KEY TAKEAWAYS
- Sovereignty over integration: The AfD rejects deeper EU political and security integration, favouring an intergovernmental Europe in which nation-states retain control over borders, defence and foreign policy.
- Strategic autonomy: The party supports NATO membership until an independent European military alliance becomes viable, while seeking to develop Europe into an autonomous centre of power in an increasingly multipolar order.
- Russia and Ukraine: The AfD advocates normalized relations with Moscow, an end to sanctions and the restoration of Nord Stream, while opposing arms shipments to Kyiv and envisioning Ukraine as neutral and outside NATO and the EU.
- A recalibrated U.S. relationship: Washington remains a key ally, but the AfD seeks cooperation on equal terms, rejects the stationing of U.S. long-range weapons in Germany and opposes extraterritorial sanctions.
- China without decoupling: The party treats China as both a strategic economic partner and a competitive challenge, supporting engagement with the Belt and Road Initiative while seeking stronger protection for German technology and industry.
- Türkiye’s changing role: Once markedly more hostile towards Ankara, the AfD now describes Türkiye as an important strategic and economic partner while opposing Turkish-linked Islamist or nationalist influence inside Germany.
- Realpolitik in German interests: The 2025 manifesto places national interest at the centre of foreign policy, combining global trade and engagement with BRICS+ and ASEAN with strategic protection of critical German assets and industries.
Alternative für Deutschland, AfD: although much has been said about the German party chaired by Dr Alice Weidel during the latest federal elections, too little has actually been detailed about its foreign-policy and international-relations outlook — i.e., how a Germany governed by the AfD would move on the world stage.
This analysis examines the key positions of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), focusing exclusively on foreign relations, foreign policy, and its stance on the European Union, Russia, China, France, Türkiye, the U.S.-European relationship, and North-South relations — essentially, the broader geopolitical landscape. It will begin with the AfD’s core positions over the years and conclude by focusing on its 2025 electoral programme.
The AfD’s foreign-policy DNA
A central pillar of the AfD’s foreign-policy stance is its opposition to deeper European integration, particularly in defence and security. The party insists that national defence should be the responsibility of each European state. The AfD also strongly criticizes the Schengen Agreement, which it views as a failure in controlling the EU’s external borders. The party advocates for border management to remain under national control, while seeking to interfere as little as possible with the free movement of people and goods.
Furthermore, the AfD opposes the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), instead emphasizing NATO as the primary pillar of European defence until an independent and effective European military alliance is established. The party calls for close cooperation with the United States on equal terms but argues that NATO should return to being a strictly defensive alliance, criticizing past interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. It also insists that NATO’s operations should be confined to member states’ territories, warning against expanding its focus to confront China. Regarding the EU, the AfD favours a strict intergovernmental approach, rejecting supranational institutions and federalist tendencies.
In economic matters, the AfD supports the full repatriation of Germany’s gold reserves held abroad. It should be noted that, since the repatriation process began in 2013, the Deutsche Bundesbank has transferred 300 tonnes of gold from the Federal Reserve Bank in New York and 374 tonnes from the Banque de France in Paris to its vaults in Frankfurt.
Between Washington and Moscow
While the AfD regards the United States as one of Germany’s most important partners, it also insists that stability, peace, and order in Europe require cooperation with Russia and a balance between Washington and Moscow. The party advocates for the normalization and de-escalation of relations with Russia, seeing Moscow’s integration into a broader European security framework as essential for lasting peace on the continent. This stance is evident in its position on Crimea: whereas parties that have participated in coalition governments over the years, such as the CDU/CSU, SPD, Greens, and FDP, have unequivocally condemned Russia’s annexation as a violation of international law and supported sanctions, AfD politicians have tended to contextualize the annexation historically, question the sanctions regime, or offer arguments more sympathetic to Moscow’s position.
On the war in Ukraine, the AfD has portrayed the conflict as an American proxy war against Russia — as the U.S. currently does — while still condemning Moscow’s invasion as a breach of international law and recognizing Ukraine’s right to self-defence. However, it opposes arms shipments to Kyiv and the transition to a war economy, instead advocating for de-escalation and negotiations to end the war rather than merely freeze it, with Germany acting as a mediator. The AfD is also the only party that consistently highlights the Nord Stream pipelines sabotage, supports reopening Nord Stream 2, favours deepening economic ties with Russia, and calls for lifting economic sanctions against Moscow. Additionally, it strongly opposes U.S. extraterritorial sanctions against German projects and interests.
At the core of the AfD’s foreign policy is the principle that German national interests should be determined in Berlin (not in Washington, Kyiv, Brussels, or Taipei).
China, Türkiye, and the Road to Eurasia
Regarding China, the AfD acknowledges Beijing’s rising influence as a challenge but advocates for German-Chinese cooperation on equal and fair terms, given China’s critical role as a trading partner. Despite concerns over trade, investment, and technology transfer, the party has supported German engagement with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (New Silk Road) and has proposed a complementary German-led West–East initiative.
This perspective ties into a broader geopolitical view that sees Moscow and Istanbul — i.e., Russia and Türkiye, as the two key gateways between Europe and Eurasia. Historically, European powers have had to maintain access through at least one of these strategic points. If relations with Russia deteriorate, maintaining ties with Türkiye becomes essential — hence why pro-NATO and Atlanticist factions, despite often opposing Russia, tolerate or even support Türkiye. Conversely, parties with anti-Islamic leanings, such as the AfD, tend to be more sympathetic to Russia, viewing it as the preferred route to Eurasia. The AfD’s position vis-à-vis Türkiye has softened somewhat recently — and much could be said about the causes of this — yet exploring the AfD’s “political DNA” on the matter remains important.
The AfD’s earlier firm opposition to Türkiye’s EU accession — alongside markedly critical positions on Ankara’s role within the Western alliance — reinforces the argument that Germany’s road to Eurasia should run through Moscow rather than Istanbul, insofar as our “two gateways to Eurasia” schematization would have it. This aligns with the party’s broader worldview, which has historically been sceptical of deeper engagement with parts of Africa and the Islamic world. Within this analytical framework, without Türkiye, Moscow emerges as Europe’s principal alternative pathway eastward. Ultimately, the AfD’s vision for Germany is one of strategic realignment — moving away from complete dependence on the United States and NATO, resisting deeper EU integration, and forging an independent path that balances relations between Washington and Moscow while maintaining economic ties with China.
The AfD’s 2025 elections manifesto: continuities and discontinuities
Let us now turn to how these tendencies crystallized in the 2025 election manifesto. The AfD’s platform for the 2025 German federal elections reiterates the party’s established principle of “Realpolitik im deutschen Interesse” — Realpolitik in the German interest — prioritizing the freedom, rights, prosperity, and security of German citizens and advocating for a sovereign Germany capable of guaranteeing them. Regarding Europe, the AfD envisions a “Bund europäischer Nationen” as an economic and interest-based community in which member states retain extensive sovereignty.
The party explicitly rejects the centralizing ambitions of the European Union. It views the current EU as engaging in illegitimate de-democratization, centralization, over-regulation, and planned economic policies. Key common interests within this “Bund” would include a common market, effective protection of external borders against illegal immigration, strategic autonomy in security policy, and the preservation of European cultures and identities.
In the realm of international organizations, the AfD commits to the principles of international law, particularly the UN Charter, and to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. It is critical of the influence of international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on national self-determination and demands that foreign NGOs operating in Germany disclose their funding sources. Crucially, the AfD seeks a permanent German seat on the UN Security Council and the deletion of the “enemy states clauses” from the UN Charter. For context, these clauses refer to provisions in Articles 53 and 107 of the United Nations Charter, originally included to address states that had been enemies of the Allied powers during World War II — primarily Germany, Japan, and their allies. Article 53 contains a historical exception concerning enforcement action against former enemy states, while Article 107 preserves measures taken as a consequence of World War II.
Concerning security, the AfD’s 2025 manifesto supports NATO membership and an active German role in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) until an independent and capable European military alliance is established. It advocates for the concept of strategic autonomy for Europe: the party believes that the world is undergoing a transition towards a multipolar order and calls for balanced cooperation among all European states based on their legitimate security interests, while opposing the eastward expansion of the EU and NATO. The AfD also supports strengthening and expanding control mechanisms for nuclear and conventional armaments and renegotiating suspended treaties.
From Washington to Beijing: the AfD’s map of partners
The AfD’s 2025 platform outlines specific approaches to various countries:
- USA: The AfD views good relations with the USA as essential, particularly in economic, technological, and scientific cooperation. It seeks to improve relations, particularly in light of the Trump administration’s policies. However, it acknowledges increasingly divergent geopolitical and economic interests and rejects the stationing of long-range U.S. weapon systems in Germany.
- Russian Federation: The AfD considers Russia a reliable supplier of affordable energy and calls for the immediate lifting of economic sanctions against Russia and the repair of the Nord Stream pipelines to restore undisturbed trade. It also aims to expand Germany’s relations with the Eurasian Economic Union.
- Ukraine: The AfD envisions Ukraine as a neutral state outside NATO and the EU.
- Türkiye: In stark contrast to earlier AfD pronouncements, the 2025 manifesto considers Türkiye an important strategic and economic partner, despite stating that it does not culturally belong to Europe. However, the party opposes foreign interference in Germany’s internal affairs through ideological or financial support for Islamist and nationalist groups.
- China: The AfD states that relations with China must be based on Germany’s Realpolitik interests. It aims to expand economic, scientific, and cultural contacts, emphasizing the need for equality and fairness in competition and protection against the exploitation of German technologies and key industries. While willing to utilize opportunities arising from China’s New Silk Road initiative, it calls for an immediate end to all development aid to China.
- Middle East: The AfD believes that peace in the Middle East requires confidence-building measures based on international law, equality, and mutual recognition rather than terror, war, or international interference. Its primary stated interests are preventing new mass migration and a large-scale war in the region. The AfD parliamentary group has also explicitly affirmed Israel’s right to exist and its legitimate right to security.
Trade without strategic dependence
In trade policy, the AfD aims to ensure non-discriminatory access to foreign import and export markets for German companies, including access to raw materials and freedom of trade routes. It supports reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and cooperation with BRICS+ states and regional organizations such as ASEAN and Mercosur when beneficial to Germany’s economic welfare and political self-determination. However, it argues that the Mercosur agreement in its current form harms German agriculture. The AfD also advocates for stronger control over foreign takeovers of German companies in security-relevant and essential sectors and considers extraterritorial decisions by foreign courts and unilaterally imposed sanctions against German projects to be null and void and contrary to international law.
It is almost shocking that, in international discussions, so little light has been shed on these core positions advocated by Germany’s current main opposition party. The fact remains that, overlooked as they are, these are the foreign-policy positions of a German party with such considerable electoral prowess in the 2025 federal elections and demonstrably obvious future prospects — should the party not become “Melonified” on its eventual way to power. Whoever has ears to hear, let them hear.
Dimitris B. Peponis holds an MA in Governance and Public Policies from the University of the Peloponnese’s Department of Political Science and International Relations and is the author of “The End of the Great Deviation: From Ukraine and the Pandemic to the Shaping of the New Global Order” (Topos books, in Greek).