As tensions rise and strategic balances shift across the Asia-Pacific, China’s position on regional security is becoming increasingly explicit. “The only negotiation or discussion China would possibly have with the United States over the Taiwan question would be whether the U.S. would oppose Taiwan’s attempt at independence, and whether the U.S. would respect China’s legitimate sovereignty claim over Taiwan,” Dr. Wu Shicun asserts—a statement that underscores the centrality of the Taiwan issue in Sino–American relations.
At the same time, a comparative reading of China’s 2019 and 2025 white papers on national security and defense reveals a broader evolution in Beijing’s strategic outlook. China now views the Asia-Pacific environment as more complex and fragile than before.
To explore these developments, GeoTrends spoke with Dr. Wu Shicun, Chairman of the Huayang Center for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance and President Emeritus of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies. In this interview, Dr. Wu offers his insights on China’s regional strategy and the geopolitical implications of the shifting security landscape in the Asia–Pacific.
– Dr. Wu, China’s perception of the security landscape in the broader Asia–Pacific and in the South China Sea is evolving. From your perspective, what is China’s current strategic vision in the region?
“Injects Certainty and Stability into a World of Rising Turbulence”—this is also the title of the first chapter of China’s National Security in the New Era, a white paper released by China’s State Council Information Office in May 2025. This formulation reflects Beijing’s evolving perception of regional order and its role within it.
A comparative reading of the 2019 and 2025 white papers on national security and defense reveals a notable shift: China now views the Asia–Pacific security environment as increasingly complex and fragile. The expansion of military alliances, the emergence of “exclusive small blocs,” and the interference of external powers have collectively eroded regional peace and stability, further complicating long-standing territorial and maritime disputes.
In response, Beijing emphasizes a cooperative and shared-security approach. Rather than portraying itself as a solitary source of regional stability, China frames regional cooperation as the key to stability, seeking to strengthen partnerships with neighboring countries to jointly safeguard peace and promote development. This perspective underscores China’s recognition of the Asia–Pacific as a core pillar of global governance stability. Ultimately, China’s strategic vision is to project itself not through confrontation or isolation, but through constructive engagement and regional integration, thereby injecting reliability and predictability into an increasingly turbulent world.
– You have emphasized that China does not seek confrontation, yet in practice its maritime and security posture has become more assertive. How would you define the concept of modern “Chinese leadership” in contrast with the old one?
“Becoming more assertive”—is that true? Such a description often reflects an external perception framed by traditional security paradigms rather than China’s own strategic intent. From Beijing’s perspective, many of its actions, particularly in the maritime domain, are defensive and responsive rather than expansionist. China’s priority remains stability and the prevention of escalation, not confrontation.
Modern “Chinese leadership” follows a coordinative and developmental model, pursued through peaceful, cooperative, and institution-based means to achieve national rejuvenation. President Xi’s vision of building China into a maritime superpower underscores the ocean’s strategic role in economic growth, ecological civilization, national security, and global competition.
Unlike traditional power-projection leadership, the modern Chinese approach emphasizes:
A) peace and mutual benefit—advancing national interests through cooperation rather than confrontation;
B) balance and coordination—integrating domestic and international, land and sea, economic and security dimensions;
C) institutional leadership—shaping order through shared rules and multilateral frameworks;
D) civilizational inclusivity—promoting harmony and mutual learning under the vision of a community with a shared future for mankind.
In essence, China’s current leadership seeks strength through peace, influence through cooperation, and legitimacy through shared development.
– What role does China envision for itself within the regional security architecture of the Asia–Pacific?
A “builder” and “public goods provider.” The 2025 white paper China’s National Security in the New Era reaffirms Beijing’s commitment to contributing to regional stability through the provision of public goods—highlighting progress in improving infrastructure on certain South China Sea reefs and islands, as well as offering public services such as navigation safety, maritime search and rescue, and meteorological forecasting.
These efforts illustrate China’s dual objectives: first, to defend its maritime claims and resist external interference, and second, to assume greater regional responsibility by strengthening its capacity to deliver collective benefits.
More broadly, Beijing seeks to shape an inclusive and cooperative regional security framework based on the principle of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security. In this sense, China aspires to be a constructive contributor to regional order, injecting predictability and shared stability into a complex and contested environment.
– Indian analysts have argued that the ongoing naval arms buildup and China’s drive to expand its maritime power are linked to Beijing’s ambition to displace the influence of both India and the United States in the Indo-Pacific. How do you respond to these claims?
This assumption—that China’s naval buildup necessarily reflects an ambition to displace the influence of India and the United States in the Indo-Pacific—relies on a linear logic: that increased naval capacity automatically equates to revisionist intent. From Beijing’s perspective, China’s maritime development is primarily aimed at achieving “national rejuvenation through the seas,” emphasizing prosperity, cooperation, and stability rather than confrontation.
However, naval expansion is not unique to China. In recent years, the United States has actively sought to rebuild and internationalize its shipbuilding base through partnerships with key Asian allies, particularly South Korea and Japan. This reflects Washington’s recognition that maritime industrial capacity is a critical component of strategic competition and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Notable examples include:
A) “Make America Shipbuilding Great Again”: a $150 billion initiative led by South Korean shipbuilders to help rebuild the U.S. shipbuilding industry;
B) the Korea–United States Summit of October 29, 2025, which produced a $350 billion investment framework, allocating $200 billion in direct investments to the United States and $150 billion to a shipbuilding cooperation initiative—specifically funding the “Make America Shipbuilding Great Again” program;
C) the subsequent announcement by President Trump approving South Korea’s construction of a nuclear-powered submarine, expected to be built at Hanwha’s shipyard in Philadelphia.
These developments demonstrate that naval expansion is a regional phenomenon rather than a uniquely Chinese behavior. Therefore, while China’s naval modernization undeniably enhances its maritime presence, framing it purely as a strategy to replace India or the United States oversimplifies the reality. China’s approach combines capability building with institutional participation and cooperative security, seeking to shape—rather than dominate—the evolving regional order.
– One of the most pressing and sensitive issues between China and the United States remains Taiwan—a topic that appears to be intensifying. President Trump has stated that President Xi “would not dare to approach Taiwan.” Given that the United States has not formally ratified the “One China” policy, but has stated that it would protect it, do you believe the current trajectory could lead to a military confrontation in the near future?
A direct military confrontation between the United States and China remains unlikely, though it cannot be entirely ruled out.
Currently, the United States is taking a relatively cooling approach toward the Taiwan issue. During his second term as U.S. president, Donald Trump did not approve any arms sales or military aid packages to Taiwan. He has, in fact, suspended $400 million in military aid following a call with Chinese President Xi Jinping in September.
Taiwan remains a strategic card rather than an abandoned priority. Trump’s decision to cool U.S.–Taiwan relations does not mean that Taiwan is no longer important for the Trump administration. Such a conclusion would be premature, considering Trump’s earlier willingness to test the boundaries of the “One China” policy during his first term, including breaking protocol to accept a direct call from then-Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen.
In his recent meeting with President Xi Jinping, neither side raised the Taiwan issue during their trade negotiations. The fact that Trump did not use Taiwan as leverage to extract concessions from China over the recent trade dispute suggests that he may be retaining the Taiwan card as a potential bargaining instrument for future use.
– What factors could trigger a direct military confrontation between the U.S. and China over Taiwan?
The use of force remains contingent on Taiwan’s unilateral moves. Because of the sensitive nature of the Taiwan question, even President Donald Trump would likely refrain from recklessly involving the United States in a direct conflict with China over the island, instead approaching the matter cautiously.
The most likely scenario for U.S.–China military entanglement would be if Taiwan’s leadership decided to declare formal independence. In such a case, China would almost certainly seek immediate unification, potentially through the use of force. Should the United States decide to send troops to “protect” Taiwan—which remains highly unlikely—then open military confrontation between the United States and China could occur.
– Can an open confrontation between China and the United States over Taiwan still be avoided? If so, what should the main negotiating points be?
Avoiding confrontation requires that the United States understand and respect China’s core national interests and refrain from encouraging Taiwan’s politicians to push for formal independence. An open confrontation over the Taiwan issue can indeed be avoided, but only if the United States recognizes and respects China’s core national interests.
– What actions from Taiwan could trigger a direct Chinese response?
For China, the most probable trigger for the use of force would be a formal declaration of independence by Taiwan’s leadership. If the United States wishes to prevent a direct military confrontation with China over Taiwan, it should oppose any unilateral attempt by Taiwan to seek formal independence, as this would be the most likely cause of an open conflict between the two countries.
There is very limited room for negotiation between China and the United States on the Taiwan question. From Beijing’s perspective, Taiwan’s sovereignty is not a matter for debate or negotiation—it is a matter of internal affairs. The only discussion China would possibly have with the United States regarding Taiwan is whether the U.S. would oppose Taiwan’s attempt at independence and whether it would respect China’s legitimate sovereignty claim over the island.
– As technological advances continue to reshape maritime power and the regional strategic balance, how can technology be leveraged to contribute to peace rather than competition?
Functional cooperation among regional and non-regional states utilizing technological advancements is essential for building mutual trust in the region.
Technology itself neither advances peace nor fuels rivalry—it depends entirely on how it is applied. When it comes to maritime technology cooperation, there are many areas where China and other regional and non-regional countries can collaborate to make the South China Sea and East China Sea safer, more peaceful, and more prosperous.
– What practical steps can regional states take to ensure technology fosters cooperation rather than competition?
Regional and non-regional states should work together to direct rapidly developing technological advancements away from fueling security competition and strategic distrust, and toward shared goals. These include collaborative efforts to improve technologies for maritime rescue operations, joint research to better monitor and protect the marine environment, and enhancement of maritime navigation and communication systems.
Cooperation in improving port infrastructure and shipping technologies for trade facilitation, as well as joint development of more effective marine disaster early-warning systems, would further ensure that technological development becomes a bridge for countries to expand areas of common interest, build mutual trust and confidence, and reduce the risk of misperceptions and miscalculations—ultimately keeping the South China Sea stable, cooperative, and peaceful.
It serves as a constant reminder that there is far more to the China–ASEAN relationship than the rising tensions over territorial disputes in the South China Sea. East Asian states do not have to forgo cooperation and mutual development in pursuit of short-term geopolitical competition.