsecurities Lab,” we develop innovative methodologies and policy-relevant outputs. In this vision, education is not ancillary to security; it is foundational to building resilient maritime strategies that can effectively respond to the evolving security environment.
Ultimately, this approach helps to address one of today’s greatest challenges: “sea blindness,” the inability of societies to grasp the importance of the sea and the maritime domain for prosperity and security, and the resulting difficulties in the current era of technological innovation, climate change, and geopolitical rivalries. “Security Lancaster” serves as a trusted interface between policy, operational needs, and research innovation. This model ensures that maritime security solutions are both conceptually robust and practically deployable, while remaining strategically aligned.