China’s COSCO transform the once-ailing Port of Piraeus into the Mediterranean’s premier container hub, Washington has decided to enter the fray. The plan was solidified in a recent meeting between Greek Development Minister Takis Theodorikakos and U.S. Ambassador Kimberly Guilfoyle, where the Elefsina port development was officially championed as the strategic counter to Chinese influence.
During the meeting, the diplomatic language was as ambitious as the plan itself. Ambassador Guilfoyle declared, “We look forward to the expansion and use of the Elefsina port as a logistics hub in this important geopolitical region. It is a critical step forward.” Her Greek counterpart, Minister Theodorikakos, added that the partnership “strengthens Greece’s economic transformation, competitiveness, and security.” The narrative is compelling: a democratic, Western-backed alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) flagship. But beyond the diplomatic pronouncements and geopolitical posturing, a rather inconvenient question remains: is this project a genuine commercial competitor, or is it merely expensive geopolitical theatre? A closer look at the facts suggests the latter.
COSCO’s Piraeus: An inconvenient success
To understand the scale of the challenge facing the Elefsina port development, one must first appreciate the monumental success of Piraeus under COSCO’s management. When Western capital fled Greece during its sovereign debt crisis, Beijing stepped in. COSCO’s involvement began in 2008, culminating in a majority stake in 2016 after it was the sole bidder in a privatisation process mandated by Greece’s international creditors. Funny how Western strategic interest in Greek ports seems to materialise only after China has done the hard work.
The results speak for themselves. COSCO invested over $600 million, transforming Piraeus from a regional port into a global logistics powerhouse. The numbers are stark.
| Metric | Pre-COSCO (c. 2009) | Post-COSCO (2023–2024) | Growth Factor |
|---|---|---|---|
| World Ranking | 93rd | Top 40 | ▲ >50 positions |
| Container Capacity | 1.5 million TEUs | 6.2 million TEUs | ▲ >4× |
| Annual Revenue | €37 million loss | €230.9 million | From loss to profit |
| EU Ranking | Not in top 15 | 5th | ▲ Major leap |
Sources: China Daily, PortEconomics, Greek Reporter
This transformation was not accidental. It was the result of sustained, large-scale investment and a clear-eyed understanding of global trade routes. Piraeus offers a shipping time from Shanghai of around 22 days, roughly ten days shorter than routes to northern European ports like Rotterdam or Hamburg. This geographic advantage, combined with modern infrastructure, made it the indispensable “dragon’s head” of the BRI in Europe. Furthermore, with Greek shippers transporting an estimated 60% of China’s exports, the commercial symbiosis is deeply entrenched. The notion that this deeply integrated, commercially successful behemoth can be casually “bypassed,” as Ambassador Guilfoyle suggests, seems rather disconnected from market realities.
The American proposition: A shipyard with ambitions
Now, consider the American-backed challenger. The Elefsina port development is, at its core, a plan to revitalise a shipyard. ONEX Group, the operator, has already demonstrated commendable success in the ship repair sector, servicing over 800 vessels in 2024 across its Syros and Elefsina yards. The new plan, however, envisions a leap into a different league: a multi-use port with commercial, logistics, energy, and defence functions, built on 40 hectares of land adjacent to the existing shipyard.
| Feature | Piraeus Port (COSCO) | Elefsina Port Development (ONEX/DFC) |
|---|---|---|
| Primary Function | Global Container Transshipment Hub | Shipyard / Proposed Multi-use Hub |
| Container Capacity | 4.8 million TEUs handled (2024) | 0 (No dedicated container terminal) |
| Lead Investor | COSCO (Chinese State-Owned) | ONEX (Private, US-backed) |
| Known Investment | >$600 million | $125 million (DFC Loan) |
| Current Status | Fully operational, 5th largest in EU | Shipyard; port expansion pending legislation |
Sources: DFC, PortEconomics, Atlantic Council
Herein lies the rub. The DFC’s $125 million loan is intended to “rehabilitate and modernize” the shipyard. It is not, by any stretch of the imagination, an investment capable of building a world-class container terminal from scratch. Such infrastructure requires billions, not millions, in dedicated capital for cranes, yard space, and dredging. The plan’s success hinges on a proposed rail link to the Thriasio logistics centre, but a train needs containers to carry. At present, the Elefsina port development has no capacity to handle them at scale.
To compare this to Piraeus is to compare a well-run garage to a Formula 1 factory. Both service vehicles, but they do not operate in the same universe. The idea that this project will meaningfully challenge Piraeus in the container market is, to put it mildly, fanciful.
Beijing fires back
The diplomatic temperature rose sharply after Ambassador Kimberly Guilfoyle’s remarks, in which she described China’s control of the Port of Piraeus as “unfortunate” and suggested the port “could be for sale” to allow American investment to “balance against Chinese influence.” The Chinese Embassy in Greece reacted decisively, condemning the comments as “malicious slander of the normal Sino-Greek commercial cooperation” and a “serious interference in Greece’s internal affairs.”
Beijing emphasized that its investment in the Port of Piraeus is rooted in “mutual support, without geopolitical calculations,” recalling its role during Greece’s debt crisis and the job creation that followed. The embassy insisted the port “belongs to the Greek people” and “must in no way fall victim to geopolitical confrontation.”
It further accused Washington of “inciting Greece to terminate its contractual obligations and sell the port,” warning that such efforts—grounded in what it called “Cold War mentality and hegemonic logic”—were “doomed to fail before the Greek people.”
This episode underlines the broader stakes: the disagreement isn’t just about infrastructure or containers, but about who sets the terms of strategic access in the Eastern Mediterranean. For Washington, the push in Elefsina becomes part of a larger narrative of countering Beijing’s maritime reach. For Beijing, Piraeus remains a cornerstone of its European logistics footprint, not something up for debate.
A necessary reality check
Even Piraeus’s recent dip in performance underscores its dominance. In 2024, the port’s container traffic fell by 7.8%, causing it to slip from 4th to 5th place in Europe. However, this was not a sign of structural weakness. It was a direct consequence of the Red Sea crisis, which forced vessels to bypass the Suez Canal and, by extension, the Eastern Mediterranean. As PortEconomics analyst Theo Notteboom noted, the region became a “maritime cul-de-sac.” While Piraeus dipped, ports on the Atlantic coast surged. This was a temporary disruption, not a fundamental flaw in the Piraeus model. Its long-term growth of over 248% since 2007 speaks to its underlying strength.
So, if the Elefsina port development is not a serious container competitor, what is it? The answer lies in the project’s other stated goals: energy and defence. The DFC’s own 2023 press release is revealing, stating the financing will help create a “critical energy supply hub” for LNG ships and support the nearby Revithoussa LNG terminal. It also mentions repurposing infrastructure for wind turbine assembly. This is a sensible, strategic investment in European energy security, particularly in reducing reliance on Russian gas.
This is not about containers; it is about creating a strategic foothold. The U.S. wants a reliable, friendly port in the Eastern Mediterranean for its naval assets and for energy logistics. By backing the Elefsina port development, Washington secures this foothold without needing to engage in a hopeless commercial battle with COSCO. It allows the U.S. to project influence and secure its energy and military interests under the guise of commercial competition.
What Elefsina could actually become
Skepticism about Elefsina’s role as a container giant does not mean the Elefsina port development is without merit. On the contrary, by shedding the unconvincing narrative of a Piraeus-killer, its true, more specialised potential comes into focus. The $125 million DFC investment is far more logically suited to developing high-value, niche capabilities where Elefsina has a genuine competitive advantage.
- LNG logistics hub: With Europe scrambling for energy security, Elefsina is perfectly positioned to support the nearby Revithoussa LNG terminal. The DFC has explicitly mentioned this, and it aligns with Greece’s ambition to become a regional energy gateway. This involves infrastructure for LNG carriers and transshipment, a far more attainable goal than a full-scale container port.
- Offshore wind base: The DFC also highlighted the potential for repurposing infrastructure for wind turbine assembly. As Greece develops its offshore wind capacity, Elefsina could become a critical assembly and maintenance base, servicing the turbines that will power the country’s green transition.
- High-value ship repair: ONEX already excels in shipbuilding and repair. Instead of competing with Piraeus on volume, Elefsina could double down on high-specialisation work, such as servicing complex vessels like LNG carriers, naval ships, or mega-yachts, commanding higher margins.
- NATO naval support hub: This is the unspoken part of the plan. Its strategic location, combined with American investment, makes Elefsina an ideal support hub for U.S. and NATO naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. This provides a secure logistical base away from the commercial hustle of Piraeus, enhancing allied operational flexibility.
These four pillars represent a viable, productive future for Elefsina. They leverage its existing strengths, align with regional geopolitical needs, and offer a realistic return on investment—something the container hub fantasy never could.
The verdict
The U.S. plan for Elefsina is not about creating a new Piraeus; it is about securing a strategic asset. The Elefsina port development will succeed not as a commercial rival to COSCO, but as a specialised hub for energy, defence, and high-value maritime services. Calling it a container competitor is a convenient fiction that serves a geopolitical purpose. The reality is more subtle, and far more sensible. COSCO keeps its commercial crown, while Washington gains a much-needed strategic foothold in a critical region.