Is returns a taboo subject in European migration policy? At times, it certainly feels that way. For Greece, however, it’s an issue faced daily. Despite the strides made in recent years, the path ahead remains fraught with significant obstacles. Greece, as a frontline Member State, has committed to addressing the challenges of returns, but the reality remains: returns are not a simple task.
In recent years, Europe has found itself at a crossroads when it comes to irregular migration. While discussions often revolve around entry and asylum, one critical component is too often left in the shadows: returns. Returning irregular migrants to their countries of origin—humanely, effectively, and lawfully—is not only essential to upholding the integrity of the asylum system, but also to restoring public confidence and promoting social cohesion. For Greece, the stakes are especially high.
This article attempts to highlight in a realistic manner the complicated and multifactorial nature of the issue of the returns of illegal migrants, noting its existing structural difficulties as they intertwine with each other, creating a complex puzzle for the effective resolution of which the utilization of resources and initiatives on multiple fronts is required, both at the national level and internationally.
Main reasons for the low number of returns
Despite recent policy shifts and increasing political momentum, the number of actual returns remains disproportionately low across the European Union—and Greece is no exception. A complex web of structural and operational bottlenecks continues to hinder meaningful progress. These challenges are deeply interlinked, reinforcing one another and obstructing even the most well-intentioned policy initiatives.
One of the most significant and persistent barriers is the lack of cooperation from countries of origin. In many cases, third countries either refuse outright to accept the return of their nationals or delay the process significantly, citing reasons such as political instability or diplomatic sensitivities. Even when a formal agreement exists in principle, bureaucratic inertia and administrative hurdles—particularly in identity verification—cause protracted delays. The process of confirming nationality, issuing travel documents, or even securing the basic cooperation of consular services can be drawn out for months, if not longer.
This leads directly into another critical bottleneck: unverifiable identities. A significant portion of return-eligible migrants lack the proper documentation required to establish their origin. In some cases, documents are lost during transit; in others, they are deliberately destroyed. Without definitive proof of identity, return procedures stall. This not only prevents deportation but also contributes to prolonged stays in reception and detention centers, exacerbating issues of overcrowding and overstretched infrastructure.
Compounding these difficulties is the absence—or ineffectiveness—of bilateral readmission agreements. While some countries have negotiated formal return arrangements, many key countries of origin have not. Where agreements do exist, their implementation is frequently inconsistent, under-resourced, or politically contested. As a result, frontline states like Greece are left without the legal or diplomatic tools necessary to carry out returns efficiently and consistently.
Political will—or the lack thereof—is another key obstacle. Although certain Member States, including Greece, have demonstrated a strong commitment to improving return systems, the broader European framework remains fragmented. There is still no binding mechanism to ensure that all Member States contribute equitably to return efforts, nor is there a unified external diplomacy strategy to pressure countries of origin into cooperation. Migration policy remains politically charged, and ongoing disagreements within the EU about burden-sharing and fundamental principles only deepen the divide. Without a coherent, pan-European approach, even the best national efforts are undermined by a lack of coordination and solidarity.
Perhaps most troublingly, the abuse of the asylum system has become an increasingly common tactic for delaying returns. Many individuals continue to submit multiple or successive asylum applications—even after their initial claims have been definitively rejected. This practice, often facilitated by legal loopholes and the slow pace of appeals procedures, keeps individuals in legal limbo for extended periods. Strategic use of asylum mechanisms to forestall removal is further exacerbated by the phenomenon of “asylum shopping,” where migrants attempt to re-enter the system in different Member States after being rejected elsewhere. The end result is a bloated, inefficient asylum system that ultimately undermines its own credibility.
As Hannah Arendt insightfully noted, “The right to have rights” depends on being part of a political community. Abusing the asylum system undermines this foundational principle, distorting a process designed for protection into one used to avoid legal accountability.
Legal challenges add another layer of complexity. Even once a return decision is issued, enforcement is frequently delayed or suspended due to protracted appeals or legal objections. While humanitarian safeguards are both necessary and enshrined in law, they can sometimes be invoked in ways that are neither transparent nor justified—especially in cases involving dubious medical claims or tenuous family links.
In parallel, one cannot overlook the powerful push factors that drive many migrants to remain in Europe despite return orders. Economic instability, conflict, and social fragility in countries of origin make the prospect of returning unappealing, even under voluntary return schemes. Reintegration support remains inadequate in many cases, reducing the attractiveness of voluntary programs and encouraging prolonged irregular stay instead.
On a more practical level, the operational capacity of return systems—particularly in frontline states like Greece—remains overstretched. Detention facilities are limited, return units are often understaffed, and the resources available for coordination with foreign embassies and international partners are insufficient. The technical, logistical, and legal requirements of return operations demand a level of institutional coherence and cross-agency coordination that is difficult to maintain in the face of chronic underfunding and shifting political priorities.
In sum, the low number of returns is not the result of a single failing but rather a systemic impasse: diplomatic reluctance, legal ambiguity, operational fragility, and political division all contribute to the inertia. Without a decisive, unified, and well-resourced response at both the national and EU level, the return system will continue to fall short of its objectives.
The hard truth: Breaking the taboo on returns
For too long, the topic of returns has been treated as a taboo in European migration policy. Why? Because a dominant political narrative—driven largely by certain parties and advocacy groups—managed to frame any effort to return irregular migrants as a presumed violation of human rights. The discourse was monopolized by the idea of open borders, and returns were cast in a negative moral light, often associated with coercion, trauma, or injustice.
This narrative left little space for nuance. It ignored the legal obligation of states to enforce final asylum decisions and protect the integrity of their migration systems. It also dismissed the very real need for sustainable migration management that considers both rights and responsibilities.
But reality has begun to shift. With rising arrivals, growing public discontent, and a more pragmatic political environment, Member States are now acknowledging what was once politically inconvenient to say: that effective return policies are not only lawful, but necessary. They are not inherently at odds with human rights—on the contrary, they support fairness, legal certainty, and social cohesion. As the sociologist Max Weber once observed, “The state is the human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force.” Enforcing return decisions, within the framework of the rule of law and international obligations, is part of this fundamental state responsibility.
If Europe is to manage irregular migration effectively, it must reframe the return narrative—not as an act of rejection, but as a fundamental pillar of a rules-based system. And reframing must go hand in hand with reform.
A key part of this reform involves the strategic use of incentives and consequences. Countries of origin that demonstrate a willingness to cooperate on return procedures could be granted improved access to EU development funding, visa facilitation schemes, or preferential trade arrangements. Such measures would not only encourage collaboration but also help build long-term partnerships based on mutual trust and stability.
Conversely, where countries systematically refuse to cooperate, the EU already possesses tools that could be used more assertively—such as visa restrictions, the suspension of bilateral aid, or limits on participation in EU programs. These instruments, however, are often inconsistently applied. Making their use more coherent and predictable would send a strong message about the importance the EU places on compliance with return obligations.
Solidarity within the EU is also a critical factor. Some Member States, particularly those at the external borders, carry a disproportionate share of the operational burden in managing returns. Others contribute by supporting joint operations or hosting returnees under sponsorship arrangements. A mechanism that acknowledges and compensates such contributions—through additional funding, technical assistance, or flexibility in relocation commitments—could promote a fairer distribution of responsibilities across the Union.
The EU must use the full range of its diplomatic, financial, and legal instruments—not just to suggest cooperation, but to negotiate and, when necessary, to enforce it. A shared return policy without shared leverage will remain a paper promise.
Yet even as returns become a political priority, a long-standing culture of hesitation still lingers. Overcoming it will take more than policy—it will take leadership, narrative change, and a renewed commitment to aligning rights with responsibilities.
As Raymond Aron rightly asserted, “Realism does not mean cynicism—it means accepting the world as it is in order to transform it.” A coherent return policy must be built not on moral idealism or political evasion, but on a sober assessment of what works and what must be done to uphold the rule of law.
We must move beyond moral hesitation and build a return system based on structured leverage and common tools. Europe’s return policy does not suffer from a lack of legislation—it suffers from a lack of implementation and strategic cohesion.
From Athens to Brussels: Greece leads where Europe lags on returns
As the European Union continues to navigate the complexities of migration, the issue of returns can no longer remain on the margins of the debate. Greece, as a frontline Member State, is now emerging as a pioneer in the implementation of a stricter, more realistic return policy—one that acknowledges both the limits of the asylum system and the necessity of enforcing its final outcomes.
This shift marks a conscious departure from the idealistic dead ends of the past. For too long, European migration discourse was dominated by the language of open borders and humanitarian absolutes, often reinforced by NGO lobbying networks in Brussels. In this environment, even raising the question of returns was seen as politically toxic. But the realities on the ground demanded a change in tone and direction.
Greece’s evolving approach demonstrates that it is possible to uphold the principles of legality, dignity, and state sovereignty simultaneously. Returns, when carried out lawfully and systematically, are not a betrayal of values—but a confirmation that rules matter and that borders are not just lines on a map, but instruments of order and legitimacy.
By moving beyond the outdated taboos and embracing a migration strategy rooted in responsibility and enforcement, Greece is not only protecting its national interests, but also contributing to the credibility and cohesion of Europe’s common migration policy. The message is clear: a migration system without returns is neither sustainable nor fair—and Greece is determined to be part of the solution.
* Marios Kaleas is General Director of the Greek Asylum Service and Deputy Chair of the Management Board of the European Agency for Asylum (EUAA).