On November 1, 2024, a newly renovated canopy at the Novi Sad railway station collapsed, killing 16 people and injuring many more. This was not merely a structural failure; it was the moment the veneer of Serbia’s proclaimed progress under President Aleksandar Vučić shattered. The station was a flagship project, a key node in the Belgrade–Budapest railway line financed and constructed as part of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. The tragedy swiftly morphed from a national day of mourning into a rolling political crisis, sparking the largest and most sustained anti-government protests Serbia has seen in years.
For months, student-led demonstrations have rocked Belgrade, Novi Sad, and other cities. The initial shock and grief have given way to a potent cocktail of rage directed at what protesters see as a corrupt and negligent regime. The government’s response has been a textbook case of escalating incompetence. After initial, solemn promises of a thorough investigation, the state apparatus has resorted to brute force. August 2025 saw a severe escalation, with violent clashes between protesters, police, and pro-government groups, resulting in scores of injuries and hundreds of arrests across the country. The scenes in Belgrade and Valjevo, where police were reported to have beaten minors, have only poured fuel on the fire, hardening the resolve of the demonstrators.
The investigation: A trail of denials and arrests
As public pressure mounted, the state’s investigative mechanism ground into motion, though its targets have done little to quell public anger. In early August 2025, authorities arrested several figures, including Tomislav Momirović, a former Minister of Infrastructure and a close ally of Vučić. Another high-profile arrest was that of Sinisa Jokić, uncle of Serbian basketball superstar Nikola Jokić. As a prominent member of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska Napredna Stranka/SNS) and a former director of the regional heritage protection institute, his arrest sent a clear signal that the rot reached high levels.
Yet, for many Serbs, these arrests feel like token sacrifices designed to protect those at the very top. The core of the problem, they argue, remains untouched. The pervasive Chinese influence on major infrastructure projects is seen as a primary enabler of this systemic corruption.
The Chinese connection and the corruption nexus
The Novi Sad station is a microcosm of Serbia’s deep entanglement with Beijing. The project was executed by a consortium of Chinese state-owned giants: China Railway International (CRIC) and China Communications Construction Company (CCCC). These projects, often secured through opaque inter-governmental agreements that bypass public tenders, have become the hallmark of Vučić’s economic policy. For years, this strategy was sold to the public as a fast track to modernization. Now, it is viewed by a significant portion of the population as a pact with the devil.
The slogan “Corruption kills” has become a rallying cry for the protesters, who see the Novi Sad disaster not as an isolated incident but as the inevitable outcome of a system that prioritizes geopolitical alignment and crony capitalism over public safety and transparency. The deep-seated resentment is not necessarily aimed at the Chinese people, but at the model of development their state-owned enterprises bring: a model that appears to thrive in environments where accountability is weak and the rule of law is negotiable. This perception has made Chinese influence a lightning rod for public discontent. The Chinese consortium, for its part, has denied responsibility for the collapsed canopy, pointing the finger at a local subcontractor.
A chorus of conflicting voices
The crisis has created a cacophony of competing narratives, with each faction attempting to frame the events to its advantage.
The government: President Vučić and his inner circle have portrayed the protests as a foreign-orchestrated plot. Ana Brnabić, the Parliament Speaker, spoke of a “hybrid war” and “planned sabotage” aimed at destabilizing Serbia. Vučić himself has oscillated between calls for dialogue—which the opposition dismisses as a stalling tactic—and defiant rhetoric against his political enemies. His government’s narrative is clear: Serbia is under attack from the West, which seeks to punish Belgrade for its independent foreign policy and close ties with Beijing and Moscow.
The opposition and protesters: For the opposition, led by figures like Savo Manojlovic, leader of the Move-Change party (Kreni-Promeni), the message is simple and stark: “Everyone from the former or current government who is a generator of corruption must be held accountable.” They reject any negotiation with a government they deem responsible for the deaths of 16 people. Their demands are not just for justice for the victims of Novi Sad, but for a fundamental dismantling of the corrupt system that they believe the ruling party has built, a system heavily lubricated by Chinese influence.
The Chinese consortium: CRIC and CCCC have played their part with a masterclass in corporate deflection. They issued a statement flatly denying that the collapsed canopy was part of their renovation contract, pointing the finger at a local subcontractor. They have refused to conduct a full structural assessment of the station, arguing it falls outside their contractual obligations, a move that has been met with public derision.
Djokovic’s “civil war” warning
Into this maelstrom stepped Serbia’s most famous son, Novak Djokovic. Speaking to the press in August 2025, the tennis icon delivered a chilling assessment: “There is a serious escalation, we are literally on the verge of a civil war.” His words, carrying immense weight both domestically and internationally, stripped away any pretense that this was a minor political squabble.
Djokovic, who later voiced support for the student protesters, used his platform to articulate the gravity of the national divide. The intervention transformed him from a unifying national hero into a polarizing figure, attacked by pro-government media for daring to challenge the state’s narrative.
The geopolitical fault line
The Serbian crisis is being watched with keen interest from Washington, Brussels, and Moscow, as it represents a crucial battleground in the contest for Chinese influence in Europe.
The U.S. and the EU have been cautiously supportive of the protesters, calling for restraint and respect for democratic rights. For Western capitals, the crisis is an opportunity. It lays bare the risks of Beijing’s “no-strings-attached” investment model, which they argue fosters corruption and undermines democratic institutions on Europe’s doorstep. The unchecked growth of Chinese influence in the Balkans has long been a source of concern, and the Novi Sad tragedy provides a powerful, tangible example of its potential consequences.
On the other hand, Russia, a traditional ally of Serbia, has firmly backed the Vučić government. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned the West against fomenting a “colour revolution” in Belgrade, a narrative that aligns perfectly with the Serbian government’s own claims.
Beyond the rubble
The dust from the collapsed canopy in Novi Sad has yet to settle, and what it has revealed is a Serbian state deeply fractured along political, social, and geopolitical lines. The tragedy has become a brutal metaphor for the condition of the nation itself: a facade of progress concealing a rotten core. The government’s attempts to blame foreign agents ring hollow to a generation of young Serbs who see their future being sold off in opaque deals with foreign powers. The protests are more than a reaction to a single event; they are a rebellion against a decade of perceived democratic backsliding and systemic corruption.
The ultimate outcome remains uncertain, but one thing is clear: the relationship between Belgrade and Beijing, once touted as a pillar of Serbian development, is now at the very heart of its gravest political crisis in a generation. The question is no longer whether the Chinese influence comes at a price, but whether Serbia is willing, or able, to pay it.

