In a move that raises eyebrows from Beijing to New Delhi, the Philippines has extended an informal invitation to India and South Korea to join its newly formed Squad alliance. Originally composed of the U.S., Australia, Japan, and the Philippines, this grouping aims to counter China’s territorial assertiveness in the South China Sea. Manila’s top military official, General Romeo S. Brawner, announced the proposition during the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi, making headlines across the Indo-Pacific.
Brawner was candid about the Philippines’ motivations. “Together with Japan and our partners, we are trying to expand the Squad to include India and probably South Korea,” he stated, emphasizing the need for stronger military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and joint operations. This is Manila’s latest attempt to shore up deterrence capabilities in response to what it describes as China’s “illegal, coercive, and disruptive Grey Zone” tactics in the region.
China’s reaction: More than just a raised eyebrow
Predictably, Beijing is unimpressed. The Chinese government has long viewed multilateral security groupings in the Indo-Pacific as thinly veiled containment strategies. Ding Duo, Director at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, dismissed Brawner’s remarks as a reflection of Manila’s anxiety rather than strategic foresight. “By courting external powers, the Philippines attempts to embolden itself for provoking China,” he said, warning that Manila risks escalating tensions rather than resolving them.
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi went a step further, calling the Philippines’ actions a “shadow play” orchestrated by external actors. He cautioned that “infringement and provocation will backfire” and those serving as “others’ chess pieces” would eventually be discarded. If that was meant as a subtle warning, it wasn’t particularly subtle.
India’s cautious approach
The Philippines’ overture to India is intriguing but not without complications. While New Delhi has had its share of border tensions with Beijing, it has so far resisted entanglement in any formal security framework explicitly aimed at countering China. India’s maritime doctrine prioritizes the security of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and while it has strong defense partnerships with Quad nations (the U.S., Japan, and Australia), joining a new Indo-Pacific security bloc could disrupt its carefully maintained strategic balance.
As one Indian official reportedly put it, “Though we share concerns over Chinese aggression, we also value strategic autonomy. Every security partnership we enter into is calibrated.” The absence of an official response from India’s Ministry of Defence or Ministry of External Affairs suggests that New Delhi is weighing its options before making any commitments.
South Korea’s dilemma: Security vs. economics
For South Korea, the decision is even more delicate. With its attention divided between the North Korean threat and its deep economic ties with China, Seoul has little incentive to openly antagonize Beijing by joining an informal security grouping. South Korea is already part of the U.S.-led security architecture in Northeast Asia, but it has historically shied away from broader regional security commitments in the Indo-Pacific.
Ding Duo argues that Seoul is unlikely to embrace the Squad due to its economic interdependence with China. With Beijing accounting for nearly 25% of South Korea’s exports, joining a military grouping that China sees as antagonistic would carry economic risks.
Strength in numbers or strategic overstretch?
The alliance is still in its infancy, and expanding it presents logistical and strategic challenges. While Manila sees enlargement as a necessary step to enhance deterrence against China, bringing in India and South Korea would require balancing different threat perceptions, strategic priorities, and diplomatic constraints.
For the U.S., which is deeply invested in strengthening Indo-Pacific security, Manila’s proposal might seem appealing at first glance. However, Washington also recognizes the need for cohesion within security groupings. Expanding the Squad without clear commitments from prospective members could weaken its effectiveness rather than enhance it.
Australia and Japan, both key players in the Indo-Pacific security landscape, have remained publicly neutral on the matter. Their willingness to incorporate India and South Korea would likely depend on how the proposal aligns with their broader security strategies.
Will India and South Korea take the leap?
Manila’s initiative to expand the Squad reflects both its growing security concerns and its willingness to seek broader strategic partnerships. However, whether India and South Korea will buy into this vision remains uncertain. Both countries have their own calculations to make, balancing national security with broader diplomatic and economic interests.
For now, the alliance remains a four-member club. Whether it grows into a larger framework or remains a Manila-led experiment in security networking depends not only on the willingness of India and South Korea to join but also on whether the existing members see expansion as a strategic advantage rather than a liability.
As the Indo-Pacific continues to be a theater of great power competition, the Philippines has placed its bet. Now, all eyes are on New Delhi and Seoul to see if they will call.