The September 9 Israeli strike on Hamas leadership in Doha has unleashed consequences that extend far beyond Qatar’s borders. What began as a tactical military operation has evolved into a strategic catalyst, exposing the fundamental weaknesses of Arab collective security while accelerating the emergence of new bilateral partnerships that promise to reshape the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) security architecture for decades to come.
The immediate aftermath revealed a region caught between aspiration and reality. Arab leaders gathered in Doha with grand rhetoric about unity and collective response, yet departed with little more than strongly worded statements. This disconnect between public posturing and private calculations has become the defining characteristic of contemporary Middle Eastern diplomacy—a theatre where domestic audiences demand defiance while strategic necessities counsel pragmatism.
The Arab NATO that never was
Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi arrived in Doha with ambitious plans to resurrect the dormant 1950 Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty. His proposal for a NATO-style collective defence arrangement represented more than military cooperation—it was Cairo’s bid to reclaim its historical role as the Arab world’s strategic hegemon. The mathematics appeared compelling: Egypt’s military experience combined with Gulf financial resources could theoretically create a formidable regional bloc.
Yet the proposal died before it could draw breath. Qatar and the UAE, the very states that would anchor any meaningful Arab alliance, rejected the Egyptian initiative with barely concealed disdain. Their objections centred on leadership disputes—Saudi Arabia demanded command while Egypt insisted on its superior military credentials—but the deeper issue was trust. Gulf states have grown comfortable with their current security arrangements and see little benefit in subordinating their sovereignty to Cairo’s strategic ambitions.
The American factor proved equally decisive. A Qatari delegation returned from Washington bearing messages that effectively neutered any concrete action against Israel. The promise that President Trump would “manage the crisis” and restrain Netanyahu provided convenient cover for Gulf states already reluctant to confront their largest regional trading partner. This episode perfectly encapsulates the contemporary MENA security architecture: Arab states publicly demand action while privately accepting American mediation. The failure echoes previous attempts at Arab military integration, from the 1948 Arab–Israeli War to the 2015 Sharm el-Sheikh summit. Each iteration follows the same pattern—crisis generates calls for unity, initial enthusiasm gives way to practical obstacles, and national interests ultimately trump collective action. The September summit merely added another chapter to this familiar narrative.
Strategic partnerships fill the vacuum
While Arab multilateralism foundered, bilateral cooperation flourished. The Saudi–Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement, signed on September 17, represents the most significant development in regional security architecture since the Abraham Accords. Unlike the rhetorical commitments that characterise most Middle Eastern agreements, this pact establishes concrete mutual defence obligations with potentially nuclear implications.
The agreement’s timing was hardly coincidental. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, facing growing uncertainty about American reliability, has embraced strategic diversification with characteristic boldness. Pakistan offers what traditional allies cannot: a nuclear-armed partner with no competing regional commitments and a military establishment eager for Gulf patronage. The arrangement provides Riyadh with enhanced deterrence while offering Islamabad financial lifelines and diplomatic support.
Critics dismiss the pact as symbolic, noting Pakistan’s limited power projection capabilities and competing priorities in South Asia. Yet this analysis misses the strategic logic. The agreement signals Saudi willingness to explore alternatives to Western security guarantees while potentially extending Pakistani nuclear deterrence to the Gulf. For Iran, any aggression against Saudi Arabia now risks drawing in a nuclear-armed neighbour—a calculation that fundamentally alters regional dynamics.
The Egypt–Türkiye rapprochement represents another significant development in the evolving MENA security architecture. The “Friendship Sea 2025” naval exercises marked the first joint Turkish–Egyptian military cooperation in over a decade. This partnership addresses shared concerns about Israeli expansionism and Eastern Mediterranean energy resources while challenging existing alignments.
Türkiye’s growing defence cooperation with Egypt creates new possibilities for regional power projection. Both nations possess significant military capabilities and harbour ambitions that extend beyond their immediate neighbourhoods. Their collaboration in the Eastern Mediterranean directly challenges the Greece–Cyprus–Israel energy triangle while offering alternative security arrangements for Arab states seeking to reduce Western dependence.
The Turkish–Egyptian alignment fundamentally alters the balance of power in Libya, where both nations previously backed opposing factions. Cairo’s rapprochement with Ankara effectively neutralises Turkish support for the Tripoli government while creating space for coordinated energy exploration in disputed Mediterranean waters. This cooperation directly undermines the Greece–Cyprus–Israel axis that has dominated Eastern Mediterranean energy politics since 2019. The joint naval exercises send an unmistakable message to Athens and Nicosia: their exclusive economic zone claims now face a unified Turkish–Egyptian challenge backed by significant naval capabilities.
Iran’s response to these developments reveals the complexity of regional realignment. While Tehran welcomes any challenge to Israeli influence, it views the Saudi-Pakistan pact with considerable unease. The agreement potentially extends nuclear deterrence to Iran’s primary Gulf rival while strengthening Sunni solidarity against Shia influence. Unlike the bilateral partnerships emerging elsewhere, Iran remains largely isolated, relying on proxy networks rather than formal alliances. This isolation becomes more pronounced as former adversaries like Egypt and Türkiye find common ground, while traditional rivals like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan forge unprecedented security ties. Tehran’s inclusion in BRICS+ provides economic alternatives but cannot substitute for the strategic partnerships that increasingly define the new MENA security architecture.
A new MENA security architecture emerges
The collapse of Arab collective security has accelerated the formation of pragmatic bilateral partnerships that prioritise shared interests over ideological alignment. This emerging MENA security architecture differs fundamentally from previous arrangements—it is transactional rather than aspirational, bilateral rather than multilateral, and driven by immediate security concerns rather than grand strategic visions.
The Saudi–Pakistan defence pact and Egypt–Türkiye rapprochement represent the first concrete manifestations of this new order, but they will not be the last. Regional states are discovering that bilateral cooperation delivers tangible benefits while multilateral initiatives produce only rhetoric and disappointment.
The Abraham Accords under pressure
Israel’s military operations since October 7 have fundamentally undermined the logic of the Abraham Accords. The agreements were predicated on the assumption that regional prosperity could advance without resolving the Palestinian question. This calculation has proven spectacularly wrong.
Saudi Arabia’s position exemplifies the broader challenge. Riyadh cannot sign any agreement with Israel that excludes Palestinian statehood without facing domestic and regional backlash. The Doha strike reinforced perceptions of Israeli impunity while highlighting American inability to restrain its closest ally. Gulf states that normalised relations with Israel now face pressure to reconsider their positions.
The UAE has already declared that continued Israeli settlement expansion constitutes a breach of the Abraham Accords. Jordan has frozen aspects of its peace treaty with Israel. Qatar demands international sanctions following the Doha attack. These responses suggest that the normalisation process has stalled indefinitely, with potential reversals becoming increasingly likely.
The Arab League’s recent adoption of collective security measures supporting Palestinian statehood includes provisions for non-cooperation with Israel. While these measures lack enforcement mechanisms, they signal growing regional consensus against further normalisation without Palestinian progress.
The October 9 Gaza ceasefire agreement, brokered by Trump and approved by Israel’s cabinet, introduces new variables into this equation. Trump’s role as guarantor of the deal—backed by an extraordinary executive order treating any attack on Qatar as an attack on the U.S.—demonstrates American willingness to constrain Israeli actions when core interests are at stake. The ceasefire’s success could theoretically create space for renewed normalisation efforts, particularly if it leads to meaningful progress on Palestinian statehood. However, the agreement’s fragility and Netanyahu’s documented reluctance to implement “phase two” arrangements suggest that any revival of the Abraham Accords remains contingent on developments that appear increasingly unlikely.
Western responses to the evolving MENA security architecture
American policymakers face a complex calculus regarding these developments. The Stimson Center argues that the Saudi–Pakistan pact represents “effective buck-passing” that reduces American security burdens while enhancing regional stability. This perspective suggests Washington should welcome arrangements that shift responsibility to regional partners.
Yet the broader trend toward strategic autonomy challenges American influence. The MENA security architecture is becoming less dependent on Western guarantees and more reliant on regional partnerships. This evolution reflects growing doubts about American reliability and commitment to traditional allies.
European concerns focus on energy security and migration flows. The Eastern Mediterranean disputes threaten EU-supported infrastructure projects while regional instability could generate new refugee movements. The Great Sea Interconnector, designed to link Cyprus, Greece, and Israel, faces Turkish objections and conflicting legal claims that could derail European energy diversification efforts.
The expansion of BRICS+ adds another dimension to these challenges. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE now control over 40% of global oil production within a framework explicitly designed to challenge Western economic dominance. The bloc’s promotion of local currency trading and alternative payment systems threatens dollar hegemony while providing regional states with new options for economic cooperation.
Energy security and economic dimensions
The Eastern Mediterranean’s energy resources remain central to regional competition. The “Gas Triangle” formed by Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel contains an estimated 80 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, yet territorial disputes prevent effective exploitation. Türkiye’s objections to Greek and Cypriot exploration activities have intensified following the formation of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, which explicitly excludes Ankara.
The Red Sea shipping crisis continues to disrupt global trade routes. Houthi attacks on commercial vessels have increased insurance costs and forced carriers to seek alternative routes around Africa. These disruptions highlight the vulnerability of critical energy and trade arteries to regional conflicts.
Egypt’s strategic position at the intersection of Africa, Asia, and Europe makes it a crucial player in any regional security arrangement. The country’s control of the Suez Canal and its military capabilities provide leverage that extends far beyond its immediate neighbourhood. Cairo’s growing cooperation with Türkiye creates new possibilities for challenging existing energy and security arrangements.
Regional realignment reshapes MENA security architecture
The failure of Arab collective security has accelerated bilateral cooperation between unlikely partners. This evolving MENA security architecture is fragmenting into competing blocs based on shared interests rather than cultural or religious affinity. This development reflects the maturation of regional states that increasingly prioritise national interests over ideological solidarity.
China and Russia benefit from this fragmentation. Both powers have cultivated relationships across the region while avoiding the commitments that constrain Western policy. Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative provides economic alternatives to Western investment, while Moscow offers military equipment and diplomatic support without demanding political reforms.
The implications extend beyond the Middle East. India faces new challenges as Pakistan gains Saudi backing, potentially altering South Asian dynamics. European energy security depends increasingly on stable relationships with authoritarian regimes. American alliance structures require fundamental reassessment as traditional partners pursue independent policies.
The September developments in Doha have revealed the extent to which the post-Cold War order is dissolving in the Middle East. American hegemony, Arab nationalism, and Israeli deterrence—the three pillars that defined regional politics for decades—are all under unprecedented pressure. The emerging MENA security architecture will likely prove more complex, more competitive, and considerably less predictable than its predecessor.
Regional states are adapting to this new reality with characteristic pragmatism. The grand strategies and ideological commitments that once defined Middle Eastern politics are giving way to transactional relationships based on mutual benefit. This evolution may ultimately prove more stable than the imposed order it replaces, but the transition period promises continued turbulence as new arrangements solidify and old certainties crumble.