The recent military confrontation between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan has officially de-escalated with a ceasefire, but the diplomatic aftershocks continue to reverberate across the region. While bullets may no longer fly across the contested border, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi appears determined to redirect his frustration toward alternative targets—most notably Türkiye.
“Pakistan is a friendly country and India is not our enemy,” a senior Turkish official confided recently, encapsulating Ankara’s balanced approach to the subcontinent’s perennial rivalry. Türkiye has consistently communicated its readiness to contribute toward peaceful resolution, maintaining that diplomatic solutions remain the only viable path forward.
This measured stance, however, has provoked a disproportionate reaction from New Delhi. The Modi administration, still smarting from what many observers characterize as a military embarrassment, has launched a multi-pronged campaign against Turkish interests that reveals more about India’s emotional statecraft than strategic calculation.
The sting of military humiliation
The roots of India’s diplomatic tantrum lie in its recent military setback. Following a terrorist attack on Indian soil, New Delhi launched strikes against Pakistani territory, expecting a demonstration of overwhelming force would yield strategic advantages and domestic political dividends. The operation produced neither.
Instead, Pakistan’s military response proved unexpectedly effective. According to Islamabad, five Indian fighter jets were downed during the engagement, while American intelligence sources confirm at least two aircraft losses. These Rafale fighters—the same French-manufactured aircraft recently acquired by Greece with expectations of “air superiority in the Aegean”—proved vulnerable to Chinese-manufactured beyond-visual-range missiles deployed by Pakistani forces.
This outcome created a perception of “failure” in global public opinion and a sense of “defeat” within New Delhi’s government circles. For Modi, whose political brand relies heavily on projections of strength and decisiveness, this reality proved intolerable.
Redirecting rage
Rather than addressing the strategic miscalculations that led to this outcome, India has opted for what analysts describe as “anger management”—dispersing accumulated domestic tension outward. While Pakistan pulled the trigger and Chinese technology provided the means, Türkiye and Azerbaijan have become primary targets of India’s redirected rage.
Indian diplomats now accuse Türkiye of failing to maintain neutrality during the crisis, alleging Ankara provided Islamabad with Turkish unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), military advice, and technology. Behind closed doors, Indian officials issue veiled threats: “In 10 years, you will see a completely different India. Türkiye should not throw the future of our relations into the fire.”
This diplomatic offensive has cascaded into the economic sphere. Major Indian travel platforms now actively discourage Hindu tourists from visiting Türkiye (274,000 visited last year). Indian universities have suspended cooperation with Turkish counterparts. Operations of Çelebi, a Turkish company providing ground handling services at airports, have been disrupted. Commercial boycott campaigns targeting Turkish products have gained traction, despite the fact that the India–Türkiye trade balance already heavily favors India, with $8 billion in imports versus $2 billion in exports.
The alliance game
Perhaps most revealing is India’s attempt to construct a counterbalancing alliance explicitly targeting Türkiye. Indian media outlets openly discuss creating a Greece–Armenia–India axis to oppose what they characterize as a Türkiye–Azerbaijan–Pakistan alignment.
In pursuit of this vision, India has signed new defense export agreements with Armenia, building upon previous radar and missile system arrangements. Naval cooperation with Greece and the “Greek Cypriot Administration” has also been floated as a possibility.
These maneuvers represent textbook examples of emotional rather than strategic diplomacy. India, now the world’s most populous nation, possesses significant potential power, but its military, diplomatic, and economic capabilities remain insufficient to meaningfully threaten Türkiye through such arrangements.
Moreover, the timing appears particularly ill-conceived. As Azerbaijan and Armenia edge closer to a peace agreement, threatening Türkiye through alignments with neighboring countries seems impractical, however appealing it might appear “on paper.”
Türkiye’s measured response
Ankara’s approach to India has remained remarkably restrained despite numerous points of contention. When Azerbaijan began its campaign to liberate occupied territories in Karabakh, weapons flowed to Armenia from two primary sources—Iran and India. Yet neither Ankara nor Baku transformed this into a diplomatic crisis.
Similarly, Türkiye has refrained from publicly criticizing India’s strong relations with Israel, its opposition to Türkiye’s inclusion in BRICS, or its participation in the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which competes with the Türkiye–Iraq Development Road.
Most notably, Türkiye has maintained diplomatic discretion regarding India’s 2019 revocation of Kashmir’s special status, the spread of radical anti-minority ideologies, and the oppression of Muslims within India—all issues that would typically provoke strong responses from Ankara.
This restraint underscores Türkiye’s pragmatic approach to international relations, particularly in regions where it lacks immediate strategic leverage. While maintaining its century-long “friendship in difficult days” with Pakistan, Türkiye recognizes that antagonizing India serves no constructive purpose.
Beyond emotional diplomacy
India’s diplomatic tantrum against Türkiye reveals a concerning pattern in New Delhi’s approach to international relations. When military or diplomatic setbacks occur, the response prioritizes emotional satisfaction over strategic advancement.
The targeting of Türkiye—a nation with limited direct involvement in the India-Pakistan conflict—suggests decision-making driven more by the need to demonstrate action than by careful consideration of long-term interests. This pattern raises questions about India’s readiness for the global leadership role it actively seeks.
For regional stability, India would benefit from adopting Türkiye’s more measured approach—addressing grievances directly with relevant parties while maintaining productive relations with others. Until then, Turkish businesses and diplomats should prepare for continued turbulence in bilateral relations, particularly following any future India–Pakistan tensions.
As one Turkish analyst aptly noted, “These days, as Azerbaijan–Armenia peace draws near, threatening Türkiye through neighboring countries isn’t feasible, even if it looks good on paper.” The same might be said for India’s entire approach to post-conflict diplomacy.