KEY TAKEAWAYS
- Strategic shift: Gulf Arab states are pivoting from U.S. reliance and dependency toward Eastward entente partnerships, strategic relationships, and alliances with powers like China and India, primarily for long-term economic and security stability.
- Red Sea tensions: Conflict-related threats, including Houthi attacks on Israel-linked vessels, have reduced Red Sea shipping by 56% in 2024, driving traffic around the Cape of Good Hope and raising global freight costs.
- Neutral stance: Gulf states now maintain neutrality in Israel-Iran hostilities, avoiding U.S.-led actions against Iran and favouring regional stability.
- Diminished U.S. confidence: Events like the U.S. exit from Afghanistan and NATO’s struggle in Ukraine have eroded Gulf states’ trust in U.S. protection and reliability.
- BRICS+ partnerships: China’s mediation in Saudi-Iran relations and BRICS+ membership offers the Gulf states a strategic alternative, aligning with their economic goals while respecting sovereignty.
- Future outlook: Gulf states may continue balancing East-West alliances, signalling a more multipolar Middle Eastern dynamic.
Editorial note: This forms part of a cluster of four interrelated GeoTrends analyses; one on the fall of Syria, and one on post-Assad Turkish-Israeli tensions, by Sotiris Mitralexis; one on the recent historical background of Turkish-Israeli relations as a lens for understanding Syria, by Dimitris B. Peponis, and this analysis below on the ascendancy of Saudi Arabia’s and generally the Gulf Arab States’ importance as a result of recent geopolitical developments:
In recent years, the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East has experienced profound transformations, especially among the Gulf Arab states. These nations, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have traditionally aligned with the United States, relying on its military and economic support for decades. However, recent developments indicate a gradual pivot in their foreign policy and strategic alignments. Confronted with shifting regional threats and a diminished confidence in U.S. reliability, Gulf Arab states are reevaluating their options, increasingly turning eastward toward emerging powers like China and India, exploring new regional partnerships, including with historical adversaries like Iran.
The Gulf Arab states’ reliance on the U.S. stems from the latter’s longstanding commitment to safeguarding the security of the Persian Gulf—a commitment reinforced by shared interests, particularly energy security. The U.S. has historically served as a protective shield against regional threats such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Iran’s revolutionary government, and upheavals following the Arab Spring. The U.S.-Israel patron-client relationship has also been central, with Israel’s defence policies often supported by the U.S. in efforts to counterbalance threats from Iran.
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have traditionally been cautious in engaging directly with Israel, though recent years have seen an alignment of security concerns, particularly regarding Iran. Overt quasi-alliances, however, remain complex due to public opinion (the “Arab street”) and the Palestinian issue. The potential for formal diplomatic ties has waned as Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, gain a more autonomous role in regional dynamics, illustrated by Saudi Arabia’s rising influence since the escalation of the Gaza conflict.
The growing influence of Saudi Arabia and Gulf Arab states
Saudi Arabia’s role in Middle Eastern diplomacy has been on the rise since the Gaza conflict’s escalation—an aspect of the wider context that has not been highlighted adequately. Israel seeks a strategic connection with Saudi Arabia to bolster its regional standing, but Saudi Arabia’s interests are less aligned with Israel’s than previously assumed. For Israel, forming alliances with the Gulf states serves to strengthen its strategic positioning against Iran and other regional rivals. However, Saudi Arabia and the UAE do not rely on Israel for regional connectivity, as they possess various trade routes from India to Europe, through Egypt, Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon. This autonomy, coupled with diversified relationships, indicates a shift from the traditional U.S.-Israel-Gulf alignment.
Rising tensions in the Red Sea: Impact on global trade
The escalating conflict in the Middle East has also made the Red Sea a focal point, with significant implications for global trade. The Red Sea, a historically critical maritime route, has seen a 56 percent drop in shipping traffic as of September 2024 compared to the previous year. Heightened risks have prompted many vessels to take the longer, costlier route around South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope. Retaliatory attacks by the Houthis on commercial vessels linked to Israel, following Israeli strikes in Gaza, have heightened risks along the Red Sea, particularly affecting container and LNG (liquefied natural gas) vessels, which saw traffic drops of 73 percent and 87 percent, respectively.
Consequently, container ship transits around the Cape of Good Hope spiked by 420%, fundamentally altering global shipping routes and patterns. The rerouting has driven up freight costs, with rates for 40-foot containers peaking at $6,000 in mid-2024. While these prices have eased slightly, they remain 116 percent higher than late 2023 levels, causing ongoing disruptions to global supply chains. This shift not only underscores the Red Sea’s vulnerability to regional conflicts and its central role in international trade, but also discloses it as a critical node in possibilities and impossibilities of long-term U.S.-dictated stances and alliances. Last but not least, it proves that safety trumps profit.
Gulf states’ neutral stance on the Israel-Iran conflict
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have adopted a notably neutral stance in the ongoing hostilities between Israel and Iran, marking a significant departure from previous alignment with U.S. objectives. This neutrality was highlighted in April 2024, when Gulf Arab states on the one hand cooperated at the intelligence level with Washington and Tel Aviv, yet on the other hand, they informed the U.S. and Israel that they would not allow American operations against Iran to be launched from their territories, underscoring their reluctance to be drawn into a direct confrontation with Iran.
The current stance of the Persian Gulf Arabs, following Iran’s October 1 attack on Israel, should not come as a surprise to those who paid due attention to their reaction to the first Iranian attack of April 13, 2024. This stance reflects a broader shift in Gulf policy, with neutrality emerging as a strategy to maintain regional stability and avoid the economic repercussions of escalated hostilities. Ever since, the gradual normalisation in Saudi-Iranian relations defies any previous expectations, to say the least.
A waning faith in U.S. protection
Recent developments have also eroded the Gulf states’ confidence in the U.S. as a reliable security partner. Well before the current Middle Eastern crisis, key among these is the 2021 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, NATO’s protracted struggles in Ukraine, and—to return to ongoing developments—Israel’s security lapses in recent conflicts. For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, these events have raised doubts about the U.S.’s ability and commitment to consistently safeguard their interests in an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape. With American attention shifting towards East Asia and its competition with China, the Gulf states are concerned about a diminished focus on their immediate security needs.
In addition, Gulf Arab states are wary of the ideological/values-related demands often imposed by the U.S.; these demands clash with the Gulf states’ governance models and have driven them to seek partnerships that respect sovereignty without political conditions.
Strategic realignment: The Gulf’s eastward pivot
The Gulf Arab states’ pivot toward the East has been underscored by a series of high-profile partnerships with China, which has presented itself as an attractive alternative to the U.S. by emphasizing economic development and non-interference in domestic governance. China’s mediation of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement earlier this year and its inclusion of Saudi Arabia (as an invited member) and the UAE (as a current member) in the BRICS+ framework illustrate this strategic shift.
China, India, and other BRICS nations offer a valuable alternative, free from imposed constraints, that aligns with the Gulf states’ goals for economic growth and security. The BRICS+ alignment, inclusive of major emerging economies, is appealing for its potential to diversify global power dynamics and lessen dependency on the U.S.-led global order. As China and India’s energy demands continue to grow, they offer the Gulf states substantial markets for energy exports and investments that are critical for long-term development goals.
Dilemmas and choices for Gulf Arab states
The Gulf Arab states’ evolving strategy reflects a careful balance of regional and international interests. They face three main options in their approach to regional geopolitics:
- Align with Israel and the U.S. against Iran: Such alignment would place the Gulf states on the front line of any conflict with Iran, emphasizing military security but also carrying high risks, including potential economic and social instability.
- Adopt a neutral stance: A neutral position allows Gulf Arab states to avoid direct entanglement in the Israel-Iran conflict, maintaining diplomatic channels and preserving stability critical to their economic ambitions.
- Develop a working relationship with Iran: Given Iran’s historical and geographical prominence, Gulf states may ultimately pursue a working relationship with Tehran. The BRICS+ framework offers an avenue for exploring broader partnerships that favour regional cooperation over external alliances.
The second approach, a more neutral stance, is gradually unfolding, leading to a departure from the first and an inclination towards the third approach. The latter might be challenging, yet it aligns with Gulf Arab states’ growing interest in regional peace and reflects a counterbalance to traditional U.S. and Israeli influence in the region. Things are not developing quite as the Abraham Accords would foresee.
Future outlook: A post-American/post-unipolar Middle East?
The Gulf Arab states’ gradual pivot away from Western reliance and dependency marks a historic transformation in Middle Eastern geopolitics. The Saudi-Iran reconciliation, facilitated by China, symbolises a potential shift toward a multipolar Middle East, where local powers prioritize autonomy and diversified alliances.
This Eastward turn signals a new era where Gulf states, driven by pragmatism and economic foresight, decisively depart from prior conducts in order to secure a resilient future. The Gulf Arab states’ pivot also reveals an emerging acknowledgment that their future may no longer align solely with Western powers. As relationships with BRICS+ nations deepen, the Middle East may witness an increasingly multipolar dynamic, reshaping alliances, economic ties, and security frameworks.
With its renewed orientation, the Gulf is poised to redefine its role in Middle Eastern geopolitics, signalling a transformative phase that could shape the region for decades to come.
* Dimitris B. Peponis holds an MA in Governance and Public Policies from the University of the Peloponnese’s Department of Political Science and International Relations and is the author of “The End of the Great Deviation: From Ukraine and the Pandemic to the Shaping of the New Global Order” (Topos books, in Greek).