The concept of the Blue Homeland, which was also referenced in the European Parliament’s Türkiye Report published in mid-June, has once again brought two NATO countries into confrontation. However, I believe the upcoming NATO Summit has prevented this tension from escalating. After all, it makes little sense for two allied countries—or countries that ought to be allies—to harbor hostility toward one another.
Almost every time I visit Greece, if the conversation eventually turns to politics — which in our countries is almost as inevitable as a law of nature — one of the questions I encounter concerns the Blue Homeland. And each time, I find myself thinking that this concept, whose shadow is larger than itself, is hardly understood at all.
Because Greece and Türkiye established their nation-states after wars won against one another roughly a century apart — 1821 and 1923 — the traces of those painful days continue to live on in the collective memories of both countries. As a result, what we in Türkiye call “making a mountain out of a molehill” occurs frequently: relations between the two countries become strained over matters of little real importance.
A political reaction, not a legal doctrine
The Blue Homeland is no different. To properly evaluate the concept, two points must be understood correctly. First, the Blue Homeland is not a legally binding concept. It is not mentioned in any law and, let alone being adopted, it has not even been debated in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Second, the Blue Homeland is ultimately a reaction. Therefore, it should be regarded not as a demand arising from within, but as a response to pressure perceived to be coming from outside.
The moment that pressure diminishes, discussions surrounding the Blue Homeland will also fade.
The long shadow of the Aegean
The Aegean Sea has been one of the most intractable issues between the two countries for at least the last fifty years. Other major issues, from Türkiye’s perspective, include Cyprus and the problems of the Turkish-speaking minority in Western Thrace. For decades, the positions of both countries on these matters have remained unchanged. Greece’s decision to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean to twelve nautical miles was declared by Türkiye to be a casus belli — a cause for war.
Unlike the Blue Homeland, this position was formally adopted by the Turkish Parliament, though it has never been implemented. It is worth reminding ourselves once again that both countries are NATO allies.
From marginal theory to public debate
Although the concept of the Blue Homeland was first articulated in 2006 by a retired admiral known for his anti-Western views, at that time Türkiye was successfully implementing its “zero problems with neighbors” policy, achieving significant economic successes, and taking important steps toward European Union membership. In such an environment, it was impossible for the Blue Homeland doctrine to gain support beyond marginal circles — and indeed, it did not.
The period when the Blue Homeland began to gain broader recognition among the Turkish public was after 2018. In other words, it achieved relative popularity precisely when relations with the EU started to deteriorate. Yet if we go back to May 2016, we find a period in which relations between Türkiye and the EU were good enough that they were on the verge of signing a visa liberalization agreement. Unfortunately, the visa-free travel arrangement for Turkish citizens, scheduled to come into force on June 30, 2016, never took effect because several conditions — including the adoption of a GRECO recommendation — were not fulfilled. It was during this period of declining relations that the so-called “Seville Map,” which many in Türkiye associated with the Treaty of Sèvres, suddenly entered the national agenda.
The Seville Map and perceptions of encirclement
Although it had no legal force, this map, which appeared to assign almost the entire Aegean Sea to Greece, provoked strong reactions in Türkiye. The Blue Homeland began to attract support as a solution — or rather, a response — to this feeling of restriction. In fact, this reactionary map, drawn as though Cyprus, Rhodes, and Crete did not exist, perhaps reflected the state of mind of two societies that may be among the least capable of understanding one another.
One admiral who was such a strong advocate of the Blue Homeland that he openly attached his own name to the doctrine in his book resigned from the military in 2020 before even waiting for retirement after being demoted. He devoted his life to promoting the concept, established a think tank, and entered academia. Recently, however, he became the subject of allegations of serious plagiarism in his doctoral dissertation. Many of the ideas presented as if they were official aspects of the Blue Homeland are, in reality, nothing more than the personal views of a former admiral whose dissertation has been accused of plagiarism.
From what I can see, just as the non-binding Seville Map was greatly exaggerated in Turkey, the Blue Homeland is treated in a similar manner in Greece — and among its European partners.
Toward a shared Aegean
What needs to be done is for both sides to recognize the Aegean as a “shared sea” and discuss how a lasting solution can be achieved together. If sufficient political will can be demonstrated, what Germany and France accomplished could be achieved even more easily by Türkiye and Greece. The sole guarantor of a lasting solution may well be Türkiye’s membership in the European Union. Even though EU membership has appeared to be relegated to a secondary priority over the last decade, it should not be overlooked that Türkiye remains a candidate country, is part of the Customs Union, and maintains an extensive trade relationship with the EU. Changing the atmosphere depends on a few positive words from both sides and political determination.
A country such as Türkiye, surrounded by seas on three sides, cannot be expected to remain silent if Greece extends its territorial waters to twelve nautical miles. The casus belli decision may, in fact, have served as a deterrent, encouraging Greece to reconsider its position and preventing a direct military confrontation between the two countries. The issue is not the twelve-mile limit itself — Türkiye has exercised this right in the Black Sea without troubling any neighboring coastal state.
The issue is that Türkiye feels constrained. The Blue Homeland doctrine derives its strength from this feeling of constraint.
The psychological dimension
This means that the root of the problem is psychological. It stems from the fact that both countries define part of their existence through opposition to one another. Once the psychology changes, there is no reason why the problems should not begin to resolve themselves.
Moreover, these two countries are NATO allies. Under the famous Article 5, they are also responsible for one another’s security. Two countries that, in the early 2010s, advanced their relations to the point of holding joint cabinet meetings and signed more agreements in a single day than in the previous ninety years combined should not regard further progress as an unattainable dream.
Why democrats matter
All issues between allies who ought to trust one another most must ultimately be resolved. If we agree on that point, then the responsibility seems to fall less on statesmen and more on democratic intellectuals. If democrats in both countries consistently and loudly demand solutions, marginalize those who thrive on deadlock, defend rationality against populism, and create bottom-up pressure for change, then first the psychology and then the politics will change.
What I am suggesting is far from easy because we live in an age of populism. If Greeks do not want Turks — who feel cornered and who speak of the Seville Map as though it were an inevitable international project — to seek solutions in the Blue Homeland, they should listen to their own democrats. They should consider how issues such as the militarization of the islands are perceived on the other side. Allies cannot be threats to one another.
At the same time, democrats in Türkiye should tell their own society that a solution can only come through progress toward European Union membership. Because if Türkiye regards EU membership — or, more broadly, reaching the standards of countries such as Norway or Switzerland, whether or not it formally joins the Union — as its fundamental goal, it would become one of the principal guarantors of stability and peace in the region.
Beyond Blue Homeland and the Seville Map
A lasting solution will come neither from the Blue Homeland nor from the Seville Map, but from establishing an order in which neither country feels restricted or excluded while sharing the Aegean Sea — not, of course, in the sense of dividing it equally. That is why the democrats of both countries have a great deal of work to do.
Bilgehan Uçak is a political analyst and author.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of GeoTrends.