The release of China’s third Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) on December 10, 2025, is not a bureaucratic update; it is a formal declaration of strategic intent. Nine years after its predecessor, this document codifies China’s elevated status as a primary economic and political actor in a region traditionally viewed through a different geopolitical lens. Its language is clear, deliberate, and devoid of ambiguity—much like a captain issuing orders on the bridge.
A brief historical context
China launched its comprehensive strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008 with the publication of its first Policy Paper. That initial document, followed by a second in 2016, established the foundational principles of non-interference and mutual benefit, paving the way for China to become the region’s second-largest trading partner. This third iteration is therefore not a sudden shift in course but a strategic acceleration—one that reflects the maturity of Beijing’s engagement and its growing confidence in projecting power into the Western Hemisphere.
The core of the document revolves around the concept of building a “China-LAC Community with a Shared Future,” a phrase that is now standard nomenclature in Beijing’s foreign policy lexicon 1. This rhetorical framing is crucial because it positions China not as a transactional partner, but as a deep, long-term collaborator, a “true friend” offering a model of South-South cooperation without the political encumbrances often associated with traditional Western engagement 2.
At the core of the new paper is the concept of building a “China-LAC Community with a Shared Future,” a phrase now standard in Beijing’s foreign policy lexicon. This framing positions China not as a transactional partner but as a deep, long-term collaborator—a “true friend” advancing a model of South-South cooperation without the political conditions often associated with Western engagement.
The strategic framework of Beijing’s LATAM strategy
The strategy is operationalized through five core programs, which collectively form the architecture of Beijing’s LATAM strategy:
| Programmatic pillar | Strategic objective |
|---|---|
| Solidarity | Enhance political trust and coordination across multilateral institutions (UN, G20, BRICS). |
| Development | Promote economic cooperation, technological innovation, and supply chain integration. |
| Civilization | Strengthen cultural exchanges and mutual understanding to build soft power. |
| Peace | Expand security cooperation, focusing on anti-crime, anti-corruption, and illicit financial flows. |
| People-to-People Connectivity | Facilitate travel (e.g., visa exemptions) and educational exchanges to deepen societal ties. |
This framework is comprehensive, extending far beyond conventional trade to encompass the full spectrum of statecraft—from hard infrastructure to soft power projection. It is a blueprint for deep integration, designed to make China an indispensable partner across every level of Latin American governance and society.
The economic mainstay: Strategic sectors and financial leverage
The Policy Paper’s economic agenda is the engine room of Beijing’s LATAM strategy, targeting sectors of high strategic value. This is not simply about acquiring raw materials; it is about shaping the future supply chains of the global economy.
The document explicitly calls for expanded cooperation in:
- Artificial Intelligence (AI) and telecommunications
Ensuring the export of Chinese technological standards—particularly through firms such as Huawei—thus creating long-term dependence on Chinese-built digital infrastructure.
- Renewable energy, hydrogen, and mineral processing
A direct play for control over critical resources, especially lithium, essential for electric vehicles and global battery markets. By investing in processing capabilities, China strengthens its position across the entire value chain, from extraction to finished products.
- Infrastructure and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
The commitment to transport, logistics, and urban development projects under the BRI is designed to create new commercial corridors that link LAC directly to Asia, bypassing traditional US-centric trade routes 3. The Peruvian port of Chancay, a Chinese-controlled mega-port, is the clearest example of this strategic deployment 4.
Commitments to transport, logistics, and urban development under the BRI aim to create new commercial corridors linking LAC directly to Asia, bypassing traditional US-centric routes. The Chinese-controlled mega-port of Chancay in Peru is the clearest manifestation of this strategy.
Furthermore, the paper advocates expanding the use of local currencies in cross-border transactions and promoting free trade agreements—clear steps toward reducing regional reliance on the US dollar while supporting the internationalization of the Chinese Yuan. This financial positioning is subtle but powerful geopolitical leverage.
The geopolitical counter-punch to Washington
The most striking element of the Policy Paper is its explicit geopolitical framing, which serves as a direct counter-narrative to Washington. The document’s opposition to “unilateralism” and “decoupling” is a diplomatic broadside aimed squarely at the United States.
The accompanying Global Times editorial was even more explicit, accusing certain nations of deploying a “new Monroe Doctrine” to exert military pressure and economic coercion. By framing its engagement as a rejection of historical Western dominance, China positions itself as the champion of the Global South—a partner that respects sovereignty and non-interference.
The American perspective, reflected in assessments from institutions such as the Council on Foreign Relations, views this expansion as a “direct challenge to U.S. dominance.” Washington fears that its own policy missteps—sanctions, aid reductions, and inconsistent engagement—have inadvertently pushed LAC nations closer to Beijing.
European analysis, though less emotionally charged, reaches similar conclusions. French media describe China as “gradually ejecting the former king of the Americas, the United States, from its traditional garden.” The EU, too, recognizes the risk of losing market share and influence as China reshapes the region’s economic geography through the BRI.
The LAC conundrum: Opportunities and dependence
For Latin American and Caribbean nations, the new Policy Paper presents a complex mix of opportunities and risks. On one hand, cooperation with China has delivered tangible benefits, including significant advances in infrastructure development and trade. China offers a vast market for regional commodities and a willing investor for projects that Western institutions often overlook.
Yet the relationship is fundamentally asymmetric, raising concerns about overdependence on the Chinese market. The persistent focus on raw material extraction—though profitable—may hinder long-term industrial diversification. While the widely circulated “debt trap” narrative is often exaggerated, it remains a risk for countries with weak fiscal governance. The leverage Beijing gains from these trade and financial relationships is undeniable, giving it greater ability to press political objectives such as adherence to the “One China” principle. LAC nations must therefore navigate this relationship carefully, maximizing benefits while mitigating structural vulnerabilities.
The Taiwan factor: Beijing’s non-negotiable principle
No analysis of Beijing’s LATAM strategy is complete without addressing the Taiwan factor. The Policy Paper reaffirms the “One China” principle as the non-negotiable foundation for bilateral relations.
This is a clear diplomatic condition—a quid pro quo for economic and development benefits. By making recognition of Beijing a prerequisite for deeper engagement, China continues its systematic effort to isolate Taiwan on the global stage. With countries such as Paraguay and Guatemala still maintaining ties with Taipei, the Taiwan question remains a critical pressure point in China’s regional strategy.
The long view and the golden decade
China’s third Policy Paper for Latin America and the Caribbean is a sophisticated, multi-layered document confirming a long-term strategic commitment. It is a masterclass in soft power reinforced by substantial financial and infrastructural capital.
The paper offers tangible benefits—technology, infrastructure, and trade—while clearly advancing geopolitical goals: countering US influence, promoting a multipolar international order, and isolating Taiwan. It is a strategic deployment of resources designed to integrate LAC more deeply into China’s sphere of influence.
Looking ahead, Beijing anticipates a “golden decade” in its regional ties. Analysts suggest that by 2035, China may surpass the United States as Latin America’s most significant trading partner. The message to Washington and Brussels is unmistakable: China has set its course, and Beijing’s LATAM strategy is now operating at full capacity. The Western Hemisphere is no longer an uncontested domain—and the new reality demands a far more coherent and robust response than we have seen to date.