On the occasion of the recent sad anniversary of the 25th year since the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers, I find myself wondering to what extent the West, compared to the past, is now in a position to feel safer and less vulnerable to attacks of this kind and, above all, to what extent it feels justified about the way it reacted to what happened that shocking day.
It was supposed that the “crusade” launched immediately after the attack against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden, both with the agreement of the NATO forces and the almost unanimous acceptance of American public opinion, would lead to the overthrow of the theocratic regime in Kabul, while at the same time uprooting the fundamentalist network of Al-Qaeda and its offshoots across the world. From Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia to ISIS in Syria and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen.
Afghanistan: the promise of a new order
In the years that followed the Western military intervention in Afghanistan, and despite the removal of the Taliban regime, the transitional government, controlled by the Americans, never managed to emit any real signals of normality, economic and social stability, let alone acceptance and overall recognition.
Despite the billions of dollars in military and development aid that were invested, with the exception of Kabul and a limited number of provinces, a large part of Afghan territory continued to remain under the military control of jihadists, who never surrendered or abandoned their insurgency against the “infidels.”
Whatever efforts were made towards religious tolerance, respect for minorities, acceptance of women’s rights, modernisation of the Afghan economy, reorganisation of the army, and the disengagement of the justice system from Sharia law fell into a vacuum.
Opium cultivation and drug trafficking continued to constitute the country’s heavy industry, while “puppet” leaders and corrupt officials, with their extravagant lifestyles and the waste of U.S. dollars, provoked ordinary people, who saw their standard of living crushed between the two millstones of an ongoing war between the NATO forces and the Taliban.
The Taliban’s return: the limits of imposed democracy
The return of the latter to power on 15 August 2021, without any substantial reaction from the national army, revealed the limited possibilities of an attempt to transplant democratic values and establish a secular state when this is pursued through terms and conditions foreign and incompatible with the character and traditions of the native population.
The average Afghan found himself confronted with a different form of “occupation,” and the only thing that changed was the replacement of the Taliban’s whip with the smart weapons of the American army.
The allies’ imposition, therefore, was not enough to create a modern and democratic state, just as neither Soviet nor British attempts had been enough in the past.
What made this case different, however, was the sight of the Americans leaving in disarray, abandoning equipment and their own, until recently, partners, which constituted an utterly appalling operational spectacle, but also a moral decline.
Withdrawal: an operational and moral reckoning
Not only because of the shameful way of the withdrawal, nor for those who were left at the mercy of the Taliban, but also for the hundreds of human lives that, as it turned out, had been lost in vain.
Moreover, today the Taliban, for the first time in history, appear as interlocutors of the West. Although the EU Member States have not proceeded to establish diplomatic relations with them, contacts with them have already begun, particularly on matters of foreign policy and, above all, migration, since it is estimated that around one million Afghans have left their country and are now in Europe.
They therefore gradually managed not only to avoid isolation, but also to strengthen their international standing and, at the same time, to establish themselves as a necessary negotiating partner.
Twenty-five years later: what was gained?
So, what exactly was all this for? What was the benefit and the added value, operationally and morally, beyond the belated and instinctive satisfaction of immediate revenge in response to the horror of 9/11?
How exactly did the West, through its choices, manage overall to confront extremism and radicalisation and to demonstrate its superiority?
Unfortunately, Afghanistan proved in the most painful way that a militarily superior power may temporarily prevail because of its military strength, but in the long term it is unable to impose its own socio-political model on a society that has not internalised it.
Marios Kaleas is the General Director of the Greek Asylum Service and Chairperson of the Management Board of the European Agency for Asylum (EUAA).
This article expresses the personal views of the writer and does not represent the official position of the Greek State, the Public Administration or the EUAA.