The recent agreement reached between Greece and Germany in Brussels, on the sidelines of the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council, regarding the management of the pending cases of the “Dublin III” Regulation, in combination with the imminent activation of the first cycle of the solidarity mechanism, as provided for in the new “Pact on Migration and Asylum” (PACT), constitutes a real milestone in the bilateral relations between the two states.
It is perhaps the first time in recent years, and especially after the 2015 migration crisis, that the two countries are aligned politically, and consequently diplomatically, to the point of supporting each other in terms of implementing structural points of the PACT.
Without overlooking the fact that both represent two strong pillars of the management of illegal migration, with geopolitical specificities, different operational approaches, and sometimes conflicting national interests, they have managed, through the “fermentations” of recent months, to achieve an osmosis that, if we leave the nihilists aside, echoes the wishes of all sound-minded parties involved.
Greece between Dublin obligations and secondary movements
Greece, which for years has been facing the “sword of Damocles” of returning all those who illegally left Greek territory by moving to another Member State, is now managing to get rid of this pressure by single-handedly erasing not only the burdens from the entry into force of the “Dublin” Regulation, but also the potential returns that it would have to accept for those migrants who, if they enter Europe through our country, manage to find themselves in Germany by 12/6/2026.
But how many of these cases are there? And moreover, how many of those offered for transfer to our country are realistically feasible for return? The answer to both questions is impossible to give with precision. Only speculations and estimates can be made. However, we must note that Greece is a transit country for the vast majority of illegal migrants. This means that since 2015 and until today, hundreds of thousands of third-country nationals have left Greece, and continue to do so, although according to the Dublin Regulation they were required to remain in our country until their asylum application is finalized. Taking advantage of the generous policy of the Germans for several years, in combination with the case law of their federal courts, most of the above managed to ultimately remain on German soil and avoid their return.
The phenomenon, however, is dynamically evolving, and the supreme German courts have now overturned their previous decisions that were based on the alleged inability of the Greek authorities to ensure basic benefits to asylum seekers residing in the country. With the blessings of the European Commission and its related documents, the Germans now legally treat Greece as a Member State where migrants can enjoy their livelihood: bread, bed, and soap. Therefore, the main inhibiting factor for not transferring to Greece those who are not entitled to be in Germany has been overcome.
Germany’s policy shift and the weight of domestic pressure
However, the other factor, namely the official German political will, after the verbal naivety of the past, has also changed, and under the pressure of German public opinion and the gradual rise of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in the polls, our partners seem more determined than ever to implement the relevant returns. It is no coincidence that the former Chancellor herself, Mrs. Merkel, has been dismantled by her party’s members regarding the official policy she chose to follow in 2016, literally opening the borders to uncontrolled flows, while indicative of the prevailing climate in Germany is that the talk about returns is not limited to the Dublin Regulation but also includes deportations to countries that were previously considered a migration taboo, such as Afghanistan and Syria.
Therefore, the conditions at the given time were extremely burdensome for the Greek side, especially if we take into account the general change in the global course regarding migration management and the prioritization of active prevention, border guarding, and returns over integration and the promotion of legal channels of migration.
Nevertheless, one wonders why, while the wind is in Germany’s favor, it accepts to “gift” Greece with these cases, essentially depriving itself of a significant pool of returns and, at the same time, throwing away a communication trick against the far-right AfD. The answer, no matter how much some within Greece attempt to interpret it in terms of micro-political expediency (as is usually the case in similar cases), by speaking of hidden agendas and colpi grossi, is much simpler. Germany, like any serious state, looks to the future by seeing the “forest,” which is none other than the new Pact on Migration and Asylum. In essence, it has accepted that the past mismanagement on its part, by promoting an open border policy, brought about these specific long-term consequences, which it is willing to endure since it understands that the situation regarding the past is irreversible.
The new PACT and the reshaping of European migration governance
What it cares about is the next day, and for this reason the German Interior Minister, Alexander Dobrindt, is interested in gaining the relevant guarantees regarding the implementation of the new Pact. He accepts sacrificing these tens of thousands of returns to Greece in order to find “fellow travelers” in the effort of a restart that will not focus on subsidized, indiscriminate, mass migration, but on coordinated management in terms of primarily national security and secondarily economic development. Greece and Italy equally realize, from their side, that Germany has been disproportionately burdened over the years through secondary flows, although to a large extent through its own fault, and for this reason they have decided to be part of the solution and not the problem.
The inexpensive tactic of throwing the “ball in the stands,” that is, letting illegal flows come and then cross the country hoping that they will end up, in one way or another, at the final destination (Germany), where they will remain due to the administrative inability of the Germans to implement the returns, is being exhausted. At the same time, the Commission’s financial channels with the European funds intended for the creation of reception conditions and integration prospects in the countries of first entry are starting to close, since everyone understands that the financing of the existing way of managing illegal migration essentially functions as a magnet and accelerator of secondary flows.
The countries of southern Europe have, and will have, the right to be on their side, as their geographical location automatically makes them vulnerable to flows and susceptible to future migratory pressures. They are entitled to call for further practical solidarity, relocations, proportional redistribution of arrivals, and additional financial European support. However, in addition to reasonable demands and voices of protest, they also have obligations arising from the international agreements they have signed and the conventions they have ratified.
In conclusion, it becomes clear that the recent Greek-German declaration of mutual understanding is not a simple diplomatic development, but a key bilateral step with significant implications for readjusting the broader European migratory architecture. Greece is freed from chronic adverse pressures that undermined the effectiveness of its national asylum policy, while Germany now favors a pragmatic orientation that goes beyond the political costs of the past, investing in the sustainable implementation of the new Pact. In an unstable geopolitical environment of increasing challenges and constant reshuffles, this cooperation proves that there is ground for European win-win solutions, but for them to happen, flexibility, courage, understanding, and commitment to a common vision are needed.
Disclaimer
This article reflects the personal views of the author and does not, in any way, express the official policy or administrative practices of the Greek State, the Greek Authorities, or the EUAA.
English reprint of an article first published on the website tovima.gr on December 13, 2025.
* Marios Kaleas is General Director of the Greek Asylum Service and Vice-President of the Management Board of the European Agency for Asylum (EUAA).