Policymakers, think tanks, and media across both North America and Europe over the years have frequently accepted the idea that large-scale illegal migration is the inescapable solution for labor shortages. In this narrative, migrants—particularly those who are entering illegally—will allegedly fill vacant positions in the market eschewed by the native population, i.e., agriculture, construction, and domestic service.
However, closer examination reveals that this reasoning fails economic, social, and moral basis. Rather than providing a practicable solution to correct labor market imbalances, it has ulterior motives and supports negative stereotypes. This article is intended to deconstruct the myth and unveil the risks inherent in such oversimplification.
The racist argument: Migrants as “labor slaves”
Among the most widespread arguments for promoting mass migration is the claim that rich Western countries require migrants to do the types of work their citizens allegedly shun. This line of reasoning asserts that impoverished third country nationals from the Global South are present to clean, build, harvest, and serve on behalf of wealthier populations. The aforementioned argument is seriously reminiscent of the slave-labor exploitative systems of the American South, where African slaves were forced into sweat-inducing work that was avoided by the elite (Baptist, 2014).
Even though this rhetoric is framed in euphemistic language—“filling key positions,” “strengthening the economy”—it remains dehumanizing in nature. It reduces migrants to tools of productivity, measured by their economic worth and not their worthiness or aspirations. By situating them as necessary but replaceable, such reasoning authorizes a modern system of caste by birth and socioeconomic status (Walia, 2021).
Local labor decline and economic displacement
The argument that illegal migration is what keeps sectors such as agriculture or construction booming is likely to ignore its broader social impact. In the majority of rural Greece, as with central and northern parts of the country, the overuse of foreign labor has denied younger native workers places in these sectors. This has encouraged the sustained depopulation and economic downturn of rural towns—a process some sociologists call “internal desertification” (Kasimis, 2012).
What was once a system of cross-support economically—labor, land, and local know-how—has turned into a dependence on long-term, low-cost labor over time. Cheaper availability of labor reduces the motivation for governments or employers to invest in training, technology, or raises for native workers. Through the passage of time, this erodes the local economy’s self-sufficiency and deepens regional inequality (Dustmann et al., 2016).
Welfare magnetism: Migration for social benefits
A poorly discussed but key factor in understanding modern trends of migration is the influence of welfare regimes. Contrary to the myth that migrants are willing to work for anything, large bodies of research demonstrate that an overwhelming majority of migrants, particularly those from poorer or war-torn countries, would prefer resettlement to those states possessing well-developed social welfare systems (Borjas, 2011). Those countries, like Germany, Sweden, and the UK, which offer housing, financial benefits, and healthcare are popular destinations—not so much for the jobs, but because they are safety nets.
This experience defies the usual, uncritically accepted premise that migrants are coming to “do the work that locals won’t do.” In reality, most migrants may seek stability, education, and state support over physical labor. This also destroys the idea that mass migration is a panacea to manpower deficits for labor-dependent industries like Greek agriculture or Italian viticulture.
Skills mismatch: The unrealistic expectations of instant integration
There is also a dangerous fallacy in the assumption that migrant communities can integrate quickly into professional labor markets. The truth is that most Western economies—particularly in public services, construction, and tourism—are calling for high levels of specialisation, professional certification, and adherence to tight regulation. For instance, working in a German or French luxury hotel requires one to learn customer service, food safety, various languages, and cultural sensitivity at times—all of which are out of reach for someone without a basic formal education (Cangiano, 2014).
The same applies to construction work, nowadays requiring increasingly technical knowledge about safety codes, materials, and machines, in addition to physical strength. As long as migration is less about professional qualifications but humanitarian or geopolitical factors, the mismatch of skills is unavoidable—and costly. A high percentage of recent European asylum seekers are educationally unqualified beyond secondary level, therefore unfit to be directly integrated into high-skill industries (OECD, 2020).
Unsuccessful historical integration models: The German and Swedish cases
Germany’s “Gastarbeiter” (guest worker) program in the 1960s is widely referred to as a model of imported labor. Nevertheless, years later, a large percentage of Germany’s Turkish citizens are still socioeconomically excluded, having higher rates of unemployment and poorer educational achievements than the broader populace (Esser, 2004).
Similarly, Sweden, which boasts one of Europe’s most liberal asylum policies, has seen parallel communities form in cities like Malmö and Gothenburg, where migrant unemployment rates reach up to 40% (Rydgren, 2018). These illustrations show that integration by labor is far from automatic, especially when the host nation is not adequately planned to invest in mechanisms of language learning, professional training, or social integration. What begins as an economic venture can become a long-term social burden.
The contradiction of labor shortage claims
It is also critical to examine the paradox within the narrative. While governments and media attribute a shortage of workers in the tourism or hospitality industry, statistics suggest otherwise. For instance, between 2019 and 2023, Greece received record numbers of tourists and revenue—despite reporting underemployment and labor shortages in the industry (SETE, 2024).
This raises a key question: If the industry is booming, where is the shortage, then? One probable explanation is that employers are resisting greater pay and better conditions for native workers, preferring instead to make attempts to get cheaper, more exploitable foreign labor. This keeps wage expectations down and reduces bargaining power for local workers, leading to a race to the bottom (ILO, 2022).
Cultural and religious tensions
Aside from economics, there are genuine cultural and moral issues involved in the large-scale resettlement of individuals from essentially different value systems. Western liberal, secular, and individualistic societies are likely to be in cultural conflict with migrants who come from more religiously conservative and strict societies.
Values of gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, religious freedom, and freedom of speech are inherent backstops of liberal democracies. These, however, may be rejected—or, indeed, opposed—by certain groups of migrants. There is evidence to suggest that a significant percentage of migrants from specific regions hold a view about homosexuality, women’s rights, or secular law which is in direct contradiction to prevailing European views (Pew Research Center, 2017). For example, in Sweden, social research has underlined the fragmentation and the existing tensions within migrant-dense urban areas, where parallel societies reject gender equality norms or secularism, and integration is harder (SOU 2017:65 report, 2017).
Similarly, in France, strict application of secularism (“laïcité”) has led to conflict over Muslim religious communities and religious symbols such as the hijab, reflecting profound cultural differences (Bowen, 2007). In addition, there have been debates in Germany regarding refugee integration that entailed challenges of social norm acceptance and women’s rights, such as women’s autonomy and participation in education and labor markets (Heckmann, 2015).
The refusal to accept or acknowledge such cultural differences can lead to parallel societies, social disintegration, while research indicates that social exclusion and cultural non-reciprocity could contribute to radicalization channels for the marginalized groups (Kundnani, 2012; Bleich, 2011). Given the above, it is obvious that integration is not just a matter of work but a prolonged and complex process involving cultural reciprocity, not just economic activity.
Toward a responsible and ethical migration policy (revised)
Where there are labor shortages, the sustainable response is to invest in homegrown labor, not circumvent it. Governments ought to prioritize vocational training, rural development incentives, and fair labor practices to encourage local participation in thinly populated sectors (OECD, 2020; Eurofound, 2019).
At the same time, however, any serious long-term strategy must also address the demographic struggle afflicting much of rural and semi-rural Europe. Rather than focusing on recruiting foreign workers for the purpose of keeping populations from declining, governments should introduce pro-natal, family-oriented policies that entice young people to stay, work, and start families in their local towns. These can involve subsidizing housing, tax relief to families, maternal support programs, and investment in local schools, health provision, and transport (European Commission, 2021; Eurostat, 2023).
In countries like Greece, where rural villages are aging so rapidly and whole towns are in decline, these policies are not only desirable but, in fact, necessary in order to preserve cultural continuity and reinforce local economies (Hadjimichalis & Papadopoulos, 2018). Migration, in this context, needs to be thought of as a complementary—not primary—tool in the overall endeavor of population revitalization (OECD, 2020).
Concurrently, migration policies need to be calibrated not only for economic necessity but for social integration and long-term integration prospects. Policymakers need to examine whether receiving societies have the social infrastructure to absorb new entrants without inducing instability or breaking social confidence (Dustmann et al., 2016; Cantle, 2012).
In addition, public discourse should move away from depicting migrants as either heroes or villains. Such narratives fail to capture the diversity of migration, which bleeds into geopolitics, global warming, and inequality. A reductionist approach—wanting only for labor completion—neglects structures in play and in fact can lead to more problems than solutions (Castles, 2010; Carens, 2013).
From myth to policy
The myth that large-scale illegal immigration can fill the gaps in the labor market is more than a simplistic misunderstanding of labor economics—it is a pernicious story that hides exploitation, fosters dependency, and reinforces division. Workable solutions must include structural change, not scapegoating. Politicians must abandon reductionist logic and frame the migration debate in a balanced, fact-based, and humane manner.
Illegal migration cannot be made an economic policy. Instead, the emphasis must be on education, innovation, and the development of the nation. Anything less is not only unworkable—it is unfair.
Disclaimer
This article reflects the personal views of the writer and in no way expresses the official policy and administrative practices of the Hellenic State, Greek Authorities and EUAA.
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* Marios Kaleas is General Director of the Greek Asylum Service and Deputy Chair of the Management Board of the European Agency for Asylum (EUAA).