The numbers tell a story that defies conventional market logic. Maersk reported $1.096 billion in net profit for Q3 2025—a 64.4% collapse from the previous year’s $3.081 billion. CMA CGM fared worse, with earnings sliding 72.6% to $749 million². Zim and One Line experienced near-catastrophic declines of 89.1% and 85.7% respectively. Yet container volumes hit record highs across the board.
This paradox sits at the heart of the container shipping crisis now consuming the industry. Maersk moved 6.8M TEU in Q3 2025, its highest quarterly volume ever. COSCO shifted 6.9M TEU. CMA CGM handled 6.2M TEU. Global demand for containerised goods remains robust, growing 3–5% year-over-year according to Maersk’s own assessment.
The problem isn’t demand. The problem is price.
Key Performance Metrics: Q3 2024 vs Q3 2025
| Carrier | Q3 2024 Profit (USD M) | Q3 2025 Profit (USD M) | Decline | Q3 2025 Volume (M TEU) | Rate Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Maersk | 3,081 | 1,096 | -64.4% | 6.8 | -30.6% |
| COSCO | 2,967 | 1,332 | -55.1% | 6.9 | -25% |
| CMA CGM | 2,730 | 749 | -72.6% | 6.2 | -32% |
| ONE Line | 1,999 | 285 | -85.7% | —* | -24% |
| Zim | 1,126 | 123 | -89.1% | —* | -35.5 |
* Volume data not disclosed in quarterly filing.
The table above captures the brutal mathematics of the container shipping crisis. Every major carrier expanded volumes while rates compressed. Volume growth couldn’t offset pricing collapse. This dynamic will persist through Q4 2025 and into Q1 2026.
When freight rates collapse
Maersk’s average freight rate fell from $1.618 per TEU in Q3 2024 to $1.122 per TEU in Q3 2025—a 30.6% decline. Zim experienced a 35.5% rate compression, dropping from $2.480 to $1.602 per TEU. These aren’t minor adjustments. They’re the difference between profitability and losses.
The container shipping crisis deepened when rates fell below breakeven levels during the quarter. CEO Vincent Clerc stated plainly that freight rates had dipped below Maersk’s cost structure, triggering warnings of Q4 2025 losses and potential red ink extending into Q1 2026. This forecast matters because Maersk operates at industry-leading efficiency levels. If Maersk loses money, smaller carriers face existential pressure.
The Shanghai Containerized Freight Index, which averaged 2.496 points in 2024, tells the story of volatility masking underlying weakness. Spot rates that reached $3.600 per container in July 2024 have compressed dramatically. The container shipping crisis now features rates that remain elevated in absolute terms but represent a 60–70% discount from pandemic-era peaks. Carriers can’t celebrate relative stability when absolute levels destroy margins.
The overcapacity trap
Understanding why the container shipping crisis persists requires examining the order books. Between 2021 and Q2 2025, carriers ordered 15.65 million TEU of new capacity. In the prior five-year period (2016–2020), total orders amounted to just over 4 million TEU. The industry ordered nearly four times more ships during the post-pandemic boom than it had in the preceding half-decade.
This ordering spree occurred when carriers were generating record profits. The logic seemed sound at the time. Today, it looks reckless. The container shipping crisis emerged precisely because carriers extrapolated abnormal conditions into permanent reality.
Fleet growth will outpace demand growth by roughly 2:1 through 2028. The International Monetary Fund projects global growth of 3% in 2025 and 3.1% in 2026. Fleet growth is projected to reach 6.94% in 2025 and 3.42% in 2026 in net TEU terms, according to shipbroker Braemar. Even as new ship deliveries slow, the container shipping crisis will persist because supply growth continues to outpace demand, leaving the market structurally unfavourable to carriers.
Yard slots are booked until 2028. The container shipping crisis won’t resolve through attrition or scrapping. It will resolve through years of suppressed rates and compressed margins. Carriers must accept this reality and adjust cost structures accordingly.
Tariffs: The accelerant
The container shipping crisis would be manageable if it were purely cyclical. But tariffs have injected structural damage into demand patterns. The U.S. administration’s trade war escalation—driven by reshoring ambitions, electoral cycle pressures, and bilateral trade disputes—has fundamentally altered import behaviour. These aren’t temporary policy fluctuations. They represent a sustained shift in trade architecture.
Chinese imports to the United States fell 16% in recent months. The Port of Long Beach reported a 16% decline in Chinese container volumes. Furniture imports collapsed 33%. Toy imports—which historically surge 40–50% ahead of the holiday season—rose only 17%. These aren’t seasonal dips. They’re demand destruction.
Indian exports to the United States dropped 37.5% between May and September 2025, burdened by 50% tariffs. Container utilisation has fallen from 100% to 91%. Spot rates sit at two-year lows. The container shipping crisis now encompasses not just rate compression but genuine volume weakness in key trade lanes.
Retailers and manufacturers engaged in “frontloading”—importing goods early to beat tariff deadlines—during the first half of 2025. They’ve now drawn down those inventories while demand weakens. The traditional peak holiday shipping season looks virtually non-existent this year. The tariff-driven inventory cycle has created a demand cliff that will take quarters to resolve.
The forecast: Q4 2025 and Q1 2026
Maersk’s guidance for Q4 2025 is unambiguous. The company expects its ocean container business to post losses. Fitch Ratings expects container shipping performance to weaken in 2026 as lower freight rates will lead to lower profits. This isn’t speculation. It’s management guidance from the industry’s most sophisticated operator.
The broader picture is grimmer. The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) projects maritime trade growth of just 0.5% in 2025, down from 2.2% in 2024. Global shipping faces fragile growth, rising costs, and mounting uncertainty. Political tensions, shifting trade patterns, and reconfigured routes reshape maritime fundamentals.
Vessel rerouting around the Suez Canal and through the Cape of Good Hope has pushed ton-miles (the distance cargo travels) to record levels—up 6% in 2024, nearly three times faster than volume growth. Longer routes mean higher fuel costs, higher emissions, and extended transit times. The container shipping crisis now includes operational headwinds beyond rate compression.
What carriers must do
The container shipping crisis demands ruthless cost discipline. Bunker fuel represents a significant expense. Evergreen reported the lowest bunker price in Q3 2025 at $481 per metric tonne, while Maersk paid $538 per tonne. Operating costs matter when margins evaporate. Carriers must pursue every efficiency gain available.
Carriers must also confront capacity discipline. Blank sailings—deliberately skipped voyages—reduce supply and support rates. But they also reduce revenue. The mathematics favour those with lowest unit costs, strongest balance sheets, and most diversified service offerings.
The container shipping crisis will separate survivors from casualties. Smaller carriers with weak balance sheets face existential pressure. Larger carriers can absorb losses and maintain market share through the downturn. Consolidation may accelerate as distressed assets become available at fire-sale prices.
The structural reality
The container shipping crisis isn’t a temporary correction. It’s a structural reset.
The industry transitioned from abnormal gains (2021–2023) to normal competitive dynamics (2024–onwards). This transition will persist through the end of the decade. Fleet growth will outpace demand growth. Rates will remain compressed. Margins will stay thin.
Carriers cannot control tariff policy or global growth rates. They can control costs, capacity discipline, and service quality. Those that execute well will survive. Those that don’t won’t. The container shipping crisis will test which carriers have the operational excellence and financial strength to endure a prolonged period of depressed returns.