Who has nukes? The nuclear vector of the commencing Israel–Iran war 

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KEY TAKEAWAYS 

• Iran does not currently possess nuclear weapons, as confirmed by the U.S. intelligence community and IAEA.
• Israel does possess nuclear weapons and is not a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
• The Israeli offensive, Operation Rising Lion, aims at Iran but cannot feasibly destroy its nuclear programme.
• Israel’s stated aim—to prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb—is undermined by the limited physical damage to nuclear sites. 
• Iran’s uranium enrichment increased after Trump unilaterally abandoned the 2015 JCPOA, which Iran had followed, thus killing the agreement.
• The JCPOA had effectively limited Iran’s enrichment and was verified by IAEA until the U.S. withdrawal in 2018. 
• Netanyahu’s actions align with long-standing Israeli strategic doctrines favouring pre-emptive, unilateral force (e.g., 1996’s A Clean Break). 
• Claims that Iran is ‘weeks/days/moments away’ from a nuclear bomb have persisted since the 1990s, proving unreliable. However, Iran has declared that an attach on its civil nuclear programme might prompt the country to revisit its doctrine on the matter.
• Speculation suggests Israel may be provoking escalation to force U.S. intervention, possibly leveraging the nuclear threat. 
• The current conflict reflects a broader regional power struggle more than immediate non-proliferation concerns. 

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Rhetorically asking whether “a wider regional war can be avoided,” GeoTrends had noted in September 2024 that “the Israeli government’s gaze is fixed on Iran.” The recent Israeli Operation Rising Lion against Iran, and Iran’s retaliation, will not be a short exchange of quid-pro-quo strikes. The Wall Street Journal reports that Israel’s offensive is planned to last “at least two weeks.” It will be a proper war between two countries, albeit fought over an immense geographical distance—over two other sizable countries (Jordan, Iraq).   

© J Carrier/UN Photo

Israel described this war as a “pre-emptive” one in the context of “Israel’s right to defend itself”—to pre-emptively defend itself, in this case (with The Onion thus running the headline “Netanyahu Calls Iran Strikes Necessary To Prevent War He Just Started”), in view of the purportedly imminent Iranian nuclear weapon, which would be “not only a danger to Israel, but to the world.” Thus, the Israeli rationale for the operation was to destroy Iran’s nuclear programme. Yet all evidence points to the conclusion that neither did Israel’s strikes truly aspire to destroy this, a feat that would either way be practically almost impossible on the basis of Israel’s conventional military capacity (if not generally), nor that Israel succeeded in doing so. The attacks appear to have focused instead on high-ranking figures within Iran’s military, prominent scientists tied to its nuclear efforts, and key political leaders. Iran’s principal nuclear enrichment sites at Natanz and Fordow—both heavily fortified and buried deeply underground, beyond the reach or Israeli conventional weaponry—sustained little to no damage. While some of Iran’s ballistic missile facilities were targeted, the extent of the damage remains unclear, further suggesting that dismantling Iran’s nuclear infrastructure was not the primary objective. 

Incidentally, this is also Trump’s war, even if the U.S. is not a direct and overt belligerent on the ground. President Trump also inaugurated a new paradigm in global diplomacy, which is not guaranteed to incentivise nations to enquire for amicable solutions in tandem with the U.S.: if you negotiate with us and you do not accept our ultimatum, then your negotiators will physically die (“They are all DEAD now, and it will only get worse!”). This is a new way to pursue diplomatic solutions to world problems. 

Fact-checking the commencing war’s causes 

Since this war is expected to have many chapters lying ahead, it would be prudent to start at the current juncture by exploring the rationale officially given for it: Iran’s nuclear weapons. 

First of all: does Iran have nuclear weapons? 

Iran does not currently possess nuclear weapons, based on available intelligence and assessments from international bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This is also the official U.S. position: Tulsi Gabbard, as Director of National Intelligence, stated in a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing on 25 March 2025 that Iran is not currently building a nuclear weapon. She specifically noted, ‘the intelligence community continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003’. This aligns with the official U.S. intelligence community’s position as reflected in the 2025 annual threat assessment, which Gabbard referenced during her testimony. The assessment maintains that, while maintaining a civil nuclear (energy) programme, Iran has not resumed its nuclear weapons program since its suspension in 2003, though it continues to enrich uranium. 

Secondly: why is Iran enriching uranium, if not in order to build a bomb? 

Apart from the obvious answer—for energy!—,it is important to note that under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which Iran is a signatory in contrast to Israel, nations have the right to pursue uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes as part of their inalienable right to develop nuclear energy under Article IV. This article states that all parties to the treaty have the right to access nuclear technology for peaceful uses, which includes enrichment activities, provided they comply with safeguards and do not pursue nuclear weapons. However, this right is not absolute: enrichment must be conducted under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to ensure it is not diverted to weapons development.

Thirdly: why is Iran enriching more uranium than it should? 

This one has a very easy, one-sentence answer. Because Trump abandoned the deal that guaranteed Iran wouldn’t. Iran was fully complying with the JCPOA, the international agreement guaranteeing that Iran would not pursue nuclear weapons and would keep uranium enrichment to set limits, until Trump abandoned it in 2018. 

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in July 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany), with the European Union as coordinator, aimed to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions in exchange for sanctions relief. Iran committed to limiting uranium enrichment to 3.67%, reducing its stockpile to 300 kilogrammes, redesigning the Arak reactor to prevent plutonium production, and granting extensive access to IAEA inspectors. In return, nuclear-related sanctions were lifted, enabling Iran to bolster its economy through increased oil exports and foreign investment. IAEA reports from 2016 to 2018 consistently verified Iran’s compliance, noting that enrichment levels and stockpiles remained within agreed limits, with only minor, swiftly corrected deviations, such as a brief excess of heavy water in 2016. This period of adherence underscores Iran’s initial commitment to the deal. The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA on 8 May 2018, announced by President Trump, marked a pivotal shift. Trump criticised the agreement as fundamentally flawed, arguing it failed to address Iran’s ballistic missile programme, regional influence, or the “sunset clauses” that would allow Iran to resume advanced nuclear activities after 10–15 years. The U.S. reimposed stringent sanctions under a ‘maximum pressure’ campaign, targeting Iran’s oil, banking, and trade sectors, aiming to compel a stricter deal. This unilateral move, opposed by the remaining P5+1 members, disrupted the delicate balance of the JCPOA. IAEA reports immediately following the withdrawal confirmed Iran’s continued compliance, yet the economic strangulation from sanctions eroded the deal’s benefits for Iran. The European Union, Russia, and China attempted to salvage the agreement, but mechanisms like INSTEX, designed to bypass U.S. sanctions, proved inadequate.

For nearly a year after the U.S. exit, Iran maintained compliance, hoping the remaining signatories could deliver economic relief. By May 2019, however, with sanctions biting deeply, Iran began reducing its commitments, increasing its uranium stockpile, raising enrichment levels to 4.5% and later up to 60%, and restricting IAEA access. These steps, framed as reversible, signalled Iran’s frustration and strategic shift, particularly after the 2021 election of hardliner Ebrahim Raisi. By June 2025, Iran’s nuclear programme has advanced significantly, with the capacity to produce weapons-grade uranium in weeks, though no evidence confirms an active weapons programme. It should be mentioned that, both politically and religiously, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has publicly declared a fatwa against nuclear weapons since the early 2000s—while numerous statements have clarified that this stance might be revised, were Israel and/or the U.S. to attempt to destroy Iran’s nuclear programme militarily, which is precisely Israel’s advertised rationale for Operation Rising Lion. 

Fourthly: does Israel have nuclear weapons? 

Yes. Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, though it maintains a policy of strategic ambiguity, neither confirming nor denying their existence. This stance, adopted since the 1960s, is supported by estimates from international organisations like the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), which suggest Israel has 90–200 warheads, potentially deliverable via F-15/F-16 jets, Dolphin submarines, and Jericho missiles. The Dimona facility is central to its nuclear programme, with historical evidence, including Mordechai Vanunu’s 1986 revelations, pointing to weapons development starting in the late 1960s. Israel’s non-membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—in contrast to Iran—and its refusal to allow IAEA safeguards—in contrast to Iran during the JCPOA— fuel debate. The United Nations General Assembly and certain member states have implicitly recognised Israel’s nuclear capabilities, calling for a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East. The policy of ambiguity serves as a deterrent but complicates non-proliferation efforts, drawing criticism for perceived double standards, especially when compared to scrutiny of Iran’s programme.

Authoritative sources, including the IAEA’s indirect references and declassified U.S. documents from 1975, reinforce the belief that Israel is a nuclear-armed state. Furthermore, on 5 January 2020 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did a public lapsus linguae during the televised part of a cabinet meeting, saying in Hebrew, “the significance of this project is that we are turning Israel into a nuclear power,” before quickly correcting himself to “energy power” with an mischievous smile. This might be the first time in recorded history that the leader of a nuclear-armed state openly treats nuclear weapons as a subject for humour. In a nutshell, we all know that Israel has a nuclear arsenal, and Israel itself all but openly acknowledges it, but the fact that a country currently being accused of actively committing genocide, with the case being presently adjudicated at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, should not be any cause for global concern. 

And lastly: is this the first time Iran is purported to be “very close” to building a nuclear weapon? 

Not really. Iran is presented as being extremely close to building a nuclear weapon since the 1990s, when you were using a dial-up modem to connect to the internet, if you had one. Here is a table summarising the claims: 

Year	Israeli and/or U.S. claim	Predicted timeline
1992	Iran is 3-5 years from nuclear capability	3–5 years (by 1995–1997)
1993	Iran pursuing nuclear weapons, close to capability	3–6 years (by 1996–1999)
1995	Iran 3–5 years from nuclear capability	3–5 years (by 1998–2000)
1996	Iran’s nuclear acquisition could be catastrophic, deadline extremely close	Within months to 1 year (by 1996–1997)
2003	Iran’s nuclear program a global threat	1–2 years (by 2004–2005)
2004	Iran aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons	1–3 years (by 2005–2007)
2005	Iran’s nuclear ambitions must be stopped	1–2 years (by 2006–2007)
2006	Iran could have nuclear bomb soon	1–3 years (by 2007–2009)
2007	Iran racing to develop nuclear weapons	1–2 years (by 2008–2009)
2008	Iran’s nuclear program nearing completion	1 year (by 2009)
2009	Iran 1–2 years from nuclear capability	1–2 years (by 2010–2011)
2010	Iran could produce a bomb within a year	1 year (by 2011)
2011	Iran steadily moving toward nuclear weapons	1–2 years (by 2012–2013)
2012	Iran months away, will complete enrichment by spring/summer 2013	~6–12 months (by 2013)
2013	Iran continuing nuclear weapons program	1 year (by 2014)
2021	Iran closer than ever to nuclear weapons	Months to 1 year (by 2021–2022)
2022	Iran weeks away from nuclear breakout	Weeks to months (by 2022–2023)
2023	Iran advancing nuclear enrichment	Months (by 2023–2024)
2024	Iran dangerously close to nuclear bomb	Weeks to months (by 2024–2025)
2025	Iran days away from enriching uranium for a bomb	Days to weeks (by 2025)
2025	Friday 13 June 2025	Israel starts an interstate conflict “to stop Iran’s imminent nuclear weapon”

Avoiding nuclear proliferation, or striving for near-absolute regional hegemony? 

In view of the above, the situation is more complicated than the narrative according to which a nuclear-armed state currently being accused of genocide in a case adjudicated at the International Court of Justice is saving the world from the possibility of another state acquiring nuclear weapons ‘imminently.” To understand the current trajectory, one must look back to the policy blueprints that have shaped Israeli strategic thinking for decades. A pivotal, albeit controversial, document in this regard is the 1996 report, “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm.” Prepared by a study group for then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, this report advocated for a radical shift in Israel’s security approach, moving away from a “land for peace” paradigm towards a more aggressive, unilateral stance. It proposed containing, destabilising, and even rolling back perceived threats in the region, explicitly naming Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon as targets for strategic re-alignment. 

While the “Clean Break” report itself did not explicitly call for the destruction of “seven countries,” its aggressive recommendations laid the groundwork for a confrontational foreign policy. The notion of targeting multiple states in the region gained prominence through statements by figures like General Wesley Clark, who famously claimed in 2007 that a Pentagon memo outlined plans to“take out seven countries in five years” after 9/11: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran. Although the direct link between the “Clean Break” document and Clark’s specific list is indirect, the spirit of proactive intervention and regime change resonates across both, reflecting a persistent strain of thought within certain policy circles that views regional stability through the lens of military dominance and the dismantling of perceived adversaries. Apparently, these policy circles have prevailed in at least pursuing this, as a cursory glance on Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and now Iran demonstrates. 

Yet Iran is not an easy adversary. In stark contrast to the narrative often presented in Western media, the Islamic Republic is not a fragile state on the verge of collapse. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of relentless international sanctions and external pressures, and it has steadily advanced its indigenous military and technological capabilities. Furthermore, Iran occupies a pivotal geopolitical position. It is a key player in the broader Eurasian integration project, aligning itself with rising powers such as China and Russia. This strategic alignment provides Iran with significant diplomatic and economic leverage, mitigating the impact of Western isolation efforts. The current Israeli attack, therefore, is not merely a strike against a non-state actor or a destabilised regime; it is a direct assault on a sovereign state with deep historical roots and considerable regional influence. This distinction is crucial, as it elevates the potential for a full-scale, state-on-state conflict with far-reaching implications for global energy markets, trade routes, and international security. 

What’s the plan, then? 

What is the aim of the Israeli attack? It cannot possibly be the destruction of Iran’s nuclear programme, as Israel claims, since this is simply not practically achievable on the basis of Israel’s conventional weaponry—and we would risk the assessment that the use of Israeli nuclear weapons in order to annihilate potential or plausible future nuclear weapons, rather than to defeat the Islamic Republic of Iran in toto, is not on the table.  

Is Israel’s aim to topple Iran’s leadership and effect a regime change without full U.S. support and involvement? We assess that this is not feasible and realistic, merely by Israeli airstrikes and covert operations thousands of kilometres from Israel’s borders. Yet, at the moment,  the U.S. staunchly telegraphs that it is not willing to get properly involved in yet another major war—since any actual war against Iran is by definition a major war indeed, and the voices within the U.S. cautioning against such a war’s capacity to backfire are abundant (as are Israel’s ‘whatever it takes’ supporters in Congress, of course, further complicating things).  

What’s the Israeli plan, then? 

To engineer an escalation in hostilities that shall engender a true existential threat to Israel which will indeed drag the U.S. in—the “or else’ being not merely domestically political in American terms, but also potentially nuclear. We stand by our September 2024 assessment on GeoTrends: back then, we opined that “Netanyahu’s medium-term approach may indeed reflect a strategy aimed at dragging the U.S. to a regional war the latter declares it cannot currently afford on the basis of a pernicious dilemma to be tacitly posed to U.S. leadership in this electoral period, as the situation escalated further: ‘now the threat for Israel has become existential; either you join our strife to counter it, or we are left with no other choice but to employ the nuclear option, once thought of as primarily a deterrent.’ This speculative dilemma is one the United States would be particularly challenged to properly address. Leading to the conclusion: to the extent that Israeli leadership might indeed be betting on an escalation that would drag the U.S. into a wider conflict, it becomes obvious that peace becomes an ever-more distant possibility.”

* Sotiris Mitralexis holds a doctorate in political science and international relations; he works at University College London as a research fellow.