When President Trump signed his latest executive order (EO) on March 20, 2025, it wasn’t just another piece of paper. It was a declaration of war—on America’s reliance on foreign minerals. The order, invoking Section 301 of Title 3 of the U.S. Code, aims to turbocharge domestic minerals production, framing it as a national security imperative. But is this a masterstroke or just another political gambit? Let’s dig in.
The minerals list: More than just a checklist
The EO doesn’t just stick to the usual suspects like lithium and rare earths. It throws in copper, uranium, gold, and potash for good measure. Why? Because these materials are the unsung heroes of national security. Copper, for instance, isn’t just for pennies anymore. It’s the backbone of everything from electrical grids to AI-driven data centers, which are expected to guzzle up to 420,000 tons of the stuff by 2030.
Then there’s uranium. Once a global leader in uranium production, the U.S. now imports nearly all of it, including from not-so-friendly nations like Russia. By adding these materials to the list, the EO isn’t just playing catch-up—it’s trying to future-proof America’s energy and defense sectors.
But here’s the kicker: the list isn’t set in stone. The newly minted National Energy Dominance Council (NEDC) can add more materials as it sees fit. This flexibility is smart, but it also raises questions. Who decides what’s critical? And will this open the door to lobbying wars?
Permitting: Cutting red tape or cutting corners?
If there’s one thing everyone agrees on, it’s that permitting is a nightmare. The U.S. has the dubious honor of having the second-longest mine development timeline in the world. The EO tackles this head-on, ordering the NEDC to identify priority projects within 10 days and directing agencies to find suitable federal lands for leasing within 30 days.
Sounds great, right? Not so fast. While speeding up permits is crucial, it’s only part of the puzzle. Mines and processing facilities are energy hogs, and the U.S. is already struggling with energy infrastructure. The Department of Energy estimates that transmission lines need to triple by mid-century to meet demand. Without addressing this, even the fastest permits won’t get projects off the ground.
Financing: Show me the money
In an era of budget cuts and fiscal austerity, the EO leans heavily on existing funding mechanisms. Agencies like the Departments of Energy, Defense, and the Small Business Administration (SBA) are directed to offer favorable terms to private companies. The SBA is also tasked with recommending legislation to boost public-private partnerships.
But here’s the catch: the EO can’t magically create new money. It can only repurpose existing funds. For real impact, Trump will need Congress to open the purse strings—a tall order given the current political climate. Remember the Inflation Reduction Act? That was a $369 billion bonanza for clean energy and minerals. Without similar bipartisan support, this EO might end up as more bark than bite.
The EXIM Bank: A global lifeline for domestic minerals?
The EO also taps the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) to secure mineral offtake agreements abroad through its Supply Chain Resiliency Initiative (SCRI). The idea is simple: get raw materials from overseas, process them at home, and voilà—domestic minerals security.
But there’s a hitch. Many potential offtakers are skittish. Auto manufacturers, for example, are hesitant to commit to long-term agreements amid uncertainty around electric vehicle tax credits. And mining companies? They’re dealing with low commodity prices and geopolitical risks. For SCRI to work, it’ll need more than just good intentions—it’ll need price floors, risk insurance, and maybe even a few miracles.
The DFC’s new role: From gobal aid to domestic minerals
Perhaps the most intriguing part of the EO is its use of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to empower the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). Traditionally focused on international development, the DFC is now being repurposed to fund domestic minerals projects.
This isn’t entirely unprecedented. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the DFC was given $100 million in DPA loan authority to address medical supply shortages. But this time, the stakes are higher. The DFC is up for reauthorization in 2025, and this EO could reshape its mission entirely.
The big picture
Trump’s EO is ambitious, no doubt. It tackles everything from permitting bottlenecks to financing gaps, and it even throws in a dash of geopolitical strategy. But ambition alone won’t solve America’s minerals woes.
This isn’t the first time a U.S. administration has tried to shore up domestic minerals production. The Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act funneled billions into critical minerals processing and battery supply chains, while the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act aimed to modernize the nation’s grid—an issue this EO doesn’t directly address. Unlike those efforts, Trump’s approach leans heavily on deregulation and expedited permitting rather than large-scale federal funding.
The real test will be in the execution. Can the NEDC deliver on its promises? Will Congress play ball, especially given Republicans’ deficit-cutting priorities? And can the private sector be convinced to take the plunge despite market uncertainties?
For now, the EO is a bold step forward. But in the world of domestic minerals, bold steps are easy—it’s the follow-through that’s hard. Without addressing infrastructure challenges, securing stable financing, and ensuring long-term demand, this push for minerals dominance could face the same fate as past efforts: big on vision, but short on results.