Lebanon’s battle over who controls the country’s weapons has entered a decisive new phase. President Joseph Aoun is pushing for the state’s exclusive control over arms, placing Hezbollah’s disarmament at the center of a confrontation that reaches far beyond Lebanon’s borders. On 4 August 2026, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem accused Aoun of becoming “biased and divisive” while denouncing Lebanon’s direct negotiations with Israel.
Speaking to GeoTrends on 10 September 2026, General Jamil el-Sayyed, a Baalbek–Hermel member of parliament and former Director General of Lebanon’s General Security, challenges the premise that Hezbollah’s weapons can be addressed in isolation. First elected in 2018 on a list bringing together Hezbollah, Amal and their allies, el-Sayyed describes himself as politically independent but not neutral and has openly aligned himself with what he calls the resistance, whose emergence he links to Israeli occupation and the Lebanese state’s failure to build a credible national defense capability. He argues that Israeli withdrawal must precede any resolution of Hezbollah’s arms. El-Sayyed also addresses the Israel–Türkiye rivalry in Syria and Greece’s military assistance to the Lebanese Army.
— General el-Sayyed, President Joseph Aoun has accused Hezbollah of starting the war and destroying Lebanon for the sake of Iran, while Hezbollah opposes full disarmament. What is the real balance of power today between the Lebanese Army and Hezbollah?
This is a question that may be difficult for people who do not fully understand our particular situation in Lebanon. So please allow me to give a brief background before answering it.
Hezbollah is a Lebanese Shiite resistance movement and the latest in a succession of resistance movements in South Lebanon, where the majority of the population belongs to the Shiite Muslim community.
Before Hezbollah, the Palestinian resistance of the PLO emerged from the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, where hundreds of thousands lived after being expelled from Palestine in 1948 following the establishment of the State of Israel by a UN resolution.
At the time, the PLO resistance succeeded in integrating many Lebanese allies and political parties, from the late 1960s until the early 1980s. The PLO was expelled from Lebanon after the Israeli invasion in 1982. The Lebanese Shiite Amal resistance, established by the religious leader Imam Moussa al-Sadr in 1975 and backed by Syria, subsequently assumed a prominent role, before the rise of the current Hezbollah resistance, backed by Syria and Iran, which emerged in 1983 as a reaction to the 1982 invasion and the continuing Israeli occupation of parts of the South since 1978.
— So, in your view, Hezbollah’s emergence cannot be separated from the history of Israeli occupation in South Lebanon. But where does the responsibility of the Lebanese state fit into this?
Unfortunately, throughout that period, while Israel was strengthening its army and continuously violating Lebanon’s internationally recognized borders in the South, successive Lebanese governments failed to do the same. To this day, they have neglected the army’s need for weapons and technology, relying mainly on their international relations with the UN and friendly countries to deter Israel, while openly declaring that “Lebanon’s strength lies in its weakness.”
So this succession of resistance movements was the consequence of two things: continuous Israeli occupations and aggressions on one side, and the absence of a genuine defensive role for the Lebanese state on the other.
This means that the resistance was the consequence of the occupation, and the weapons were the consequence of the resistance — not the other way around.
So, logically and fairly, solving such a situation should begin by eliminating the causes, not the consequences.
— If that is the sequence of cause and effect as you see it, how do you assess President Aoun’s push to disarm Hezbollah?
It is worth recalling that Aoun was commander of the Lebanese Army from 2017 and maintained close relations, cooperation, and coordination with Hezbollah until his election as president on January 9, 2025, when he was unable to win without the votes of Hezbollah’s 15 MPs in his favor.
So what happened later is that the newly elected president, contrary to his previous deliberate coordination with Hezbollah, seemed to have given certain regional and international powers, which had conditionally supported his election and accession to power, an undertaking to disarm Hezbollah.
In summary, we are not now at the stage of evaluating the balance of power between the Lebanese Army and the Hezbollah resistance. Rather, we are in the middle of a political confrontation over national priorities and principles, centered mainly on this question: irrespective of who is backing this Lebanese resistance, should it be disarmed first, or should the Israeli occupation withdraw first?
The answer here is quite obvious for those in power, if they are independent and free enough…
— You have argued that Hezbollah emerged primarily from local conditions. Iran, however, has repeatedly presented Hezbollah as part of a broader “Axis of Resistance.” How do you view that relationship?
As I said before, Hezbollah, or any other resistance in the world, is usually born of local causes, mainly due to foreign occupation or wars in which states’ armies are defeated or unable to fulfill their defensive role. In such cases, as in many examples throughout history, it is normal to see other states or powers come and back or arm a local resistance, whether for common interests, ideology, or other reasons.
The case of the successive resistances in South Lebanon is the same: with Iran today, with Syria, Libya, Egypt, or other countries in the past or in the future. From the recent past until today, regional complications and military confrontations have increased, from Saddam’s war against Iran to the first Gulf War, the invasion of Iraq, and the current wars in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran.
All of these crucial developments contributed to growing divisions and the formation of coalitions between countries, including the axes formed between states and resistance movements, as is the case with Iran and its allies, including the Hezbollah resistance, for the accumulated reasons explained above.
— Western governments describe Lebanon today as a front in the Iranian–Israeli conflict. Do you accept that description?
This description may appear true, but as I explained earlier, South Lebanon was already a front decades before the existence of the current regime in Iran, and it remains one today. Iran became the most recent in a series of countries that have backed successive resistance movements in Lebanon since the 1967 war.
So, in fact, Lebanon already had that front, calm or hot, under the supervision of UN observers following the Armistice Agreement of 1949.
On the other hand, the main reason for the conflict between Iran and the West in general, and with Israel in particular, is not the resistance. It is the nature of the religious regime in Iran, which they consider to be outside their control, given Iran’s huge resources of oil, gas, and other rare minerals, as well as Iran’s tendency to regain its regional influence as a country powerful both militarily and economically. This is enough reason to bring Israel and its Western allies to confront that rising power and to corner and weaken it as much as possible.
— Today, if Israel moves beyond the United Nations’ “Blue Line,” would Hezbollah have a legitimate argument for maintaining an independent military force?
First, speaking of a Blue Line is legally wrong, because what exists between Lebanon and Israel are internationally recognized borders, officially reconfirmed by all parties in 2000.
Second, if Israel withdraws fully behind that international border, this would automatically resolve all the other consequences and lead to the exercise of sovereignty by the Lebanese government, the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the South, and an easy solution to the question of the resistance, on the basis of no cause, no effect.
Until recently, the resistance filled the vacuum left by the state and compensated for the weakness of the Lebanese Army’s weapons and equipment. It had never been in conflict with the Lebanese Army, neither in the South nor elsewhere. Rather, there was permanent and stable coordination between them, including, as I said before, during Joseph Aoun’s time as Commander of the Lebanese Army.
— In the West, Hezbollah is often seen as a force seeking to replace Lebanon’s official and recognized government. If Hezbollah refuses to surrender its weapons, what happens next?
Hezbollah has been a powerful resistance force over the past three decades. As a political party, it has its own popularity and supporters from different communities, mainly the Shiites.
Since 1992, it has been represented in Parliament by a bloc of 15 elected MPs, with allies from all sects, and it has been represented by ministers in every government since 2005. So, if at the time of its full strength as a resistance it took part in political life and fully respected the rules and the equilibrium of the state, how could anyone accuse it now of intending or planning to take power by force?
As for surrendering its weapons as a resistance to the state, there are two opposing logics. One says that Israel should remain in occupation of the South until the Lebanese Army fights Hezbollah and disarms it. That means bringing Lebanon into a civil war for the sake of the Israelis.
The other says that Israel should withdraw first, and that dealing with the resistance’s weapons would then become the full responsibility of the Lebanese government. I think this second choice is the safest.
— Israeli–Turkish tensions have also been rising in the region, with Israel recently striking a Syrian military site over concerns about a possible Turkish military presence there. How do you assess the risk of a broader confrontation between Israel and Türkiye?
I do not believe there is a deep-seated Israeli-Turkish conflict likely to lead to a military confrontation. Apart from the fact that one is a NATO member and the other is aligned with the United States, both nations — despite the Gaza war and their heated rhetoric — continue to share numerous interests and maintain various forms of trade and relations.
Rather, I view the situation as a regional rivalry over influence and hegemony, particularly in the Arab world, in light of what has been circulating since the war on Iraq about the redrawing of the map of the Middle East. In this context, I see the primary rivalry between them as centered on Syria.
— How has that rivalry played out in Syria itself?
After the pro-Erdoğan regime of President al-Sharaa came to power in Damascus, Israel automatically deemed itself entitled to shift its line of contact with Türkiye from the Golan Heights to the south of Damascus by exploiting the Druze unrest in Suwayda.
Furthermore, Israel sought to signal to Türkiye that it would maintain air superiority over all of Syria. This was demonstrated by an Israeli airstrike on the military airport at Idlib that targeted Turkish military equipment.
This specific incident triggered a sharp reaction from Türkiye, prompting European and American interventions that resulted in an indirect settlement between Israel and Türkiye regarding Syria.
Under this arrangement, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was relieved of the threat posed by the Kurdish separatists along his border in northeastern Syria — forces that had long enjoyed support from Israel and the West — and these groups were compelled to disband their military organization, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and submit to the authority of the legitimate regime.
Consequently, Türkiye secured its border region all the way to Damascus, while Israel ensured its presence from the Golan Heights to the south of the Syrian capital until further developments.
— On 29 August, Greece delivered 13 M113 armored personnel carriers and 10 military trucks to the Lebanese Army, following an earlier shipment in January. What does this assistance mean from a Lebanese security perspective?
From a purely military perspective, I view this Greek aid — troop carriers and transport trucks — as a symbolic gesture from a friendly nation; the Lebanese Army already possesses sufficient quantities of such vehicles.
What it truly lacks is modern, effective weaponry and technology that would enable it to fulfill its primary mission of defending the country, particularly in the South and against terrorism.
Unfortunately, based on my experience as a commanding officer in the Army and its intelligence branch, and later as Director General of General Security, I have observed that friendly nations such as the U.S., France, and Britain refuse to equip the Army with such advanced weaponry because of an Israeli veto. Even when specific types of equipment are provided, conditions are often imposed prohibiting their deployment or use in the South.
— What, in your view, are the consequences of those restrictions for the Lebanese Army?
Consequently, most of the aid supplied is suitable only for internal security operations and counter-terrorism, rather than for actual defense against an external enemy. This creates a contradiction: these nations publicly advocate strengthening the Lebanese Army — expecting it to disarm the resistance by force — while simultaneously denying it the very weaponry capable of deterring Israel.
The fundamental problem lies in being empowered to suppress one’s own people yet barred from defending them effectively. Naturally, when a state fails or is unable to defend the homeland, the people often resort to self-defense and resistance, and other nations may step in to support such resistance movements. Is this not precisely what happened when Nazi Germany invaded its neighbors during World War II?