In an extended interview, GeoTrends spoke with retired Captain of the Indian Navy and geostrategic analyst Captain (Dr.) Gurpreet S Khurana, who underscored the enduring nature of the strategic partnership between the two nations, which has evolved to address contemporary regional and global challenges.
Discussing India’s maritime strategy, naval diplomacy, and the broader implications of emerging geopolitical and technological trends in the Indo-Pacific, Dr. Khurana highlighted India’s strategic priorities, its approach to regional partnerships and threats, and the ways in which naval initiatives are shaping India’s role as a security partner and first responder in the Indian Ocean and beyond.
– Captain Khurana, how has India’s perception of the Indo-Pacific evolved over the past decade, particularly in response to China’s growing assertiveness?
The modern concept of the Indo-Pacific began to take shape around 2006. This was distinct from the earlier Indo-Pacific idea articulated by the German geopolitician Karl Haushofer. A German scholar who collaborated with me and later traveled to Japan found that Haushofer’s idea referred to something entirely different—essentially a geo-economic framework that nonetheless anticipated the rise of both India and China.
The version I developed was written in 2006–2007. However, Indian policymakers did not take much notice of it at the time. As is often the case in India, academic perspectives are not always taken into consideration.
Then, in August 2007, the Japanese Prime Minister referred to the Indo-Pacific in his address to the Indian Parliament. At the time, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh witnessed Japan’s forward-thinking vision of the Indo-Pacific as a maritime region and sought India’s cooperation in ensuring the security of sea lanes. That is how the present-day concept of the Indo-Pacific, as a security construct, came into being.
– When did this academic idea begin to shape India’s official maritime and strategic thinking?
Regarding the Indian government’s position, we did not give it much attention initially. Even during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, India had cooperated with Japan, the United States, Singapore, and Australia in disaster relief efforts, the Indo-Pacific concept was still largely overlooked. For us academics, however, it was an important idea because the existing Asia–Pacific framework did not adequately represent India’s role.
Importantly, the “Indo” in Indo-Pacific denotes the Indian Ocean, not India itself. But given India’s advantageous geographical position, it aligned naturally with our geostrategic outlook.
– Did China’s actions directly influence India’s eventual embrace of the Indo-Pacific concept?
As you rightly mentioned, China played a significant role in shaping India’s interest in this concept. India wanted to play a larger role in maritime Asia and ensure that its influence in the Indian Ocean was not displaced by China. Later, the term “Indo–Asia Pacific” began to be used, including by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Even then, India did not pay much attention to it. It was only after President Trump’s visit to Asia in November 2017, when he explicitly used the term “Indo-Pacific,” that the concept started to crystallize as a mega-region—a maritime region with strategic significance.
During the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi presented his Indo-Pacific Vision. His vision, however, differed from the U.S. perspective, which was more explicitly aimed at containing China. Given that China is our immediate neighbor, India has always been cautious in conceptualizing the Indo-Pacific, viewing it more as an inclusive regional construct and emphasizing that Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) must remain central to the region’s framework.
– Currently, what are the most pressing emerging maritime threats facing the Indo-Pacific?
In the context of the Indo-Pacific, we can identify both traditional and non-traditional maritime threats. Among the traditional threats, China stands out as the most significant. Since approximately 2010, China’s growing maritime assertiveness has increasingly destabilized regional dynamics.
This assertiveness has fueled several traditional security issues—for example, North Korea’s increased belligerence, which has been partly encouraged by China’s support.
– Beyond China, what other regional security dynamics are shaping the maritime environment?
We also see an ongoing naval arms race in the region, again linked to China’s ambitions. Building maritime power has become a top priority for Beijing, as it seeks to challenge and eventually displace the influence of both India and the United States in the Indo-Pacific.
In addition to these traditional threats, there are also non-traditional challenges such as piracy, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime. However, in my view, these are manageable issues that can be effectively addressed through regional cooperation, something we are actively pursuing through diplomatic engagement with our Indo-Pacific partners. That said, China’s threat has now extended into the “grey zone,” involving activities such as intelligence gathering and coercive tactics that blur the line between peace and conflict.
– How are technological innovations such as unmanned systems, drones, artificial intelligence, and cyber warfare reshaping naval strategy and operations?
You are absolutely right. Τhese emerging technologies are revolutionizing warfare, especially at sea, but not only at sea. As we saw in the Ukraine war, particularly in the Black Sea, these technologies have had an impact on land, air, and maritime domains.
– How are these technologies applied by China in grey-zone operations in the Indo-Pacific?
Specifically in the Indo-Pacific region, these technologies are being used by China in what I alluded to as grey zone operations. No country, including China, wants to go to full-scale war. Instead, China seeks to achieve strategic objectives below the threshold of open conflict, leveraging these technologies to expand its grey zone operations.
Take unmanned systems, for example, particularly in the underwater domain. Operating below the surface, they remain largely undetectable, offering both stealth and plausible deniability. We also saw in the Ukraine conflict the disruption of underwater gas pipelines and cables, which highlights the vulnerability of such infrastructure. These are issues that will be very important for the coming months and years, especially regarding China.
Artificial intelligence further enhances unmanned systems, enabling them to perform much more effectively. Cyber capabilities represent another significant advantage for China in grey zone operations because they are deniable. While there has been no major disruption yet, there may have been eavesdropping on cables leading to India or potential adversaries. In times of crisis, China could disrupt these cables through cyber means. Cyber operations can also disable warfighting systems without revealing the actor, maintaining deniability.
This combination of unmanned systems, AI, and cyber operations is currently one of the most pressing security concerns in the Indo-Pacific region. As we have seen in Ukraine, these technologies have implications that extend globally.
– Looking ahead, what strategic priorities should guide India’s maritime partnerships and naval diplomacy over the next decade?
As I alluded to earlier, an important strategic objective of India is to prevent China from displacing its influence in Asia, because there is competition. China talks about a multipolar world, but it does not talk about a multipolar Asia. In its actions, for example, regarding UN Security Council reform, it consistently stymies India’s efforts to play a greater role, including in the Global South.
– How has India translated this strategic vision into practical maritime initiatives?
With this strategic objective in mind, India has launched several national policy reorientations. Our geostrategic frontiers are expanding, reaching from the Western Pacific in the east to the Mediterranean. This includes India’s involvement with Greece in the Mediterranean.
India also has significant interests in the West, including its diaspora, people working in the Gulf, and energy security. To the east, the region is critically important because of China, ASEAN, and trade. The national policy initiative I mentioned was Look East, launched in the early 1990s with an economic focus on engaging ASEAN. After the Narendra Modi government came to power in 2014, this was upgraded to Act East, which incorporates a strategic and security dimension.
Now we have the Indo-Pacific vision, which dovetails not only with Act East but also with other policy initiatives like SAGAR. SAGAR is a Hindi word and an acronym meaning Security and Growth for All in the Region. It reflects India’s intent to partner with neighboring countries, especially in the Indian Ocean. SAGAR was launched in Mauritius in 2014, when India handed over a newly built patrol vessel to the Mauritius Coast Guard.
Building on SAGAR, India expanded the idea into MAHASAGAR, where MAHA stands for Mutual and Holistic. Through SAGAR, India aims to signal to its neighbors that it is their first security partner, preferred security partner, and first responder in any crisis—whether it involves non-traditional threats, humanitarian crises, or regional instability.
– Extending on India’s broader collective security, how would you characterize the evolution of the India–U.S. maritime partnership?
What we are trying to communicate to regional countries is that India is not like China. China, while increasingly present in the Indian Ocean, is not a natural regional power there in the traditional sense. Its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents an extractive model of engagement rather than a genuinely win-win framework. Many participating countries have realized that BRI projects often create dependency rather than sustainable growth.
In contrast, India offers a cooperative and inclusive model of engagement. Through our maritime and naval diplomacy—crucial components of our broader foreign policy—we seek to build partnerships based on mutual respect and shared prosperity.
In the aftermath of the Ukraine war, Russia, China, and North Korea have drawn closer, forming an emerging axis that has raised concerns in the United States and across Europe. With China now extending its influence into the European security landscape through its partnership with Russia, this presents India with a significant opportunity to deepen engagement with Western countries, including the European Union, and key states such as France and Germany.
– Speaking of the European Union, the Indian Navy recently conducted a maritime exercise in the Mediterranean Sea with Greece. What is the significance of this collaboration, and how can the two nations strengthen their relationship further? Also, Greece’s Defence Minister mentioned that a consortium involving Greece, United Kingdom, and India could play a role in the Eastern Mediterranean.
That is a very encouraging phenomenon. When we drafted the Indian Maritime Doctrine back in 2009—I was personally involved in that process—the Mediterranean was not considered an area of primary interest. At the time, our main focus was on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. However, the strategic environment has evolved, and the Mediterranean has now become a secondary but significant area of interest for India.
The recent strengthening of India–Greece cooperation has been driven, to a large extent, by the Türkiye–Pakistan nexus. Türkiye has been vocal in supporting Pakistan’s position on Kashmir and has even supplied military hardware and drones to Pakistan. This has naturally encouraged India to build stronger ties with Greece and Cyprus, supporting stability and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean.
But beyond this immediate trigger, it is important to emphasize that the India–Greece relationship is not opportunistic or transactional. Our geopolitical convergence has deep historical roots and is now being revitalized through modern strategic alignment.
– Could India, Greece, and the UK develop a deeper strategic consortium beyond exercises?
If the proposed consortium among Greece, the United Kingdom, and India materializes, it could become a highly promising initiative. India’s relations with the UK are already strong, reinforced recently by the signing of a Free Trade Agreement. Our collaboration in naval technologies, including electric propulsion systems, is also expanding rapidly. While these steps are significant, there is still ample scope to deepen cooperation beyond naval exercises.
– You mentioned the partnership between Türkiye and Pakistan, and that Türkiye has been very vocal in supporting Pakistan. Do you consider Türkiye a threat to India?
In the geopolitical sense—yes. It is not a direct threat, as its strategic focus remains primarily on the Mediterranean and its own maritime disputes. It is not a part of the clause, so it has plenty of threats at hand, including what is going on between Israel and Palestine, and Syria on its border. Then it has many other internal threats, like the Kurds. So, it is not that.
However, Türkiye is a key player due to its international standing and its geostrategic location as a bridge between Asia and Europe. The Montreux Convention, along with Türkiye’s control of the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits, underscores its strategic importance. With strong leadership under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Türkiye’s regional influence is significant, and India must take it seriously in its broader geopolitical considerations.
Even in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, there has been tension with Türkiye, as it has been supplying arms to Azerbaijan while India has provided support to Armenia. In this context, Greece shares a closer relationship with Armenia than with Azerbaijan, highlighting a point of strategic convergence between India, Greece, and Armenia.