WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW
• What’s happening: China is expanding its presence in maritime ports across Latin America and the Caribbean, not by building military bases, but through strategic commercial investments, construction, equipment supply, and operational control of key port terminals.
• Why it matters: These ports—some near U.S. trade routes or military facilities—could offer China access to sensitive logistics, intelligence collection, or coercive influence over supply chains in the event of a crisis.
• Key concept – China port influence: A strategic vulnerability that arises when Chinese state-owned or affiliated firms control or supply infrastructure critical to U.S. trade, naval activity, or regional stability.
• How influence works:
- Ownership or operation of terminals (e.g., CK Hutchison in Manzanillo, Veracruz).
- Construction contracts with long-term access or presence (e.g., CHEC highways in Jamaica)
- Equipment supply that could enable surveillance (e.g., Huawei, ZPMC, Nuctech)
- Economic entanglement that fosters dependency and shapes political alignment
• High-risk ports highlighted in the CSIS report:
- Kingston, Jamaica: Critical to Caribbean trade, close to Guantanamo Bay
- Manzanillo, Mexico: A vital hub for U.S.-bound cargo with $130M/day disruption risk
- Veracruz, Mexico: Smaller, but strategically tied to U.S. naval logistics
• Bottom line: While China’s presence doesn’t imply hostile intent, the potential for leverage is real. Infrastructure built for trade can, under pressure, be repurposed—quietly and effectively—for strategic advantage.
China’s increasing involvement in maritime ports across Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) demands careful consideration. Though commercially attractive, these investments simultaneously empower Beijing to accrue strategic leverage, gather sensitive data, and extend its geopolitical reach closer to the United States.
This analysis draws from the June 2025 CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) report, “No Safe Harbor,” by Henry Ziemer, Jaehyun Han, and Aidan Powers-Riggs. Their work provides a crucial framework for understanding this engagement, particularly by redefining risk beyond mere military base establishment. The report meticulously assesses China’s footprint across 37 distinct port projects, offering a granular view of an evolving strategic landscape.
Redefining risk
The discourse surrounding China’s influence over global port infrastructure has often fixated on overseas naval bases. While precedents in Djibouti and Cambodia exist, an overt establishment of naval facilities near the continental United States by Beijing is improbable, given the robust blowback it would provoke.
However, dismissing the risks on this basis would be a profound miscalculation. Influence over strategic ports grants China considerable advantages without a formal military presence. This translates into real-time intelligence on U.S. and allied naval operations, privileged access to maritime logistics data, and the capacity to deny or delay access during a crisis. Recent conflicts demonstrate how dual-use civilian infrastructure can be repurposed for covert military operations. The Ukrainian military’s Operation Spider’s Web, using drones from shipping containers, and Israel’s alleged tactics of smuggling explosive drones via commercial freight, underscore this reality. Foreign-controlled port infrastructure could serve as a platform for analogous endeavors. China has developed a shipping container-based cruise missile launch system, a rather ingenious method for concealing strike capabilities. Influence at ports could facilitate the discreet arrival of such systems, ensuring they evade inspection until needed.
Beyond military considerations, port control grants Chinese firms leverage over regional supply chains, enhancing Beijing’s economic and diplomatic sway across LAC. These ports can rewire trade relationships and solidify economic partnerships, a subtle yet potent form of China Port Influence.
The CSIS report defines risk as the strategic vulnerability arising when critical maritime infrastructure, vital to U.S. operations, becomes subject to Chinese influence. This risk combines U.S. reliance on a port and China’s potential to gain advantage, particularly during a crisis. The study assessed 37 projects, scoring each based on 11 indicators measuring U.S. reliance and China’s potential influence, with the latter weighted more heavily. This evaluation does not predict China’s intentions; rather, it measures the potential capability China could acquire to disrupt U.S. trade, monitor naval activity, or enable coercive operations.
Case studies: High-risk ports
While many ports pose negligible threats, a select few stand out as high-risk due to their strategic location and the extent of China Port Influence. These include the Port of Kingston in Jamaica, and the Mexican ports of Manzanillo and Veracruz. These are critical junctures where commercial interests intersect with geopolitical realities, often subtly tilting towards Beijing’s strategic ambitions.
Kingston, Jamaica
The Port of Kingston, Jamaica, with a risk score of 70.7, is the most precarious in the CSIS database. As the ninth-largest port in LAC by throughput, Kingston is pivotal for vital Caribbean shipping routes, including U.S. commerce via the Panama Canal and the Mona Passage. Its operation by a Chinese State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) grants Beijing significant control. The ramifications extend beyond economic disruption. Jamaica, a long-standing U.S. regional security partner, is strategically vital in the western Caribbean.
China’s leverage over its largest port represents a significant vulnerability for U.S. interests. The proximity of U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, a mere 170 miles distant, means substantial military activity in the Caribbean would involve ship movements near Kingston. China’s ability to combine intelligence from this port with access to Cuban signals intelligence facilities could yield valuable insights into U.S. naval operations. This port is part of China’s broader influence in Jamaica, exemplified by the China Harbour Engineering Company’s (CHEC) 2017 contract for a new highway system, financed by the China Development Bank, in exchange for exclusive toll revenue rights for half a century.
Manzanillo, Mexico
The colossal port of Manzanillo, on Mexico’s Pacific coast, ranks second-highest with a score of 70.0. Its elevated score stems from its critical role as a hub for U.S.-bound cargo. A single disruption here could bleed over $130 million from the U.S. economy each day, the largest economic impact of any port in the CSIS database, highlighting the economic vulnerability inherent in unchecked China Port Influence. The port also hosts Mexico’s Pacific Naval Force headquarters, implying China’s influence could extend to intelligence gathering on Mexican military operations, including joint exercises with the United States.
China’s influence is multifaceted: the TIMSA terminal is one of seven operated by Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison in LAC. The People’s Bank of China co-financed a 2015 expansion, with CHEC building facilities and ZPMC supplying cranes. Manzanillo is central to U.S.–Mexico tensions regarding China’s growing presence. The China–Mexico sea route is rapidly growing, and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum announced a $2.7 billion investment to double the port’s size, further amplifying China Port Influence. Its location in Colima state, contested by organized crime, makes it a target for illicit activities; 25 tons of fentanyl precursors, mostly from China, were seized there in December 2024.
Veracruz, Mexico
With a score of 64.7, the Mexican port of Veracruz ranks third-highest. Like Manzanillo, it hosts a Hutchison-operated terminal, and CHEC and the U.S.-blacklisted China Communications Construction Company have expanded it. Unlike Manzanillo, Veracruz’s Caribbean coast location primarily serves U.S. trade. Though smaller in volume, a disruption could cost the U.S. economy $63 million daily. Its strategic value to the U.S. Navy was highlighted in April 2025 when the USS Gravely docked there as a regional resupply hub.
As U.S. naval activity in the region increases, China may find new intelligence-gathering opportunities when vessels call at Veracruz for resupply. It’s yet another example of how commercial infrastructure, under the guise of routine trade, conceals strategic leverage. The presence of Chinese firms in the port’s infrastructure, even without direct operational control, creates potential for data collection and observation, leverageable in a crisis.
To build or to buy: The complexity of Chinese influence
Despite perceptions of full operational control, China’s port investments in LAC are more intricate. Crucially, only 10 out of the 37 Chinese-linked port projects involve active, Chinese-operated facilities or operated by Chinese firms. The rest are financing, construction, or equipment supply, each with distinct risk implications. This nuanced understanding is crucial for assessing China Port Influence.
Construction projects align with China’s economic strategy of securing preferential access to commodities, with investments in Peruvian ports near mines, Brazilian grain terminals, and Venezuelan oil sites. While posing less direct risk than those under Chinese operational control, they foster long-term dependencies and relationships with host-country elites and authorities. They also introduce Chinese technology, potentially creating an intelligence back door without daily Chinese presence. Nuctech and ZPMC equipment is in at least five non-Chinese-controlled ports.
In Panama’s Colón Container Terminal, Huawei and ZTE (U.S.-blacklisted) provided 300 security cameras; these remain despite a cancelled contract. Of 10 active ports operated by Chinese companies, seven are managed by CK Hutchison, including Manzanillo, Veracruz, Balboa, and Cristóbal. Historically commercial and insulated from the Chinese state, Hutchison’s posture has transformed under geopolitical pressures, adding complexity to China Port Influence assessment.
Reducing the risk: Recommendations for the U.S. and partners
While China’s influence in LAC maritime infrastructure is widespread, the United States, with regional partners, can mitigate risks. Supporting port buybacks and buyouts is one avenue; market-driven efforts to dilute China’s footprint are feasible. Policymakers should discreetly explore supporting such endeavors where they align with commercial interests and strategic value. Continuous assessment and reduction of strategic exposure are paramount. The U.S. must evaluate where its logistical and military interests intersect with foreign-controlled ports in the Western Hemisphere.
A comprehensive understanding will inform policy and risk mitigation. Finally, strengthening oversight and enhancing resilience at key ports is pragmatic. Improving inspection protocols and increasing visibility can reduce vulnerabilities. Quiet support to partner nations’ port authorities offers a cost-effective means to guard against surveillance, deter illicit activity, and counteract China’s efforts to gain deeper strategic China Port Influence. These measures, implemented with a clear understanding of the evolving landscape, can secure vital maritime interests without unnecessary alarm.
Navigating the crosscurrents
As Latin America’s docks fill with cranes painted in Chinese red, the region sails into complex waters—where commerce, sovereignty, and security converge. The challenge for the United States and its partners is not just to counter influence, but to understand it: to read the signals in supply chains, to hear the intelligence behind infrastructure, and to respond not with alarmism, but with agility.
China’s port footprint in the Americas is not a monolith—it is a mosaic of investments, contracts, and connections, each shaped by local politics, economic needs, and global ambition. The threat is not imminent invasion, but slow entanglement: a system in which leverage is built container by container, crane by crane. Navigating this new reality requires more than vigilance. It demands quiet investment, creative diplomacy, and a willingness to treat ports not as mere nodes of commerce, but as potential chokepoints of influence. In this maritime chessboard, the game is not won through military posturing, but through foresight and the strategic defense of openness itself.