The Middle East is undergoing profound change. As Dr. Mohamed Farid, Member of the Egyptian House of Representatives, observes, “In the Middle East, vacuums are filled either by institutions or militias.” Armed groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis have been weakened, while major energy and infrastructure initiatives are beginning to reshape regional linkages. At the same time, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is redefining the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.
In this GeoTrends interview, Dr. Farid examines the post-conflict landscape, China’s expanding influence, and the role of trilateral and multilateral cooperation between Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel. Highlighting the strategic stakes, he warns that “energy corridors can turn from engines of growth into new arenas of competition,” emphasizing that governance, coordination, and foresight will determine whether these projects stabilize the region or fuel new tensions.
– The Middle East appears to be entering a new era: Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis have been significantly weakened, Assad has fallen, and major energy projects are reshaping regional connectivity. How do you assess the “day after” for the region?
The region is entering a highly sensitive transition phase. Iran’s proxy networks have been degraded, and Iran itself is weaker than it has been in years. However, these actors have not been fully defeated; they continue to retain political influence and a social footprint in fragile and contested states. As a result, the Middle East remains far from stable.
At the same time, parallel crises are unfolding. The civil war in Sudan, unresolved instability in Libya, and rising tensions across the Horn of Africa constitute interconnected risks that could easily ignite new regional shocks.
The “day after” will ultimately be determined by whether military outcomes can be translated into sustainable political settlements. If Gaza remains caught between the collapse of governance and competing security agendas, if Lebanon continues to suffer institutional paralysis, and if Syria fragments into rival zones of authority, weakened armed actors are likely to regenerate in new and adaptive forms. In the Middle East, power vacuums are filled either by institutions—or by militias.
Energy and connectivity projects have the potential to support a more stable regional future, but only if they are anchored in credible governance frameworks. Without strong institutions and enforceable rules, energy corridors risk transforming from engines of growth into new arenas of geopolitical competition. The central strategic challenge ahead is to ensure that non-state armed actors continue to lose ground, while national institutions in conflict-affected states regain the capacity to govern effectively.
– What structural shifts do you see as most decisive in shaping the emerging regional order?
The region is moving toward a more regionalized order shaped by maritime chokepoints and economic corridors. Geography has effectively become strategy, compelling states to think in terms of sea-lane security, ports, logistics hubs, and cross-regional partnerships.
Power is increasingly defined by state resilience—the capacity to secure territory, control borders and maritime routes, and deliver effective governance. Where state capacity erodes, the resulting vacuum is filled by militias, criminal networks, and external patrons.
This environment is also driving a shift toward strategic hedging rather than rigid alignment. Many regional governments seek to avoid being drawn into global polarization while still defending core security interests. As a result, they diversify partnerships and preserve strategic flexibility.
– Israel recently recognized Somaliland, becoming the first country to do so—a move that prompted a strong reaction from Egypt. What implications could this recognition have for regional stability and the evolving security architecture in the Horn of Africa?
This move risks triggering new instability in the Horn of Africa and at the southern gateway of the Red Sea. Somaliland’s location is not merely a political issue; it is a strategic variable. Any change in the political status of actors around the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and the Gulf of Aden is immediately interpreted through the prism of ports, sea-lane security, intelligence presence, and potential future military access.
Recognition also threatens to deepen fragmentation within Somalia itself. Political uncertainty and contested legitimacy create precisely the environment in which groups such as Al-Shabaab expand recruitment, exploit public grievances, and frame the state as collapsing.
Moreover, this step could accelerate the militarization of both the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. In fragile regions, external actors do not compete solely through diplomacy; they compete through access. Once access becomes the primary currency of influence, the risk of escalation rises sharply.
Egypt’s rejection of the move is therefore understandable. From Cairo’s perspective, sovereignty and the integrity of the national state are the foundations of regional order. Unilateral actions that weaken state institutions tend to fuel instability, empower militias, and strengthen non-state armed actors at the expense of long-term security.
Energy and connectivity have become central to this new alignment logic. Gas, LNG, electricity interconnectors, and regional transport corridors have transformed geopolitics into a competition over routes, reliability, and interdependence. While this raises the cost of instability, it also creates new fault lines when governance frameworks and enforceable rules are weak.
A port investment is not merely an economic asset; over time, it can translate into strategic access. In chokepoint regions, access becomes influence, and influence becomes pressure
– Greece and Cyprus are deepening their strategic cooperation with Israel, particularly in the fields of energy and security. How is this trilateral framework viewed, and what added value can it bring to regional stabilit
Greece–Cyprus–Israel cooperation is a clear illustration of the region’s shift toward pragmatic, interest-based alignments. It is driven by two underlying realities: first, the Eastern Mediterranean has emerged as a strategic space for energy and connectivity; second, the evolving security environment has compelled states to coordinate more closely on deterrence, maritime awareness, and the protection of critical infrastructure.
I cannot speak on behalf of the government, but in my assessment, if this trilateral framework remains anchored in de-escalation, economic integration, and respect for sovereignty, it can make a constructive contribution to regional stability.
The Eastern Mediterranean is increasingly linked to Red Sea dynamics. Threats to shipping lanes, offshore energy assets, or undersea infrastructure now have consequences that extend well beyond national borders. In this context, security cooperation that enhances early warning, situational awareness, and deterrence plays a stabilizing role.
The critical condition, however, is that this cooperation should not be framed as an exclusionary bloc. The region does not need new lines of polarization; it needs practical arrangements that reduce risk, strengthen economic interdependence, and prevent the spillover of conflict. Managed with this mindset, the Greece–Cyprus–Israel partnership can function as part of a broader stability architecture rather than as another dividing line.
– Greece and Egypt have signed a series of energy agreements, including the recent deal to export 3,000 MW of electricity to Europe through the Greek grid. Does Egypt see itself as a regional energy hub, and which interconnectivity projects should be prioritized to further strengthen the Greek–Egyptian strategic partnership?
Egypt does view itself as a regional energy hub, but in a practical and functional sense—as a connectivity and processing platform linking producers, consumers, and transit routes across the Eastern Mediterranean, Africa, the Gulf, and Europe.
This is precisely why Egypt has invested political capital in the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). The EMGF promotes coordination, investment confidence, and market integration, reinforcing the idea that energy cooperation can serve as a stabilizing force when it is built on clear rules and institutional frameworks.
The 3,000 MW electricity export agreement with Greece reflects this strategic logic. It is not merely an energy deal; it is a long-term connectivity project that links Egypt directly to the European grid, creating shared interests in stability, predictability, and the protection of critical infrastructure.
To further strengthen the Greek–Egyptian partnership, priority should be given to projects that are bankable, scalable, and resilient. Electricity interconnectors should remain at the top of the agenda, as they align with Europe’s decarbonization objectives and transform energy cooperation into durable interdependence.
Gas will continue to play an important role. Egypt’s LNG infrastructure provides a comparative advantage as a regional processing and export hub, and expanding reliable supply chains from the Eastern Mediterranean can contribute to stability and reduce fragmentation.
Beyond physical infrastructure, however, the partnership must deepen coordination on regulation, financing, and security. Interconnectivity only functions effectively when it is governed and protected. In a region where sea lanes and undersea assets are increasingly vulnerable, energy security has become inseparable from maritime security.
– China’s strategic footprint in the Middle East and the Red Sea is expanding through port investments, infrastructure projects, and arms sales. How do you assess China’s growing influence, and what challenges or risks does it pose for regional and global security?
China’s strategic footprint in the Middle East and the Red Sea is expanding—and it is not benign. Beijing is not acting as a neutral economic partner; it is building leverage through infrastructure, technology, and selective security engagement. The objective is not to replace the United States militarily in the near term, but to reshape the strategic environment in ways that enhance China’s long-term coercive power.
Ports, logistics zones, and industrial projects are central to this approach because they create structural dependency. A port investment is not merely an economic asset; over time, it can translate into strategic access. In chokepoint regions, access becomes influence, and influence becomes pressure.
The core challenges are sovereignty and security. China often finances and constructs critical infrastructure under opaque and non-transparent terms, gradually eroding host countries’ control over strategic decision-making. Dual-use infrastructure and Chinese technology ecosystems further blur the line between commercial activity and intelligence or military utility, creating long-term vulnerabilities that are difficult to unwind.
This is why China’s expanding role can be destabilizing. In the Red Sea, the issue is not simply commerce—it is the security of a global maritime artery. If China increases its footprint without contributing to burden-sharing or regional stabilization, its presence becomes another factor intensifying competition, risk, and strategic uncertainty.
Many regional states are understandably attracted by Chinese capital, but the strategic costs are often hidden and long-term. The appropriate response is neither romanticism nor panic, but clarity: protecting sovereignty, screening strategic assets, and treating critical infrastructure and advanced technology as matters of national security rather than routine investment.
– Many regional actors accuse President Erdoğan of contributing to regional instability by providing political and operational space to Muslim Brotherhood–linked networks. Do you believe Türkiye currently plays a destabilizing role in the Middle East?
Türkiye’s regional role cannot be separated from the long-standing sanctuary it has provided to Muslim Brotherhood–linked networks and affiliated Islamist actors. When transnational Islamist movements are given safe operating space, media platforms, and protection from accountability, they can become instruments of disruption vis-à-vis neighboring states.
The Muslim Brotherhood is not a conventional political current. It is a transnational organization whose record includes incitement, confrontation with national institutions, and—when political pathways are blocked—the production of militant offshoots. In Egypt, groups such as HASM (Ḥarakat Sāwa’d Miṣr) have been treated by multiple international actors as terrorist entities, and Egyptian and regional reporting has repeatedly pointed to Brotherhood-linked figures operating from Türkiye and using Istanbul as a permissive hub for political and media activity.
What is evolving is the broader international environment. Western governments are becoming less tolerant of Islamist ecosystems that exploit democratic openness while undermining state authority and social cohesion. In Europe, for example, several states—most notably France—have moved toward more explicit confrontation with Brotherhood-style “entryism” and parallel networks. This reflects a growing recognition that ideological infrastructure can pose long-term security risks even in the absence of overt violence.
Against this backdrop, Türkiye’s continued hosting of Brotherhood figures and tolerance of their political and media operations has direct implications for Egypt’s national security and for regional stability more broadly.
In that sense, yes: when a state provides protection and operating space to transnational Islamist networks that promote disruption and radicalization, it functions as a destabilizing actor—regardless of how that policy is framed publicly.