KEY TAKEAWAYS
- U.S. foreign policy remains largely consistent despite changes in leadership, shaped by structural and strategic imperatives rather than individual leaders.
- The U.S. tendency to act unilaterally in foreign policy decisions, as demonstrated by the 2021 Afghanistan withdrawal, has been evident under both Trump and Biden administrations.
- The U.S. approach towards European security has been marked by continuous support but also a growing expectation for Europe to take more responsibility, as seen in Merkel’s 2017 comments and Macron’s 2019 remarks, with the roots of these developments preceding Trump 1.0.
- Despite calls for European autonomy, U.S. actions highlight European dependence on U.S. military and strategic support.
- A notable discontinuity is the shift in American policy towards Ukraine, particularly after the conflict was perceived as, eventually and inevitably, a Russian victory.
- The 2025 UN Security Council vote reflected a shift in U.S. alignment, moving closer to Russia and China, diverging from European positions.
- The U.S. role in global power dynamics is evolving, marked by a shift towards tri-polarity between the U.S., Russia, and China, indicating a post-Western international order and a post-American Europe.
In assessing the current Trump administration’s foreign policy, many observers tend to focus on the discontinuities with previous administrations (including Trump’s first term), often framing the debate as a shockingly new era in stark contrast to a recent, familiar, yet decisively expired U.S. This was particularly the case after the 28 February Trump-Zelensky-Vance meeting, or showdown, in the White House, which—to put it euphemistically—constitutes a break with standard diplomatic practices on both sides.
This perspective, however, overlooks the broader continuity of the U.S.’ foreign policy, which transcends individual presidencies. While there are notable discontinuities, a closer examination reveals that many aspects of U.S. foreign policy have remained consistent, shaped by deeper structural and strategic imperatives rather than the whims of individual leaders. The evolving U.S. stance towards NATO, Ukraine, and global hegemony demonstrates both deep-rooted continuities and key divergences.
Continuities
Let us name some examples. In early 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump declared that NATO was “obsolete,” arguing that it had been designed many years prior and that member states were failing to contribute their fair share financially. That same year, 2017, Germany’s Chancellor Dr Angela Merkel would assert that Europe can no longer “completely depend” on the United States for its protection, underscoring that Europeans “must take their destiny into our own hands”; Europeans must fight their own battles.
Two years later, in 2019, Emmanuel Macron, the president of the European Union’s largest military power, France, would remark that what we are living through is the brain death of NATO. In response, the president of NATO’s largest non-Atlantic military power, Türkiye, would retort by suggesting that the French leader examine his own mental state. That same year, the French president would reiterate the German Chancellor’s earlier sentiment, stating once more that “Europe can no longer rely on the United States.”
By the end of the summer of 2021, under the Biden administration, the disorderly and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan—conducted without prior consultation with NATO allies—and the subsequent fall of Kabul to the Taliban left local U.S. partners and allies exposed, sparking a storm of reactions within the North Atlantic Alliance.
Merely two months later, the signing of the AUKUS trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, marking a significant shift in U.S. strategy towards the Indo-Pacific, would further exacerbate tensions, not only within NATO and the EU but primarily between France and the U.S.
In both the cases of Afghanistan and Ukraine, the following became evident:
- There was neither a shared understanding nor coordination in the strategic decision-making process between the U.S. and its NATO allies. From a U.S.-centric perspective, this lack of coordination manifested as unilateral decision-making and action. In both instances,
- the U.S. abandoned non-NATO allied states and left European NATO members exposed, while
- admitting that it could neither uphold international law nor assert its power effectively. Indeed, the U.S.’s conduct in Afghanistan foreshadowed its subsequent behaviour in Ukraine, and in this sense, its attitude was, to some extent, predictable.
The preceding analysis suggests that, irrespective of the intentions at the time, there is a continuity in the conduct of the U.S. as a state. Many members of the current administration act and speak as though there is no connection between the U.S. before and after Trump 2.0, as if the U.S. state is unburdened by what has been, i.e., the sins and errors of its past, and as though others bear sole responsibility for issues with which the U.S. is directly implicated.
We shall not delve into the de-industrialisation of Germany and Europe, the Nord Stream pipelines and their fate, the issue of Ukraine, or NATO’s expansion despite French and German opposition. Nor shall we here explore the war in Iraq, the joint opposition of France, Germany, Russia, and China, the war in Afghanistan, or the broader, global “War on Terrorism.”
Similarly, here is not the space to address the countless regime changes, the Patriot Act, Edward Snowden’s credible revelations, or the surveillance of top officials and politicians from allied states (the NSA was not only monitoring Dr Angela Merkel’s mobile phone as we came to know in 2013; wait till you find out what happened to the Japanese). Nor will we examine the policies that the U.S. once funded, promoted, and imposed, only to reverse them after Trump’s second term. This is all highly illustrative, yet merely indicative.
Furthermore, if one assumes that the war in Ukraine is indeed a proxy military conflict against Russia as Boris Johnson famously declared, it was simultaneously serving as a political, economic, and energy war against Europe—resulting in its disruption, destabilisation, and further weakening—, in the context of which the Trump administration can be viewed as a logical continuation of the Biden administration. Its actions represent a public manifestation of the hostility that had previously existed behind the scenes and covertly (consider, once again, the surveillance of allied leaders). In this context, we witness continuity and escalation, reaching a point where hostility is now openly displayed, rather than any discontinuity.
To put it simply: when it comes to dealing with Europe, there is continuity and escalation. As for Russia, there is indeed discontinuity, yet not without reason: it is not Russia that was defeated in an ongoing war in Ukraine—a development which prompts a rupture vis-à-vis a prior strategy that assumed otherwise (more on which under the “discontinuities” section).
The hardening of the U.S. stance and the deepening of European dependence in multiple areas are, among other things, measures to compensate for a potential withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe. Yet even here, continuity prevails over discontinuity: during the Cold War, the number of U.S. troops stationed in West Germany stood at approximately 300,000. Today, fewer than 50,000 troops remain in the country. A further reduction in troop numbers would not signify a break from the past but rather the continuation of an existing trend.
During Trump’s first term, hence, continuity dominated, regardless of how much Democratic supporters sought to emphasise the opposite—discontinuity—for polemical purposes. Now, it is Republican supporters who overemphasise discontinuity by exaggerating the differences between the U.S. before and after Trump. Admittedly, there are instances where discontinuities appear striking and actions seem contradictory. For example, by undermining institutions that have traditionally served as instruments for advancing U.S. interests and as hubs for disseminating U.S. influence, the current administration is pitting itself against previously entrenched U.S. interests. Such decisions highlight contradictions regarding what constitutes an American interest.
In any case, if we focus more on the continuities, Trump’s U.S. appears as an imperial state grappling with a crisis of hegemony and power. If we place greater emphasis on the discontinuities, Trump’s U.S. behaves like a revolutionary, ideological, and revisionist state.
Discontinuities
The greatest discontinuity in U.S. foreign policy is epitomised in the current administration’s stance vis-à-vis the Ukraine war—yet only after the latter may be conclusively diagnosed as a victory for Russia. And the prime venue to explore this is the voting results at the UN Security Council, which is responsible for maintaining international peace and security, with the authority to impose sanctions, authorise military interventions, and pass legally binding resolutions, in contrast to General Assembly resolutions.
A potent and institutional snapshot of the moment lies in the United Nations Security Council resolution S/RES/2774 on 24 February 2025, titled “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine”—the only UNSC resolution on Ukraine since the nominal start of the war in February 2022.
(Let it be reminded that the UNSC’s normativity stems from its ability to make decisions that member states are legally obligated to follow, unlike the UN General Assembly, which consists of all UN member states and is more of a forum for debate and non-binding resolutions. Hence, we focus on the UNSC resolution of significantly higher import, rather than the UNGA resolutions on that same matter.)
The UNSC resolution mourned the tragic loss of life resulting from the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, reiterated the United Nations’ purpose of maintaining international peace and security, and called for a swift end to the conflict with a lasting peace between the two nations. In Favor (10): Albania, Brazil, China, Gabon, Ghana, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Russian Federation, United States. Abstentions (5): Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia, United Kingdom.
Notably, this resolution marked a significant shift in the United States’ stance, aligning more closely with Russia and diverging from European allies. The U.S. emphasized the resolution as a symbolic first step towards peace, while European members expressed concerns over the lack of explicit condemnation of Russia’s actions and the omission of references to Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
That is, the allies and the victors of World War II, who comprise the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, were on different sides: Europeans (British and French) versus non-Europeans (Americans, Russians, Chinese), instead of Westerners versus non-Westerners, as was usually the case previously. UNSC Resolution 2774 (2025) revealed, if only as a snapshot of the moment, a de facto global tri-polarity between the US, Russia and China, versus Western Europe, and a de facto post-European and post-Western/post-liberal world order in the UNSC, resulting from the post-Western/post-liberal stance of the U.S. It is indeed the case that this discontinuity has a host of implications—which will be unveiled in due time.
* Dimitris B. Peponis holds an MA in Governance and Public Policies from the University of the Peloponnese’s Department of Political Science and International Relations and is the author of “The End of the Great Deviation: From Ukraine and the Pandemic to the Shaping of the New Global Order” (Topos books, in Greek).