The relationship between the European Union and the People’s Republic of China has, for decades, been a curious exercise in cognitive dissonance. Brussels, ever the hopeful pragmatist, sought to compartmentalize the economic from the political, believing that the sheer volume of trade would inoculate the partnership against geopolitical friction. That era, however, has now definitively concluded.
The EU–China relations have decisively moved beyond mere commercial calculation, entering a phase dominated by security concerns and geopolitical rivalry. This transition, driven by Beijing’s strategic choices and Brussels’ belated awakening, defines the new reality of EU–China relations.
The European perception and the de-risking strategy
The European Union’s official designation of China as a “partner, competitor, and systemic rival” has always been a rather quaint attempt at diplomatic nuance. Today, the “systemic rival” component has become the dominant chord, effectively silencing the others. This shift is not merely rhetorical; it is a direct response to Beijing’s actions and a growing realization that the economic interdependence, once seen as a stabilizing force, has become a source of profound vulnerability.
The European perception is now one of mounting indignation, often described as a “new anger.” This sentiment stems from the belief that Beijing has consistently underestimated the bloc, assuming that Europe could be managed more easily than the United States. This underestimation, coupled with China’s perceived “neutrality” in the Ukraine conflict, which is viewed in Beijing as a successful strategy to avoid fundamental economic rupture, has hardened the European resolve.
The most tangible evidence of this new focus is the decisive move towards prioritizing security over economic expediency. The EU’s 2025 Defence White Paper explicitly frames China as a security threat, highlighting critical dependencies that expose the bloc to geopolitical coercion. These vulnerabilities are not abstract; they include China’s control over key European port infrastructure and the bloc’s reliance on Taiwan for semiconductors. Consequently, the European Union is now actively engaged in a strategy of de-risking, a term that has become the diplomatic equivalent of a stiff upper lip in the face of an existential threat.
The Achilles’ heel: Europe’s internal divisions
However, the efficacy of this strategy remains deeply contingent upon the political will of individual member states. The Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) audit reveals that while some nations, such as Lithuania, Czechia, and the Netherlands, exhibit high political assertiveness and have taken concrete measures—such as banning the Chinese AI model DeepSeek or seizing control of the chipmaker Nexperia—others remain decidedly ambivalent.
The fragmentation of the European response is the Achilles’ heel of the entire strategy, because the effectiveness of resilience measures is entirely dependent on the political commitment to implement them. This disparity in commitment creates a significant challenge for Brussels, as a chain is only as strong as its weakest link.
- High assertiveness: Lithuania, Czechia, and the Netherlands have demonstrated a willingness to publicly voice concerns and implement concrete security measures, including investment screening and technology restrictions.
- Ambivalence: Hungary and Italy continue to court Chinese investment, with Hungary being the most exposed to Chinese capital (2.36% of GDP in FDI), often undermining the collective trade defence instruments of the EU.
This lack of a unified front allows Beijing to exploit the internal divisions, thereby neutralizing the bloc’s collective leverage. The political reality is that until this internal dissonance is resolved, the EU’s de-risking strategy will remain more aspirational than operational.
The Chinese calculus and expectations
From Beijing’s perspective, the European Union’s increasingly tough stance is viewed with a mixture of strategic indifference and diplomatic frustration. The Chinese calculus, as articulated by experts, places the EU on the fourth tier of strategic priority, well behind the United States, Russia, and its immediate neighbours. Furthermore, the European security apparatus, particularly NATO, is largely perceived as a mere extension of American power. This perception allows Beijing to treat the EU–China relations as a secondary theatre in the broader geopolitical contest.
Chinese experts are quite candid about their expectations for the future of the relationship. Their core demands are framed around the concept of European “strategic autonomy,” a term they employ with a certain ironic detachment, knowing full well the structural security dependence Europe maintains on the United States 8. The prevailing Chinese view is that Europe’s current policy is driven more by “deep anxiety and strategic confusion” than by rational self-interest, with the tough stance serving primarily to appease the United States and divert attention from internal economic woes.
The four principal expectations from Beijing are clear and consistently articulated:
- Strategic autonomy: Europe must reduce its structural dependence on the U.S. security system and maintain independent judgment in international affairs.
- Pragmatism and rationality: The EU should abandon the “cognitive trap” of viewing China as a “systemic rival” and cease politicizing normal economic competition.
- Global governance cooperation: Brussels should focus on sincere cooperation in areas like climate change and AI standards, rather than engaging in “covert decoupling” under the guise of risk mitigation.
- Respect for core interests: Europe must respect China’s core interests, particularly concerning Taiwan, and maintain the relationship as a partnership, not an adversarial one.
The Chinese side argues that Europe’s current policy logic is undermining mutual trust and damaging Europe’s own interests, urging a return to policy rationality. This perspective, while self-serving, highlights the fundamental divergence in how each side views the other’s agency and strategic intent.
The mechanisms of tension: Trade and fragmentation
The current friction in EU–China relations is most acutely felt in the realm of trade, where the economic reality of China’s industrial capacity meets the political imperative of European protectionism. The escalating trade tensions are a direct consequence of China’s massive overcapacity, which threatens to destabilize key European industries.
The timeline of events following the 2024 European elections illustrates this dynamic perfectly. The EU’s investigation into Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) and the subsequent imposition of tariffs were met with swift, reciprocal action from Beijing, including anti-dumping investigations into European pork and dairy products. This tit-for-tat dynamic is the new normal, a stark contrast to the previous era of relatively frictionless commerce.
The German elephant in the room
The automotive sector is the crucible where the EU–China relations are being tested most severely, and Germany is the elephant in the room. Germany’s China policy has historically been defined by economic optimism, a “win-win” philosophy rooted in its massive automotive exports to the Chinese market. This deep commercial entanglement has made Berlin inherently cautious about any measure that could provoke Chinese retaliation, effectively acting as a brake on a more unified and aggressive EU stance on tariffs.
The German position is a classic case of a national economic interest conflicting with a collective geopolitical one. While the European Commission pushes for protective tariffs against subsidized Chinese EVs, German manufacturers, fearing the loss of their most lucrative market, lobby intensely against such measures. This internal conflict within the EU’s largest economy is a significant factor in the bloc’s fragmented response, providing Beijing with a clear point of leverage.
Furthermore, Beijing actively exploits the political fragmentation within the EU. The strategy is simple: cultivate strong bilateral ties with individual member states to bypass the more assertive, unified stance of Brussels. This is the geopolitical equivalent of the old adage: “If you can’t beat them, divide them.”
The case of Hungary is particularly instructive. Despite the EU’s de-risking rhetoric, Hungary remains the primary destination for Chinese capital, actively courting massive investments in the EV and battery sectors. This not only undermines the EU’s collective trade defence instruments but also raises the risk of China circumventing tariffs entirely by using these plants for final assembly. The political reality is that the effectiveness of the EU’s strategy is only as strong as its weakest link.
The geopolitical context and the future of EU–China relations
The entire dynamic of EU–China relations is inextricably linked to the broader Sino-American rivalry. The potential return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency adds another layer of complexity, creating new transatlantic tensions and potentially forcing the EU to intensify dialogue with China to avoid the diversion of trade flows.
The experienced analyst, when discussing this triangular relationship, often resorts to a dry, understated humour. The unofficial, yet widely circulated, joke among European China-watchers is that “The only thing that unites Europe on China is the fear of what America will do next.” This quip, which perfectly captures the structural dilemma, underscores the fact that Europe’s policy is often reactive, caught between the two superpowers.
The future of EU–China relations hinges on two critical factors:
- European cohesion: Can the EU overcome the internal fragmentation, exemplified by the disparate approaches of countries like Lithuania, Hungary, and crucially, Germany, to translate its de-risking rhetoric into cohesive, effective action?
- Strategic autonomy: Will the EU genuinely achieve the strategic autonomy that both Brussels desires and Beijing demands, or will it remain structurally dependent on the U.S. security umbrella?
The next decade is a crucial period for the European Union. Its success will be measured not by the volume of trade, but by its ability to manage the complexity of its relationship with China, protecting its economic interests while simultaneously safeguarding its security and geopolitical standing. The time for diplomatic ambiguity has passed; the geopolitical reckoning is now.