On February 27, Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), made an unexpected appeal. In a letter read aloud by political allies in Istanbul, he urged the PKK to disarm and dissolve itself. Two days later, the PKK declared a ceasefire. Given the group’s decades-long armed struggle against the Turkish state, this should have been a seismic moment. Yet, the world barely blinked.
Why? Because seasoned observers of Turkish politics have seen similar grand gestures before—only for them to unravel when their political utility expires. Erdoğan, no stranger to political opportunism, appears to be playing yet another high-stakes game. His renewed engagement with Kurdish factions is not an act of reconciliation but a strategic recalibration. The Kurdish issue remains one of Turkey’s deepest political fault lines, and Erdoğan’s sudden pivot suggests less of a peace process and more of a power play.
An old script, revised for 2025
This is not Erdoğan’s first attempt at addressing the Kurdish issue. His previous “Kurdish Openings” in 2009, 2011, and 2013-15 all followed a similar script: extend an olive branch, engage in negotiations, then retreat when circumstances change. Those initiatives collapsed due to political disagreements, shifting alliances, and Erdoğan’s growing authoritarianism.
This latest development follows the same transactional logic. The Turkish president’s political fortunes have been waning. In the 2024 local elections, opposition candidates secured key mayoral victories, largely due to the tacit support of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (Partiya Wekhevî û Demokrasiya Gelan, DEM). By re-engaging with the Kurdish movement, Erdoğan aims to fracture the opposition, co-opt Kurdish political forces, and potentially secure constitutional reforms that would extend his grip on power.
A ceasefire, but not a solution
The PKK’s ceasefire is a remarkable moment, but it is not synonymous with peace. Öcalan’s call for disarmament came with conditions. He emphasized that the process required “the recognition of democratic politics and a legal framework.” In other words, disarmament is contingent upon tangible political guarantees for Kurdish rights.
That’s where things get complicated. Erdoğan’s ultra-nationalist allies in the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) remain deeply skeptical of any reconciliation with Kurdish groups. Even Devlet Bahçeli, the MHP leader who in October 2024 floated the idea of Öcalan’s release in exchange for a ceasefire, is unlikely to champion Kurdish autonomy in any form. Erdoğan, ever the political tactician, will only make concessions if they serve his broader interests.
Regional chess moves
The Kurdish issue is not merely a domestic affair. It has deep regional reverberations. Turkey has conducted military operations in Syria and Iraq to suppress Kurdish groups, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its affiliated militias. Ankara perceives these groups as extensions of the PKK, despite their distinct political and military structures.
The SDF, led by Mazloum Abdi, has cautiously welcomed Öcalan’s call but insists that it does not apply to its own forces. Abdi’s stance underscores a key tension: Türkiye wants not just the PKK but all Kurdish military factions to disband. Erdoğan has already warned that if the process stalls or if groups attempt to “change names” rather than dissolve, Türkiye will resume operations against them. The presence of Turkish-backed militias in northern Syria ensures that the conflict remains far from over.
Meanwhile, Erdoğan has strengthened ties with Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This pragmatic engagement highlights a key contradiction: while Ankara fights Kurdish factions in Syria and Türkiye, it simultaneously collaborates with Kurdish leaders in Iraq. If Erdoğan’s shift on the Kurdish issue is to have any meaningful impact, it must reconcile these competing strategies.
Erdoğan’s endgame: Power, not peace
What, then, is Erdoğan’s true objective? The answer likely lies in constitutional reform. With 57 parliamentary seats, DEM holds significant leverage in any potential amendment process. If Erdoğan can secure Kurdish political support for changes that extend his presidency beyond current term limits, he will have achieved his primary goal.
The signs are already there. Türkiye’s government has hinted at modifying the constitutional definition of citizenship to make it more inclusive—a symbolic but politically potent move. Such a gesture might be enough to bring Kurdish political actors to the table while ensuring that Erdoğan retains ultimate control over the process.
However, history suggests caution. When Kurdish political forces no longer serve his interests, Erdoğan has a track record of abandoning them. The same could happen here. Kurdish politicians and civil society organizations may find themselves sidelined once their political utility expires.
History repeats itself
Despite the flurry of diplomatic activity, a genuine resolution to the Kurdish issue remains elusive. The AKP-MHP coalition continues to suppress Kurdish political representation, imprisoning elected officials and replacing mayors with state appointees. Turkish-backed militias continue their campaigns in Syria, and Erdoğan’s rhetoric leaves little room for Kurdish autonomy.
For now, the Kurdish question remains one of Türkiye’s most volatile political issues. Erdoğan’s shift is not a sign of reconciliation but of strategic maneuvering. The coming months may bring new dialogue, but whether it leads to lasting peace or another cycle of repression depends entirely on Erdoğan’s political calculus. Given his history, the latter seems far more likely.