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Michail Ignatiou analyzes Trump’s election, discussing its implications for Greek-American relations, Greece-Turkey dynamics, and the potential role of the Greek-American lobby in shaping U.S. foreign policy

Interviews | by
Athanasios Katsikidis
Athanasios Katsikidis
Michail Ignatiou sitting at a conference table, wearing a suit and speaking passionately. Other participants with laptops are visible in the background, in a professional meeting setting
Michail Ignatiou, founder of Hellas Journal and SKAI’s Washington correspondent, discusses Greek-American relations and Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics
Home » Michail Ignatiou: “The prospective Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, is a personal obstacle for Erdoğan”

Michail Ignatiou: “The prospective Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, is a personal obstacle for Erdoğan”

As President-elect Donald Trump prepared to take office on January 20, GeoTrends sought insights from Michail Ignatiou, founder of Hellas Journal and SKAI’s Washington correspondent. In his analysis of the evolving Athens-Washington relationship, Ignatiou suggested that Trump would likely continue strengthening ties between Greece and the United States, building on initiatives launched during his first term and further developed by his successor, Joe Biden.

Ignatiou noted that Trump’s administration exhibited “anti-Turkish” tendencies. However, the trajectory of U.S.-Turkey relations would ultimately depend on Trump’s personal approach and his assessment of Ankara’s leadership.

This outlook underscores a potentially dynamic period in Greek-American relations, with the continuation of strategic cooperation and new developments in the Eastern Mediterranean’s geopolitical landscape.

– What was the atmosphere within the Greek-American diaspora after the elections and Trump’s victory?

The atmosphere among the Greek-American diaspora following Trump’s victory was largely positive, as the majority appeared to have supported him. Social media polls conducted at the time showed that as much as 75% of first- and second-generation Greek Americans favored Trump, compared to 25% who leaned toward the Democrats. However, the voting patterns shifted among younger generations. The third and fourth generations, reflecting more contemporary trends, were more likely to support the Democratic Party. This generational divide highlights evolving political preferences within the Greek-American community.

– What was your initial impression of how Trump might handle the dynamics of the Greece-Turkey relationship? I mean, how does he view that dynamic?

If we consider the way he acted—or rather failed to act—during the 2020 crisis in Kastellorizo, it becomes evident that he has little interest in the region’s dynamics. In fact, he only made a phone call after considerable effort from various quarters, particularly his Greek-American friends, who, after reading reports in the American press that Greece was on the brink of war, reached out to him. It was then that he decided to call the two leaders.

However, his intervention was largely unhelpful, as he approached the issue with a “let’s get together” attitude, akin to negotiating a business deal. Moreover, he lacked any understanding of the historical context, the complexities of Greek-Turkish relations, and the significance of the Turkish fleet’s positioning in the region.

– Trump’s rhetoric has raised concerns in Athens about the potential absence of the United States from regional tensions. Do you believe the U.S. role in the Aegean will diminish?

I don’t think so. I believe the president-elect will be compelled to continue where the Democrats left off, particularly with regard to strategic agreements. Let’s not forget that Greece’s strategic alliance with the United States, including key developments such as the Alexandroupolis agreement, was forged during his presidency. Yes, Mike Pompeo was Secretary of State at the time, and he played a significant role, taking the initiative and contributing greatly—I don’t dispute that—but these achievements were still made during Trump’s administration.

While Mike Pompeo will not return as Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, who is expected to take on the role, is someone who has a deep understanding of Greece, Cyprus, and the dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The United States has already established agreements with the Republic of Cyprus, despite it not being a NATO member, and I believe Trump will build on these to further stabilize the region. Additionally, he will likely want to support his close friend, Benjamin Netanyahu, in Israel. We must remember that the friendship between Trump and Netanyahu is one that spans many years, dating back to their younger days in New York.

– What role is the Greek-American lobby likely to play in the early days of Trump’s administration? That is, are there “powerful” Greek key players on his staff?

Look, when we talk about the Greek-American lobby, it depends on what we mean. Unlike other communities, the Greek-American lobby lacks influential “rich” members. The wealthy in the community are not involved in lobbying to support Greece and Cyprus. Their primary focus is the Church—they direct all their resources there. As a result, they show little interest in national issues.

Even issues related to the Patriarchate, which the lobby classifies as national concerns, are handled by various groups and activists who are more broadly engaged with the Aegean, Cyprus, and Greece’s broader regional challenges.

So, what do we have? At the “table,” we have Marco Rubio, with whom the lobby enjoys an excellent relationship. Beyond that, there are some significant players in the new government who are strongly “anti-Turkish.” I believe the Greek-American lobby will capitalize on these relationships. And we are not talking about minor figures—these include the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Advisor.

– We also have Michael Rigas.

Michael Rigas is indeed a remarkable example of a Greek-American expatriate. He comes from a highly respected family with deep roots in Laconia. Known for his exceptional character and integrity, Rigas has earned a stellar reputation for his professionalism and dedication, reflecting the best qualities of the Greek-American community.

– So, do you expect significant changes in US-Turkey relations under the Trump administration, if of course, the anti-Turkey lobby prevails?

The anti-Turkey lobby certainly exists and has gained traction. Figures like Marco Rubio, who co-authored the East Med Act alongside Bob Menendez, have publicly supported initiatives involving Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, which later expanded to include Europe. This legislation became U.S. law thanks to their efforts. Rubio also maintains strong connections with the Greek-American lobby, while expats have built excellent relationships with key figures such as National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, dating back to his tenure as a congressman.

As for the prospective Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, his Senate confirmation is pending, but he is already perceived as a challenging figure for Turkey and a personal obstacle for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Hegseth’s stance, coupled with other administration officials, could complicate U.S.-Turkey relations.

However, the dynamic could shift depending on Trump’s personal approach. If he chooses to align closely with Erdoğan, whom he has previously admired as a “strong leader,” the influence of the anti-Turkey lobby may be tempered. Much will also depend on how the Kurdish issue evolves, which remains a significant point of contention in the region.

– Trump has repeatedly threatened to withdraw the U.S. from NATO. Are there reasonable fears that this threat will be carried out or is he just using it as a bargaining chip?

Trump’s statements on NATO suggest that his threats are more about leverage than an immediate intent to withdraw. He has made it clear that his concerns stem from member states not meeting their defense spending obligations. Recent reports indicate he may push for each member to allocate 5% of their GDP to defense—a figure that many countries, especially in the Eurozone, may find unattainable given current economic challenges, including Germany’s ongoing crisis.

While such demands could provide him with an excuse to exit NATO, it seems unlikely that Trump would follow through. His first term, marked by turbulence and perceived humiliations, appears to have instilled a sense of caution. Following his triumphant reelection, Trump is now more focused on cementing his legacy, and a dramatic NATO withdrawal would likely overshadow other achievements.

Trump’s interest in his historical reputation suggests he may adopt a more measured approach, leveraging his position to reshape NATO rather than dismantle it outright. His drive for posterity could temper his more impulsive instincts.

– In your experience, will Trump’s main enemy be Putin or Xi Jinping?

Without a doubt, Xi Jinping. Both Xi and Putin seem to harbor certain complexes about Trump, but from my perspective, Trump has managed to outmaneuver them. Unlike Biden, whom I perceive as a “soft” president despite accusations of initiating wars, Trump is not one for prolonged discussions or conventional diplomacy. While Biden may have reluctantly been involved in wars, Trump is seen as more direct, erratic, and determined to get his way—sometimes without listening to others.

When it comes to global leadership, few can match Trump, especially when he is in his combative “angry” mode. His relationship with China, despite public statements of friendship with Xi, is likely to remain contentious. He appears intent on asserting dominance over Beijing, regardless of personal rapport.

As for Putin, Trump may find fewer obstacles in their interactions. While tensions may persist, they are unlikely to reach the same level of rivalry as with Xi.