In a recent piece published by The Irish Times, Alexander Davey from the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) in Berlin detailed what he describes as China’s “discreet, highly impactful influence activities” targeting Irish citizens and institutions. The article emerged from the broader “China Targets” investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), involving 42 media partners worldwide. While Davey’s analysis provides valuable insights into Beijing’s soft power tactics, understanding both the content and context of these claims requires a more nuanced perspective.
The machinery of Chinese influence in Ireland
Davey’s analysis centers on three key Chinese organizations operating in Ireland. At the core stands the United Front Work Department (UFWD), which he identifies as “a key institution involved in building relationships with individuals and organisations outside the party.” According to the article, the UFWD seeks to foster connections with overseas Chinese communities and encourage support for Beijing’s positions through cultural outreach, forums, and community events.
The International Liaison Department (ILD), positioned directly under the highest organs of the Communist Party of China (CPC), has reportedly engaged with Irish politicians, including Fianna Fáil TD Cork East James O’Connor. The ILD’s focus on party-to-party diplomacy represents what Davey characterizes as an effort to cultivate ties with foreign political actors and indirectly influence academia, civil society, and policymaking.
Perhaps most intriguing is the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), which presents itself as a non-governmental organization while operating under China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In June 2024, CPAFFC representatives met with multiple Irish politicians, including Fianna Fáil TDs James O’Connor and Pádraig O’Sullivan, along with Senator Erin McGreehan. These politicians later traveled to China, meeting with CPAFFC vice-president Yuan Mindao and ILD officials.
The article details how these interactions blur the lines between party and state diplomacy, as well as between state and non-state actors. Rather than coercion, Davey notes that Chinese influence typically relies on incentives—offering events, training, and media engagement that can result in foreign individuals or institutions “unknowingly advancing CPC interests.”
China-Ireland relations: Opportunities in trade and investment
China and Ireland have developed an important trade and investment relationship over the last few decades, becoming major trade partners for a range of crucial commodities. As China-Ireland relations continue to strengthen, new opportunities arise for Irish businesses seeking to gain a foothold in the Chinese market, particularly in sectors such as technology, healthcare, and agriculture while fostering deeper economic cooperation.
On February 17, 2025, Tánaiste Simon Harris welcomed Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Dublin, reaffirming Ireland’s commitment to a strong and mutually beneficial relationship with China. During their discussions, Harris emphasized the importance of maintaining economic ties based on transparency, fairness, and shared interests within the global multilateral trading system. This visit followed a trip by Chinese Premier Li Qiang to Ireland in early 2024, which further reinforced the strategic partnership between the two nations and highlighted new avenues for collaboration.
Over the years, China has become one of Ireland’s most significant EU trading partners, with economic exchanges continuing to expand across multiple sectors. Irish exports, particularly in technology and pharmaceuticals, have gained strong traction in the Chinese market, while Chinese investment in Ireland has also grown, strengthening financial and business connections.
With China’s evolving market landscape and ongoing economic reforms, Irish businesses have a unique opportunity to expand their presence. Sectors such as pharmaceuticals, food and agriculture, and technology present promising growth prospects.
Why Ireland? Possible explanations
China’s focus on Ireland is not incidental. While Ireland may seem small in size and population, several strategic advantages make it an appealing partner for Beijing. First, Ireland’s longstanding military neutrality sets it apart from other EU states more firmly aligned with NATO. This neutrality can make Ireland a more comfortable environment for Chinese diplomatic overtures, allowing for warmer bilateral exchanges with less political friction.
Second, Ireland maintains a rare trade surplus with China, giving it a vested interest in sustaining smooth trade relations. This trade dynamic incentivizes pragmatism in diplomatic engagement and makes Ireland an outlier within the EU, many of whose member states face trade deficits and more tense relations with Beijing.
Ireland also presents a low-risk platform for high-level Chinese visits within Europe. With minimal recent controversies and a moderate political climate, it provides an opportunity for Chinese officials to conduct European diplomacy without the heightened scrutiny they may face in larger capitals like Berlin or Paris. This same perception may also extend to Beijing’s broader strategy of influence, with Ireland serving as a comparatively low-friction environment to establish soft power relationships that might be more heavily scrutinized elsewhere.
Historical context of United Front work
Understanding the UFWD requires appreciating its historical significance in Chinese politics. The concept originated in the Soviet Union but became fundamental to CPC ideology when Mao Zedong described the United Front as one of the party’s three “magic weapons” alongside armed struggle and party building.
Under Xi Jinping, United Front work has gained renewed importance, incorporated directly into his ruling ideology. A top-level group headed by Wang Huning—one of China’s most senior leaders and the party’s chief ideologue—directs these efforts. Since its 1949 establishment, the UFWD has developed branches at all governmental levels, with specific bureaus targeting overseas Chinese communities to cultivate loyalty to the People’s Republic.
Domestically, the UFWD targets non-party groups, including religious communities and ethnic minorities, to bring them into the CPC’s sphere of influence. Internationally, it builds networks that aim to shape how China is perceived abroad and influence local policy environments.
MERICS and the framing of Chinese influence
To properly assess Davey’s analysis, one must consider its source. The Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) ranks among Europe’s most prominent think tanks focusing on China. Founded in 2013 and based in Berlin, MERICS has established itself as a leading voice on Chinese affairs in Europe—known for its detailed research but also for its generally critical stance toward Beijing’s policies.
In 2021, MERICS found itself directly in Beijing’s crosshairs when China sanctioned the institute alongside several European parliamentarians and scholars in response to EU sanctions over Xinjiang. This background provides essential context for understanding the lens through which MERICS and its analysts view Chinese activities in Europe.
While MERICS produces valuable research, its framing of Chinese influence operations often emphasizes threat narratives that align with growing European wariness of Beijing. This institutional positioning inevitably shapes how its analysts interpret Chinese engagement with European actors.
A critical reading of Davey’s analysis
Examining Davey’s article reveals several patterns typical of Western analysis of Chinese influence operations. The language consistently frames Chinese activities in terms suggesting deception—organizations “present themselves as independent” while “operating beneath the radar.”
This framing creates an impression of insidious influence rather than acknowledging that many described activities resemble standard public diplomacy practiced by numerous countries, including Western nations. Cultural exchanges, academic partnerships, and relationship-building with foreign politicians constitute normal diplomatic practice, though the article presents them as uniquely problematic when conducted by Chinese entities.
The selective focus on specific interactions with Irish politicians provides limited context about the broader relationship between Ireland and China. Missing is any comparative analysis of how these interactions differ from similar engagements by other major powers like the United States, whose diplomatic foundations include extensive soft power instruments targeting foreign populations and elites.
The article’s emphasis on the UFWD’s goal of ensuring “loyalty to the party trumps dissent” among overseas Chinese communities also requires careful consideration. While Beijing certainly seeks to influence diaspora communities, such claims risk depicting ethnic Chinese individuals as potential agents of foreign influence—a problematic framing that can feed into harmful stereotypes.
The emerging trajectory of Europe’s China debate
Davey’s analysis offers valuable insights into one aspect of Europe’s evolving relationship with China. The specific focus on Irish politicians’ engagement with Chinese officials signals a likely direction in upcoming European discussions about Chinese influence.
The emphasis on “pulling back the cloak of neutrality” from Chinese organizations suggests we may see increased calls for transparency requirements targeting Chinese-affiliated entities operating in Europe. This mirrors developments in other Western democracies, particularly Australia and the United States, which have implemented foreign influence registration requirements partly in response to concerns about Chinese activities.
The detailed focus on subnational diplomacy—meetings with local politicians rather than national leaders—also indicates growing attention to how China builds relationships at multiple governmental levels, potentially bypassing national oversight mechanisms.
European institutional responses
European institutions have already begun developing frameworks to address foreign interference, with the European Democracy Action Plan and the proposed Anti-Coercion Instrument reflecting growing concerns about external influence in European affairs. Davey’s analysis suggests these efforts may increasingly focus on seemingly benign cultural and political exchange mechanisms.
The ICIJ’s broader “China Targets” investigation, of which Davey’s analysis forms a part, represents a coordinated journalistic effort to document Chinese influence activities across multiple countries. This coordination itself reflects the increasing prioritization of Chinese influence operations as a matter of public concern in European media and policy circles.
While maintaining vigilance regarding foreign influence is essential for democratic societies, the challenge lies in distinguishing legitimate public diplomacy from genuine interference activities. As Europe recalibrates its relationship with China amid growing geopolitical tensions, analyses like Davey’s will increasingly shape public perceptions—making a critical, contextual reading all the more necessary.
Ultimately, the value in examining Chinese influence activities in Ireland lies not in treating them as uniquely threatening but in understanding them as part of Beijing’s broader engagement strategy with Europe—a strategy that merits neither alarmism nor complacency, but rather careful, measured analysis within the complex reality of modern international relations.