The recent presidential elections in Romania offer a rare “experiment” showing what happens when institutions intervene in the electoral process to exclude “dangerous” candidates. The result of this experiment is striking and instructive: George Simion, candidate of the nationalist AUR (Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor/ Alliance for the Union of Romanians) party, emerged first with an impressive 40.96%, more than doubling the 14% he had received in the initially annulled round of elections.
The chronicle of a self-undermining intervention
In the first round of presidential elections in November 2024, independent candidate Calin Georgescu emerged first with 23% of the vote. Georgescu, an agronomist by profession with no previous political experience, had developed a peculiar mix of anti-NATO, pro-Russian, religious and nationalist rhetoric. His central slogan, “Food, Water, Energy,” promised national self-sufficiency and a return to traditional values.
Subsequently, an unprecedented institutional intervention changed the course of events: Romania’s Constitutional Court annulled the entire first round of elections and excluded Georgescu from the repeat process. The justification for this decision was based on non-transparent evidence: classified documents from intelligence services that spoke of “digital manipulation” through TikTok and Telegram, use of bots, and undeclared funds of approximately 1 million euros.
As the European Commission for Democracy through Law, better known as Venice Commission, points out, such interventions in the electoral process should be based on publicly accessible, verifiable evidence. The use of secret documents undermines transparency and, by extension, trust in democratic institutions.
From the mystic Georgescu to the “normal” Simion
With agronomist Georgescu out of the game, the vacuum created was filled and then some by George Simion. The candidate of the nationalist AUR party, who had received only 14% in the annulled elections, skyrocketed to 40.96%, more than doubling his electoral strength.
The two candidates, despite their differences, represent two sides of the same coin. Georgescu, with his mystical rhetoric and references to a “spiritual rebirth” of Romania, resembles a “national healer.” In contrast, Simion presents himself as a more “normal,” “institutional” representative of the far-right, with clearly nationalist discourse about “Romania for Romanians,” similar to that of Le Pen and Meloni.
The transfer of votes from Georgescu to Simion shows that, despite their differences, the two men express the same deeper dissatisfaction with the liberal status quo. The institutional intervention merely shifted the expression of this dissatisfaction from the “dangerous amateur” to the more “professional” nationalist.
The liberal paradox: When protecting democracy undermines democracy
As Dimitris B. Peponis pointed out in a recent article on geo-trends.eu, we are facing a deeper crisis of liberal democracy. Democracy and liberalism, although intertwined in modern political vocabulary, constitute two distinct traditions that often find themselves in tension.
Democracy, with its emphasis on popular sovereignty and majority rule, can come into conflict with liberal principles that prioritize individual rights and institutional limitations on the majority. This tension becomes apparent when liberal institutions intervene to limit “dangerous” popular choices.
The paradox is that such interventions often achieve the opposite of the intended result. The “cordon sanitaire” that Romanian institutions attempted to create around Georgescu not only failed to limit the far-right but significantly strengthened it, presenting it with a more “acceptable” face.
Similar phenomena are observed in other European countries. In France, the systematic marginalization of Marine Le Pen has not prevented the rise of the National Rally (Rassemblement National). In Germany, the strategy of “encircling” the AfD seems to ultimately enhance its electoral appeal.
The self-collapse of liberal democracies and the future
The case of Romania raises questions about the future of liberal democracies in Eastern Europe. If Simion ultimately wins the presidency, Romania will join the list of countries where nationalist forces have taken power, such as Hungary and Slovakia.
This trend has obvious implications for the EU and NATO. Although Simion is less pro-Russian than Georgescu, he remains skeptical of Western institutions. His political agenda, focused on “national purity” and economic protectionism, is potentially destabilizing for European cohesion.
More worrying, however, is the deeper crisis of trust that emerges. When institutions operate with opacity and use their power to exclude “unwanted” players, they undermine their own legitimacy. This creates a vicious cycle: distrust of institutions strengthens populism, which in turn provokes more interventionist institutional reactions, which further fuel distrust.
Extending the Romanian example: The need for a new social contract
The crisis revealed by the Romanian case is not merely political but more deeply social and economic. Populism, whether in the form of Georgescu or Simion, is a symptomatic expression of deeper social fractures.
Globalization and economic liberalism have left significant segments of society behind. In Romania, despite economic growth in recent decades, inequalities have widened. Rural areas, which formed Georgescu’s support base, have experienced intense marginalization.
At the same time, criticism of institutional interventions should not lead to a simplistic defense of “pure” democracy against liberalism. Liberal constraints on majority rule are necessary to protect minority rights and avoid the “tyranny of the majority.”
What is needed is the renewal of the social contract that connects liberal and democratic principles. This requires institutions that operate with transparency and accountability, but also policies that address the economic and social roots of populist protest.
The lessons from Romania: When prohibition accelerates
The clearest lesson from the Romanian case is that institutional interventions aimed at excluding “dangerous” political forces often achieve the opposite result. The ban on Georgescu not only failed to halt the rise of the far-right but accelerated it, even offering it a more “acceptable” face.
This observation has broader implications for how liberal democracies deal with populist challenges. The attempt to marginalize populism through institutional interventions often strengthens anti-systemic narratives about “corrupt elites” imposing their will despite popular will.
The real challenge for modern democracies is not the suppression of populism, but addressing its deeper causes: economic insecurity, growing inequalities, and the sense of cultural alienation experienced by many citizens.
When institutions are eroded from within—through legalism, opacity, and secret reports—political democracy undermines itself. That is when it gives birth to its own despots, dressed in the mantle of legitimacy.